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The traditional American rule of employment at w i l l proceeds
from the assumption that employment is a consensual rel ation.
Therefore, absent an employment

contract of specified length,

employees may be fired or may quit their jobs at any time for any
reason or no reason, without legal liability on either side.

This rule

and its concomitant rejection of any general cause of action for
wrongful discharge serve important social objectives, s uch as the
maintenance of a free and efficient flow of human resources and the
avoidance

of

frictional

expense

when

unproductive or disloyal employee.

an

employer

fires

an

However, the legal rights

conferred by the at-will rule

are also subject to abuse, particularly by
employers. 1 Louisiana employees have been coerced to do acts that

I.
The argument made in this article-that general principles of good faith and
adherence to promises should govern employment contracts-applies to both sets of parties
to such contracts. Such principles should apply to both at-will employees who quit their
jobs and employers who fire their at-will employees. However, while the logic cuts in both
directions, this article will focus only on employers' abuses of the at-will doctrine. The
reasons for this limited focus are twofold.
First, while the legal relations between employers and employees may be symmetrical,
in the real world, power relations usually are not. Of course, employees with rare skills or
expertise may have the economic clout to secure fixed-term employment contracts for
themselves or protect themselves through unionization or some other way. I n any event, the
substantial cost to an employer of hiring and training a similarly skilled replacement usually
creates an effective economic disincentive against bad faith termination. However, many
employees do not have such skills, and most workers who lack irreplaceable skills come
As Louisiana courts have occasionally
within the ambit of employment at will.

acknowledged, most at-will employees depend o n their jobs far more than their employers
depend on them; thus, at-will employees are more likely to suffer from the abusive use of the
rights conferred by that doctrine. See, e.g., Moore v. McDermott, Inc., 494 So. 2d 1159,
1161(La.1986)(quoting Wiley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d 1016 , 1019(La. Ct. App.
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are illegal or against public policy.2 Louisiana employers have relied
on the rule to avoid legal obligations, for example, by discharging a n
employee shortly before pension o r other benefits vest,3 or by
3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 431 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1983)). Consequently, use (and abuse) of
the at-will doctrine by employers may be fairly said to pose the more exigent legal issues.
Second, the jurisprudence seems to indicate that employees are far more likely to feel
that they have been victimized by their employers' exercise of the right to terminate their
relation at will, than are employers to feel harmed by
depart.

an

e mployee's exercise of his right to

Except in the context of covenants not to compete or similar claims of unfair

competition, cases involving employer complaints about an employee voluntarily leaving
ei:iiployment are far too few to provide much grist for the critical mill.
Nonetheless, in an a ppropriate case, one in which an employee's decision to resign
might impose hardships o n a n employer similar to those normally imposed on terminated
employees, the logic of the arguments proposed here would apply with equal force.

The

principles set forth in this article certainly apply and bind the employee as surely as they
bind the employer.
2.

See, e.g., Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706, 707-08 (La. Ct. App. 4th

Cir.) (finding cause of action for wrongful discharge where employee was fired because he
refused to participate in illegal acts), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La. 1982).
The rigidity of the current Louisiana version of employment at will has also been relied
on by at least one court to w e aken the antidiscrimination protections that would otherwise
be available to employees in Louisiana. See Bradley v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 559 So. 2 d 46,
47-48 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (distinguishing between federal and Louisiana laws against
gender discrimination in the workplace), writ denied, 566 So. 2d 397 (La. 1990). The issue
arises in the context of so-called "mixed motive" cases, where some evidence exists both to
show that the challenged employer action was motivated by discriminatory reasons and also
to show that it was motivated by legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. at 48. Even as
restrictively interpreted in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989 ), federal law
provided that an employee who made a prima facie case that she was discriminated against
because of her race or sex would prevail unless the defendant showed that the same result
would have occurred anyway, based on nondiscriminatory reasons alone. Id. at 246. In

Bradley, the court held that Louisiana's statute prohibiting e mployment discrimination, LA.
R.S. 23: 1006, should be read in conjunction with article 2747, and therefore interpreted
differently than federal law.

559 So. 2d at 47-48.

Because article 2747 requires no

statement of reasons for termination, the court interpreted the state antidiscrimination statute
as not requiring defendants i n mixed-motive cases to prove that the same result would have
been reached regardless of discrimination.
3.

See, e.g., Walther v. National Tea, 848 F.2d 518, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding

that firing an at-will employee in order to prevent the vesting of pension benefits did not
constitute an "abuse of rights" under Louisiana law); Hill v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 8 F. Supp.
80, 81 (W.D. La. 1933) (holding that a claim that an employer discharged an employee to
avoid paying pension benefits stated no cause of action, despite employer's promise to
employ worker "until such time as he retired on a full pension").

Cf Williams v. Touro

Infirmary, 578 So. 2d 1006, IOIO (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (holding that at-will
employees who alleged that their employer fired them to avoid paying accrued retirement
benefits did not state a cause of action, but noting that claims of employer's bad motive
might suffice to disprove possible "qualified immunity" defense to employees' related
slander claim).
Note, however, that this particular problem-employers terminating employees to
avoid paying retirement benefits-has been rendered largely moot by federal ERISA
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retaliating against employees or their families when employees assert
legally protected r ights and privileges.4

Bec ause of the breadth of

the at-will doctrine in Louisiana, workers who have relied on what
appeared to be commitments by the employer that the employee
would be employed "permanently" or "for life,"5 that the employee
would be fired only for cause,6 that certain procedures would be
legislation, 29 U.S.C. § § 1001-1371(Supp. 1995). See, e.g., F rost v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 635 So. 2d 706, 709 (La. Ct. App. !st Cir.), writ denied, 640 So. 2d 1353 (La. 1994).
4.

See, e.g., Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv., Inc., 501 F.2d I 04 (5th Cir.

1974) (finding no cause of action under state law for at-will employee who was fired in
retaliation for exercising legal right to file complaint to the Wage and Hour Division of the

United States Department of Labor); Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat Serv., Inc., 634 So. 2d
1324, 1328(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994)(finding no cause of action when employer retaliated
against employee who filed seaman's claim by firing the injured worker's brother); Woodson
v. Alarm Protection Servs., Inc., 531 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.) (finding no
cause of action

when

worker

was fired

because

her

husband

received

workers'

compensation benefits), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 358 (La. 1988); Ballaron v. Equitable
Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481, 483(La. Ct. App. 4 t h Cir. 1988)(holding employer had not
committed an abuse of rights when it fired employees who took an employer-mandated lie
detector test, but refused to sign a consent form waiving all legal rights against t h e company

administering those tests).
5.

See, e.g., Hill, 8 F. Supp. at 80(finding no cause of action for employee who was

fired despite written contract promising lifetime e mployment, even though contract was
entered into in return for employee's release of a pre-existing liability claim against
employer); Pechon v. National Serv., Inc., 100 So. 2d 213, 218 (La. 1958) (finding
employee had no cause of action despite giving up a "high and responsible" position with
the F.B.I. in the expectation that he would be employed for life); Page v. New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc., 167 So. 99, 100 (La. 1936) (holding that employee who gave up a lucrative
position in California and traveled to Louisiana in order to assist employer during a strike in
reliance on a promise of "lifetime employment" had no cause of action when h e was fired
without cause); Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas, 139 So. 760, 761 (La. 1932) (finding no cause

of action for employee fired in apparent violation of contract stating that contract of
employment was to continue as a long as defendant company was operating); Baynard v.
The Guardian Life Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (La. Ct. App. !st Cir. 1981) ( stating that
"even if [plaintiff's employment] contract were expressly for life, it could still be terminated
at any time by Guardian, as a matter of law."); Griffith

v.

Sollay Found. Drilling, Inc., 373

So. 2d 979, 982(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1979)(holding employee who moved from Atlanta in
reliance on promise of "permanent" employment had no cause of action); Sirrunons v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 3 l l So. 2d 28, 31 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1975) (holding that
employer's promise not to fire employee without good cause was not enforceable and was

binding only if supported by "special consideration" ). The Hill case was noted and
criticized in Note, Recent Jurisprudence, 9 TuL. L. REV. 444 (1935) [hereinafter Recent

Jurisprudence].
6.

See, e.g., Senac v. L. M. Berry Co., 299 So. 2d 433, 434 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.

1974) (finding no cause of action for employee who alleged she was induced to leave
another job in reliance on employer's promise that she would not be fired except for cause).
Cf Morgan v. Avondale Shipyards, 376 So. 2d 516, 517 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1979)
(holding statement in "Employees Guide" that employee would be fired inunediately for
certain offenses did not constitute any promise not to fire for other offenses).

1995]

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

1517

followed before dismissal,7 or that the employee would receive
certain benefits8 or future rewards,9 have all found their reliance t o
b e misplaced.

In recent decades, the principle of at-will termination has been
significantly eroded

by

numerous federal statutes that prohibit

discrimination against private employees because of their membership
in certain protected groups, '0 or prohibit retaliation against employees

7.
See, e.g., Gilbert v. Tulane Univ., 909 F.2d 124, 1 26 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
employee does not have a contractual right to enforce the grievance procedures specifically
set forth in the Tulane employee handbook); Mix v. University of New Orleans, 609 So. 2 d
958, 960-61 (La. 1993 ) (holding that employer's failure t o follow its own published
grievance procedures raised no cause of action for tenninated employee); Marson v.
Northwestern State Univ., 607 So. 2d 1 093, 1096 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (announcing
virtually per se rule that procedures set out in employee handbook are not binding on the
employer); Keller v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 597 So. 2d 1113, 1115-17 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 992) (holding graded levels of discipline set out in employer's "personnel
manual" do not constitute an enforceable contract); Thebner v. Xerox Corp., 480 So. 2d
454, 457 (La. Ct. App. 3 d Cir. 1985) (concluding that statements in employer's personnel
policy manual did not constitute part of the contract between the parties, and violation of
those policies by employer gave rise to no claim for damages), writ denied, 484 So. 2d 139
(La. 1986); Terrebonne v. Louisiana Ass'n of Educators, 444 So. 2d 206, 210 (La. Ct. App.
I st Cir. 1983) (holding employer not bound by letter, sent to employee before hiring and on
which employee allegedly relied, which contained statement that no employee would be
fired without a "due process" hearing), writ denied, 445 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1984); Williams v.
Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637, 638 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 982) (conclud in g at-will
employee stated no cause of action where she alleged that she was fired wi1hout receiving
the three prior warnings required by the employer's personnel policy).
8.
See, e.g. , Wall v. Tulane Univ., 499 So. 2d 3 75, 376 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 500 So. 2d 427 (La. 1987). In Wall, an employee sued to enforce tuition waiver
benefits described in Tulane's "Staff Handbook." The court held that because the emp lo yee
was at will, Tulane was free to tenninate his employment or modify Ihc benefits of that
employment at any time. Id. at 376.
9.
See, e.g. , O'Neal v. Chris Steak House, Inc., 525 So. 2d 325 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 1988). In O'Nea/, an at-will employee hired according to a contract which provided
that he would be given stock in the business at a future date, was fired before that date. Id.
at 326. The court held that since the plaintiff was employed without a specific term. he
could be fired at will. Id. at 3 28. The court further concluded that the obligation to transfer
the stock was subject to a suspensive condition, which firing made impossible, and was thus
void. Id.; see also Dunbar v. Williams, 554 So. 2d 56, (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (noting
that while "some states protect minority shareholders in closely held corporations from
tennination without cause," Louisiana does not); Copeland v. Gordon Jewelry Corp .. 288
So. 2d 404. 407-09 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (finding no cause of action for employee who was
fired. apparently without cause, twenty-one days before accrual of stock option rights). writ
denied, 290 So. 2d 911 (La. 1974).
I 0.
See, e.g.. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000h.
(West I 988 & Supp. V 1995 ) (prohibiting, inter alia. tennination because of an employee ·s
race, color, religion, national origin or gender); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1 988) (prohibiting discrimination against employees
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who engage in certain protected activities.11
p iecemeal approach, even

as

However,

such a

supplemented by various states, is

incapable of comprehensively addressing the basic issues of workplace
faimess.12

For these reasons, courts in most states have begun to

because they are over forty years of age); The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1 2 1 01 (West 1988 & Supp. IV 1995) (prohibiting discrimination against otherwise

qu alified employees because of their disabilities); The Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1 986, 8 U.S.C. § l 324b(a) (West 1988 & Supp. IV 1995) (prohibiting discrimination
a gainst legal aliens because of that individual's alien status).

11.
See, e.g. , The Federal Jury System Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (West
1 988) (outlawing discharge of employees because of service on federal juries); The National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (West 1 988) (outlawing, among other things,
discharge of employees because of their union activity); The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (West 1 988) (outlawing discharge of employees because they instituted
or testified in proceedings brought under the Act); The Employee Retirement Income

Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (West 1988 & Supp. IV 1995) (outlawing, among

other things, discharge of employees for exercising any right granted by that Act); The
Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2002(3) (West 1988) (outlawing, inter
alia, discharge of employees because they refuse to take or fail a lie detector test); The
Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (West 1 988) (outlawing discharge of
employees who exercise or assert rights granted by that statute).
12.

The

underlying

policy

arguments

for

and

against

substantial

judicial

modification of the traditional rule of employment a t will continues to be the subject of
debate among scholars. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common-law of E mployment

Termination, 66 N.C. L. REv. 63 1 ( 1988) (advocating substantial modification of the rule);
see also Lawrence E. Blades, Employmellt At Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 14 35 (1967) (same);
Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the
Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 ( 1 994) (defending the rule); Note,

Protecting At-will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1 8 1 6, 1824 ( 1 980) (suggesting substantial modifications to
the rule). Analysis of these competing arguments is beyond the scope of this article. For
present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that few, if any, commentators would argue
that particular abusive uses of the rights granted by the at-will doctrine are in themselves
social goods.
Assuming this is so, the second question is whether the judiciary should exercise an
independent role in policing abuses of the at-will rule, or whether that task should instead be
left to the legislature. W hile the legislature's role is important-indeed, primary-that does
not mean that judges have no useful role to play. Cases show that legislatures c a n seldom
fully anticipate, or express in general laws, all circumstances in which the right to terminate
employment can be exercised in an abusive fashion. For example, the Louisiana legislature
enacted LA. R. S. 23: 1 36 1 in order to prohibit employers from retaliating against employees
who file workers' compensation claims.

However, the legislature did not anticipate that

employers might attempt to circumvent the law and intimidate compensation claimants by
threatening the jobs of the claimants' relatives or spouses. Yet such abuses have taken place.

See, e.g., Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat Serv., Inc., 634 So. 2d 1 324, 1325 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 1994); Woodson

v.

Alarm Protection Serv., Inc., 531 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. Ct. App.

5th Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 358 (La. 1988).

It seems apparent that the only way to

1 995]
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the at-will doctrine, seeking legal principles tha t would

preserve its general utility while limiting the potential for abuse.
Typically, these courts have recognized

one or more proposed

exceptions to the doctrine of employ ment at will, exceptions rooted
variously in concepts of public policy,13 contract,14 or tort.15

prevent abuses in the myriad of novel circumstances that arise in the workplace is to pennit
judges to apply general principles, such as the duty of good faith, on a case-by-case basis.
13.

This "public policy" exception to the at-will rule sounds in tort. It was first

recognized by the California appellate courts in Petennann v. Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 2 7

(Cal. Ct.

App. 1959), in which the employer fired a n employee because h e refused t o

c ommit perjury on behalf of h i s employer. Subsequent cases found terminations violativ e o f
p ublic policy in a wide variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Tameny v . Atlantic Richfield Co.,
610 P.2d 1330, 1331 (Cal. 1980) (employee refused to participate in employer's conspiracy
to violate antitrust statutes); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 426 (Ind.
1973) (employee fired because he exercised a statutory right by filing a workers
c o mpensation claim); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Co., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987)
(employee refused to violate Clean Air Act by pumping leaded gasoline into a car requiring
unleaded gasoline); Monge

v.

Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (married

employee refused employer's sexual advances); Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225,
227-28 (S.D. 1988) (employee fired for refusing to participate in supervisor's scheme to
steal from the company). For a thorough review of the development and present contours of
this exception, see Wll.LIAM J. HOl.LOWAY, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION:
REMEDIES 133-98 (2d ed. 1993).

McCULLOCH,

RIGHTS AND

For a comprehensive listing of cases, see KEN NETH J.

TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 1 40.021 (1994); Michael A. DiSabatin o ,

Annotation, Modern Status o f Rule That Employer May Discharge At-Will Employee for
Any Reason, 12 A.L.R. 4th 544, 555-58 (1982 & Supp. 1994)
14.

There are two types of contract-based exceptions.

The first group are those

based on a finding that tennination violated a representation made by the employer-that
the employee could retain her job "pennanently," that she would not be fired without some
legitimate reason, that certain procedural steps would precede termination, or the like.
Enforceable promises of this sort have been found embodied in a wide variety of written
sources, including but not limited to, handbooks and other similar policy statements
distributed by employers to employees. See, e.g., Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 724
P.2d 110, 115-16 (Haw. 1986) (holding employer breached contract by failing to follow
procedures set forth in employee handbook before firing at-will employee); Woolley v.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J.) (same as Kinoshita), modified, 499
A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Lukoski v. Sandia Indian Management Co., 748 P.2d 507, 509

(N.M.

1988) (same); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987) (enforcing
employer's statements that, if employee performed adequately, he would be kept on "until
retirement" or "as long as economically possible"). Oral communications containing similar
representations have also been found to constitute enforceable promises. See, e.g Foley v.
..

Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401-02 (Cal. 1988) (upholding trial court finding that
discharge violated oral promise that employee would not be fired without good cause); Shah
v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Ky. 1983) (same); Kestenbaum
v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280, 288-89 (N.M.) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 ( 1989).
The second type of contract-based exception is rooted in the "implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing" that is traditionally read into all contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONT RACTS§ 205 (1981). Courts in several states have relied on such an implied covenant
to provide recovery to employees fired solely in order to prevent them from obtaining earned
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Louisiana has followed the national trend toward modification of
the at-will doctrine only to a limited degree. To be sure, Louisiana has
enacted several specific constitutional and statutory exceptions to
employment at will, including civil service protection for certain
public employees, 16 antidiscrimination provisions broadly paralleling
federal law,17 laws that prohibit retaliation against employees who
exercise certain legal rights,18 and statutes which prohibit firings based

benefits, or where the firing otherwise violates public policy. See, e.g., Reed v. Municipality
of

Anchorage,

782

P.2d

1155,

1159 (Alaska

1989) (holding that

the

firing

of

"whistleblower" who reported workplace safety violations violated the implied covenant);
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N .E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1971) (holding
discharge of an at-will salesman solely to avoid paying earned bonuses violated implied
covenant).
For analysis of both types of contract-based claims, see generally HOLLOWAY, supra
note 13, at 3-77, 95-104. The cases are collected at McCULLOCH, supra note 13,

'll

40.011;

and DiSabatino, supra note 13, §§ 6-14, at 560-81. The cases which specifically relate to
the enforceability of statements made in employee handbooks and the like are collected in
Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Right to Discharge Allegedly "At-Will" Employee as Affected by
Employer's Promulgation of Employment Policies as to Discharge, 33 A.LR. 4th 120
(1984 & Supp. 1994).
15.

Courts in some states have recognized that the circumstances in which an at-will

employee is fired may give rise to a claim in tort. Where those circumstances have been
sufficiently egregious, courts have allowed plaintiffs to assert claims based on a number of
tort theories, including intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. See, e.g.,
King v. Brooks, 788 P.2d 707, 711 (Alaska 1990) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Colo. 1988) (defamation);
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (Mass. 1976) (same); Cagle

v.

Bums

& Roe, Inc., 726 P.2d 434, 437 (Wash. 1986) (same); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Minn. 1986) (same). For

an

analysis of

both types of tort-based claims, see generally HOLLOWAY, supra note 13, at 230-41, 244-75.
C ases are collected in McCULLOCH, supra note 13, 'I! 40.031.
16.

See LA. CONST. art. x.

17.

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT ANN. §§ 23:971, 23:1006, 46:2251, 51:2231(West 1985

& Supp. 1995) (prohibiting discrimination because of an em ployee's race, color, national
origin, religion, gender, age, or handicap). But see Bradley v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 559 So.
2d 46, 47-48 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (relying on Louisiana's rigid doctrine of employment at
will to distinguish between federal and state antidiscrimination laws), writ denied, 566 So.
2d 397(La. 1990).
18.

See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:964 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting

employers from discharging employees who give testimony in investigations by the state
Department of Labor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN

.

§ 23:1361 (West 1985 & Supp.

1995)

(prohibiting discrimination against employees because they filed claims for workers'
compensation benefits);

LA. REV. STAT. ANN . § 23:1691 (West 1985 & S u p p. 1995)

( prohibiting discrimination against employees because they filed claims for unemployment
compensation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN . § 30:2027 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting
retaliation against an employee who "[d]iscloses or threatens to disclose, to a s u pervisor or
public body" employer actions believed to be in violation of environmental law; or who
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eclectic list of employee characteristi cs or activities.19 Louisiana

courts have occasionally assisted employees who were fired in

an

abusive way, either by broadly interpreting certain statutory exceptions

"[p]rovides infonnation to, or testifies before any public body conducting

an

investigation,

hearing or inquiry into" environmental violations).
Louisiana courts have granted remedies to at-will employees discharged in violation of
some of these statutory prohibitions. See, e.g., Ducote v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 471 So. 2d
704, 707 (La. 1985); Moss v. Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc., 617 So. 2d 959,
961 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (broadly construing LA. R.S. 23: 1361 to apply to employee who
filed claim under federal L ongshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act), writ denied,
620 So. 2d 845 (La.), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 469 (1993); Bartlett v. Reese, 569 So. 2d
195, 202 (La. Ct. App. !st C ir. 1990) (upholding claim of employee fired in retaliation for
reporting what he perceived t o be an environmental violation), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 22
(La. 1991); Guye v. International Paper Co., 488 So. 2d 1108 , 1109-11(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1986) (upholding trial court finding that employee was fired in violation of LA. R.S.
23:1361); Wiley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d 10 16, 1018-20 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1982) (tracing the social history leading to the enactment of LA. R.S. § 23: 1361 and
awarding damages to federal employee who was fired in retaliation for having filed claim
under the Federal Employer Liability Act). However, some of these statutes have been
interpreted more narrowly. See, e.g., Fontenot v. Manpower, Educ. & Training, Inc., 594
So. 2d 998, 1000 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (narrowly interpreting LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23: 1691 to impose only criminal liability on employers who discriminate against
employees who assert rights to social security, and holding the employee does not have a
civil cause of action for damages).
19.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:731 (West 1985) (limiting an employer's
right to terminate an employee whose wages have been garnished); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:961-62 (West 1985) (prohibiting discrimination against employees because of their
political opinions or activities); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:963 (West 1985) (prohibiting
employers from retaliating against employees who refuse to deal with particular vendors);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23 :965 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting employers from
discharging employees called to serve on juries); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:966 (West 1985
& Supp. 1995) (limiting the right of employers to discharge or otherwise discriminate
against employees who smoke tobacco); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:981-87 (West 1992)
(prohibiting employers from discharging employees who refuse to join unions); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN.§ 23:1001(West 1985) (prohibiting discrimination against employees who have

the sick.le cell trait); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.31 (West 1992) (prohibiting
discrimination against medical personnel who refuse to participate in abortions).
Louisiana courts have at least occasionally proved willing to broadly enforce these
statutes, awarding damages to employees fired in violation of their tenns. See, e.g., Davis v.
Louisiana Computing Corp., 394 So. 2d 678, 679-80 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (awarding
d amages for violation of LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23:961), writ denied, 400 So. 2d 668 (La.
1981). But see Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481, 483 (La. Ct. App. 4th
C ir. 1988) (narrowly interpreting LA. R.S. 23:963 as applying only where employers coerce
"employees to purchase goods or services from persons or companies designated by the

employer."). Note also that the result in Davis may have turned on the particular language
of§ 961, which specifically provides that nothing within the statute precludes an employee
_
from maintaining an action for damages. Statutes without such language may be interpreted
differently.
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to the at-will doctrine20 or by finding causes of action against parties
other than employers when employees are wrongfully discharged.21
However, these statutes and decisions together cover only a small
portion of employee dismissals.
In Louisiana, the majority of employee dismissals not covered by

these piecemeal statutes and narrow decisions are instead covered by
an

expansive

interpretation

of

employers'

rights

over

at-will

20. See, e.g., Cheramie v. J. Wayne Plaisance, Inc., 595 So. 2d 619, 622 (La. 1992)
(broadly construing a prior version of LA. R.S. 30:2027, which protected an employee from
retaliation when that employee "reports or complains" of possible environmental violations;
court gave a cause of action to an employee who was fired because he refused to perform
certain work which he thought would harm a protected nesting site for brown pelicans);
Wiley, 430 So. 2d at 1021 (broadly construing LA. R.S. 23:1361 to protect from discharge a
railroad employee who had brought a claim against his employer under the Federal
Employer Liability Act).
21. See, e.g., Neel v. Citrus Lands of Louisiana, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 1993) (holding at-will employee of mineral lessee who lost his job when lessor
barred him from the land stated a claim against the lessor for intentional interference with
contractual relations); Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d 915, 917 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that an at-will employee had a cause of action against a drug testing laboratory
which negligently tested a sample from that employee, causing that employee to lose his
job); Elliott v. Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 588 So. 2d I 75, I 76 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1991)
(same), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (La. 1992); Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 588 So. 2d
167, 170 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (same), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 411 (La. 1992).
However, this generosity has not been consistent. Because of the absolute nature of the
at-will doctrine in Louisiana, other courts have held that at-will employees have no legally
protected interest in retaining their jobs, and thus no claim against third parties who cause
the loss of those jobs. See, e.g., Durand v. McGaw, 635 So. 2d 409, 412-13 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir.) (holding at-will employee fired in response to complaints had no cause of action
against third party for either intentional or negligent interference with contractual relations),
writ denied, 640 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1994); Herbert v. Placid Refining Co., 564 So. 2d 371,
373-74 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (finding at-will employee who lost job as a result of a
negligently performed and erroneous drug test has no cause of action against drug testing lab
for negligence or negligent interference with contractual rights); Ballaron, 521 So. 2d 484
(finding that discharged employee stated no claim against polygrapher, despite polygrapher's
violation of regulatory statutes).
Louisiana courts have also indicated-at least in principle-a willingness to follow
their common-law counterparts by recognizing the theoretical possibility that an employee
without a fixed term of employment may not be fired without cause if he or she has given
the employer "special consideration" (going beyond mere performance of the job) in return
for the employer's promise not to fire that employee. However, courts have seldom actually
found such special consideration in fact. See, e.g., Smith v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 163 So.
2d 124, 126 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (indicating that release of a workers' compensation
claim for personal injuries sustained on the job would constitute sufficient "special
consideration" to support an employer's agreement to hire an employee "for life," but that
such a contract was void as against public policy under then-Civil Code article I 67, which
limited employment contracts to a maximum of five years); see also Hill v. Missouri Pac.
Ry., 8 F. Supp. 80, 81 (W.D. La. 1933).
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employ ees. To date, all attempts to persuade Louisiana courts to adopt
a ny of the increasingly common jurisprudential exceptions have failed.
T hus, Louisiana remains one of the dwindling minority of states that
continues to refuse to recognize any cause of action for wrongful
discharge or any nonstatutory exception to the doctrine of employment
22
at will, no matter how e gr egious the circumstances.
The rea son most often articulated by Louisiana courts for their
refusal to modify the expansive interpretation of employ ers' rights has
been what the courts have seen as the entrenchment of the concept i n
t h e Louisiana Civil Code, particularly in Civil Code article 2747, a nd

22.

Louisiana courts are quite clear about the absolute nature of the version of

employment at will in effect. See, e.g., Mix v. University of New Orleans, 609 So. 2d 958,
964 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 992) (stating that "[t]he reasons for termination need not be
accurate, fair or reasonable," and further, that "[t]he question of why Mix was terminated is
i rrelevant and consequently raises no genuine issue of material fact"); Gil v. Metal Serv.
Corp . , 4 1 2 So. 2d 706, 708 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (recognizing that many states have held
that an employee has a cause of action if tenninated for refusal to perfonn an illegal act, but
nevertheless holding that Louisiana law provides no equivalent protection), writ denied, 4 1 4
S o . 2 d 379 (La. 1982).
Those same Louisiana courts have also, on occasion, denied that Louisiana Jaw is
d i fferent from the law of its sister states with respect to employment at will. See, e.g. , Mix,
609 So. 2d at 961 n. J (referring to "several excellent, well-reasoned cases from around the
country" in order "to refute the contention that Louisiana policy is somehow aberrational or
anachronistic"). If by this the courts mean that other states have retained some concept of
employment at will as a basic rule of employment relations, they are absolutely correct. If,
h owever, they mean that other states have continued to i nterpret and apply that doctrine in
the same absolutist style as Louisiana, they are clearly wrong.

Most other states have

adopted one or more judicial exceptions to the strict rule of employment at will.

See

g en erally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 524 ( I 994) (discussing the history
of the at-will rule). Rothstein has stated the following:
During [the 1 970s and 1 980s] three major 'exceptions' to the at-will doctrine
emerged:

( I ) breach

of an express or implied promise, including representations

made in employee handbooks; (2) wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy; and (3) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Almost every state accepts at least one of these causes of action.
Id. ; see also HOl.LOWAY, supra note 1 3 , at 135 n. 1 35 (listing forty-one states and the District
of Columbia as having recognized a nonstatutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge in
violation of public policy, and noting that Louisiana was one of only five states that had, as
of 1 993, still refused to do so); DiSabatino, supra note 1 3 , §§ 3 [a) & 4[a) (listing fourteen
states that have implied a c o ntract-based cause of action when termination of an at-will
employee violates public policy, and twenty-seven states that have implied a tort-based
cause of action in such circumstances); Kruk, supra note 1 4, § 4[a) (listing thirty-four states
that have found representations made in employee handbooks regarding the grounds o r
procedures fo r dismissal t o be enforceable).
A thorough state-by-state analysis of what exceptions have been recognized in
particular jurisdictions can be found at 9A Indiv. Emp. R. Man. 505 (BNA) (1 994).
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the courts' professed unwillingness to deviate from that Code.23 But
this reliance on the Civil Code to justi fy an absolutist approach to
employment at will is not without irony.

One of the most basic

principles of the Civil Code is the o verarching principle of good
faith. 24 The absolutist view of employment at will-as a unique
exception to ordinary rules governing obligations under the Code, an
exception that would permit an employer to fire an at-wi l l employee
for any reason not specifically proscribed by statute, no matter how
unfair or abusive-is neither required by the language of the Louisiana
Civil Code nor c ompatible with its overall spirit.

On the contrary,

careful review of the historical record reveals that the broad reading of
employers' rights now prevalent in Louisiana was not developed from
any codal source, but rather erroneously interpolated from common
law sources.

That late and unnecessary interpolation should be

discarded in favor of an analysis of employment contracts that is more
compatible with the Civil Code's treatment of all other forms of
commercial obligations.
It may well be that the Louisiana Civil Code articles deal ing with
employment should be comprehensively revised and expanded, so that
the Code conforms with the reality of employment relations today.
But it is the thesis of this article that until such a revision occurs,
Louisiana courts can and should i nterpret employment contracts
according to the same principles that govern all other commercial

23.

Louisiana Civil Code article 2747 provides the following:
ARTICLE 2747. A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his

person or family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The servant is also
free to depart without assigning any cause.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1994). The cases citing Civil Code article 2747 as the
locus of Louisiana's rigid doctrine of employment at will are literally too numerous to l ist .
A representative sampling could include: Thorne v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 542 So. 2d 490,
491 ( La. 1 9 8 9)(tracing origin of article 2747); Moore v. McDermott, Inc., 494 So. 2d 1159
(La. 1 9 8 6); Keller v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 597 So. 2d 111 3 , 1115 ( La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 992); Martin v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp., 5 8 8 So. 2d 1329, 1 33 2 ( La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 130 2(La. 1992); Hammond v. Medical Arts Group,
Inc ., 574 So. 2d 521, 525 ( La . Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 99 1 ); Bradley v. Latter & B lum, Inc., 5 59
So. 2d 46, 47-4 8 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) writ denied, 566 So. 2d 397 ( La. 1990 ) ; Herbert,
56 4 So. 2d at 373; Wise v. Dufresne, 537 So. 2d 86 0 , 86 2 ( La. Ct. App. 5 t h Cir. 1 9 8 9);
Ja�kson v. E.B .R. Parish Sch. Bd., 393 So. 2d 243, 245 (La. Ct. App. ) st Cir. 1 9 8 0) (citing
article 2747 as "the source of' the principle that employees without fixed-term contracts
cannot maintain a claim for wrongful discharge, nor collect back wages on the basis of such
a claim).
24 . See infra notes 233-240 and accompanying text .
,

1 995]

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

1 525

obligations, and further, that if the courts were to do so, they could
retain the legitimate benefits of the general rule of employment at will
while preventing its most egregious abuses. The Louisiana Civil Code
recognizes important distinctions between contracts for a fixed term
and contracts not for a fixed term. 25 Thus, one cannot, consistent with
the Code, require "good cause" terminations of employees who do not
have fixed-term

contracts.

However,

properly interpreted,

Louisiana Civil Code requires the parties to

all

the

contracts, including

employment contracts of indefinite term, to perform their obligations
in good faith.
Part I of this article sets the stage by tracing the development of
the principle of employment at will in Louisiana. Part II focuses on
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1 67, 2746, and especially 2747-the
texts that have been cited by courts and litigants to justify their
treatment of employment for an indefinite term as an exception to the
general rules governing obligations under the Code.

Part II also

demonstrates that those articles should not be i nterpreted in a broad
manner. Part III then argues that at-will employment contracts should
be constrained by the same obligations of good faith that the Louisiana
Civil Code imposes on all other contracting parties.
One final note seems appropriate at the outset. It could be argued
that even if the doctrin e of employment at will in general, and article
2747 in particular, have been wrongly interpreted, the error has
become so rooted in Louisiana law that it should now be changed only
by legislation.

The argument is not without force.

Nonetheless, it

should not preclude reinterpretation, if such reinterpretation proves
justified. While the general concept of employment at will certainly i s
deeply embedded i n the Code,26 that general concept i s not under
attack here. By contrast, the misreading of article 2747 and the
subsequent absolutist interpretation of employer's rights under the
doctrine of employment at will-which
article-are
25 .

both

of

much

more

are

recent

under attack in this
vintage

and

dubious

See infra note 220 and accompanying text.

26.

See, e.g. , Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor Tenninal Dist., 602 So. 2d 704,
7 07-08 n. J (La. 1992) (tracing the origin of related article 2749 back to the French Projet du
Gouvemement of 1800, Book III, Title XIII, article 114); Thome, 542 So. 2d at 491 (tracing
the origins of the general rule of employment at will back to the Louisiana Digest of 1808
and Pothier, among others); Brannan v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 5 26 So. 2d I I O I , I103 (La. 1988)
(citing the "consistent line of jurisprudence" supporting the general concept of employment
at will in Louisiana). See generally infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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provenance. In any event, civilian legal theory teaches that the law is
found in the written Code itself rather than in the jurisprudence
interpreting that Code.27 And certainly the Louisiana Supreme Court
has acted to correct other errors of interpretation in the Civil Code that
crept into Louis i ana jurisprudence through mistaken

reliance on

common-law principles.28 The same action is required here.

PROLOGUE: EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES,

l.

AND 1HE LoillSIANA

CNIL

CODES
The Loui s i ana Civil Code traditionally dealt w ith the relations
of employers and employees in two p l ac es . Before repeal, Title VI
of Book I of the Code dealt with the personal relations of masters

and various types of "servants" in a manner similar to that in which
other Titles of that Book treated the personal relations o f hus b ands
and wives or of parents and children.29

Chapter 3 of Title IX of

Book ill of the Code, on the other h and, deals with the contractual

27.

As the Louisiana Supreme Court has said: "In a jurisdiction such as Louisiana

which applies civilian theories of legal method, prior judicial decisions do not represent law:
They are merely judicial interpretations. They should therefore be overruled when not in
accord with what is now detennined to be the legislative intent." Holland v. Buckley, 305
So. 2d 1 1 3, 1 1 9-20 (La. 1 974) (overruling a long line of inconsistent Louisiana cases
interpreting article 232 1 , and looking instead to the original French sources of that article to
detennine its true, originally intended, meaning).
This basic principle is established in the very first article of the Louisiana Civil Code,
which provides that "[t]he sources of law are legislation and custom," not jurisprudence.

LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. l (West 1993). Revision comment (b) to article l makes explicit
the superiority of written law, including the Code i tself, to any interpretive case law:
According to civilian doctrine, legislation and custom are authoritative or
primary sources of law. They are contrasted with persuasive or secondary sources
of law, such as jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional usages, and equity, that may
guide the court in reaching a decision in the absence of legislation and custom.

LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 1 cmt. b (citing A.N. YIANNOPOUL.OS, LoUISIANA CNIL LAW SYSTEM

§§ 3 1 , 32 ( 1 977)).
28.

See, e.g., 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228, 234 (La. 1 989)

(reversing Louisiana's long-standing rejection o f claims for intentional interference with
contractual relations

as

both outmoded and based on faulty, common-law influenced

mi sinterpretation of the Civil Code);

Holland, 305

So. 2d at 1 14 (overruling "as erroneous

certain decisions which have crept in, based on the common law of England, that an owner
of a domestic animal is not liable for injuries caused by the animal unless the victim proves
that the owner knew or should have known of the animal's harm-causing characteristic and
nevertheless negligently let it do harm").

29.

These articles are rooted in a paradigm that views some types of servants as

members of the master's extended household. See
text.

infra

notes 198-21 4 and accompanying
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relations of those same masters and servants, generally conceiving
the c ontractual relation as a type of "lease."30
After the abolition of slavery,31 B o ok

I of the Louisiana Civil

Code recognized only a single class of servants, "free servants,"
c omprehensively defined as all persons "who let, hire or engage their
services to another in this State, to be employed therein at any w ork,
c ommerce or occupation whatever . . . . "32

Article

those "free servants" into three subclasses :

164 subdivided

(I) "those who only hire

out their services by the day, week, or year, in consideration of certain
wages," who were c onsidered to have only "leased" their services to
their

employer;

(2) indentured or "bound" servants who were

considered to have "sold" their services for a period of time; a n d

(3) apprentices, who were also legally b ound to serve fo r a fixed
period of time.33 The remaining articles of this chapter dealt with the

30.

Of course, the Code also touches on employer-employee relations in other places
Thus, for example, articles 3 1 9 1 and 3252 establish a general
privilege in favor of certai n servants claiming back wages, and article 3494(1) establishes a
prescriptive period of three years for such wage claims. See infra notes 1 85-197, 2 1 5-2 1 9
for specific purposes.

and accompanying text. However, the basic rules were and are set by the articles discussed
in the text.

31.

Prior to the abolition of slavery, the Louisiana Civil Codes recognized two

classes of servants: "free servants" and "slaves." 1 808 DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS OF THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS art. 1 , at 36 (de Ia Vergne ed. 1 968) [hereinafter LA. DIGEST OF

1 808]; LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 1 55 ( 1 825). The Digest and the 1 825 Code also contained a
separate chapter of this Title, detailing the rights and duties of masters and slaves.

LA.

DIGEST OF 1 808, supra arts. 1 5-27, at 38-40; LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 172-196 ( 1 825).

32.

Louisiana Civil Code article 1 63 provided t h e following:
Free servants are in general all free person s who let, hire or engage their

services to another in this State, to be employed therein at any work, commerce o r
occupation whatever for the benefit o f him who h a s contracted with them, fo r a
certain price or retribution, or upon certain conditions.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 63 (West 1972). The article was derived, without substantial
change, from equivalent provisions of the 1 808 Digest and the Code of 1 825.

See LA.

DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 , art. 2, at 36; LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 156 ( 1 825).

33.

Louisiana Civil Code article 164 provided the following:
There are three kinds of free servants in this State, to wit:
I.

Those who hire out their services by the day, week, month or year, in

consideration of certain wages; the rules which fix the extent and limits of those
contracts are established by the title: OfLetting and Hiring.

2.

Those

who

engage to serve for

a

fixed time for a certain

consideration, and who are therefore, considered not as having hired out, but

as

having sold their services.

3.

Apprentices, that is, those who engage to serve any one in order to

learn some art, trade or profession.
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rights and duties of bound servants-that is, indentured servants and
apprentices34-and with the effects of the master-servant relationship
LA. CIV. CODE ANN.

art. 1 64

(West 1 972). This article was derived from equivalents in the

Civil Code of 1 825 and the 1 808 Digest. LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 1 57 ( 1 825); LA. DIGEST OF

1 808, supra note 3 1 , arts. 3, 4, at 36.
34. The pertinent Louisiana Civil Code articles provided the following:
ARTICLE 1 65.

The regulations, manner and mode according to which persons

may be bound to serve, either

as

apprentices or otherwise are prescribed by

special laws.
ARTICLE 1 66.

The time of the engagement of minors, if there be no stipulation

that it shall terminate sooner, shall expire for males, when they attain the age of
eighteen years, and females, when they attain the age of fifteen.
ARTICLE 167.

Persons who have attained the age of majority cannot bind

themselves for a longer term than ten years.
ARTICLE 1 68 .

Engagements of service contracted in a foreign country for a

longer term, shall be reduced to ten years, to count from the day of the arrival of
the person bound in this State.
ARTICLE 1 69.

An implied condition of the contract entered into between the

master and bound servant or apprentice is that the latter binds himself to serve the
former during all the time of his engagement, and the master on h i s side binds
himself to maintain the indentured servant or apprentice during the same time.
The master is also bound to instruct the apprentice in his art, trade or
profession, and to teach him or cause him to be taught to read, write and ci pher.
ARTICLE 1 70.

Bound

servants and apprentices and their masters

may be

compelled to the specific performance of their respective engagements, but those
engagements may be rescinded before the time fixed for the contract, either at the
suit of such bound servants or apprentices respectively, or at the demand of such
master, if they have just cause to claim such rescission, and in such case the judge
shall direct a restitution of such a part of the money received on account of such
engagement, in proportion to the time not yet elapsed of that which has been fixed
by the indenture, unless such rescission is occasioned by the fault of him who paid
the money, in which case no restitution shall be made.
ARTICLE 1 7 1 .

If any master shall abuse, or cruelly or evilly treat his bound

servant or apprentice, or shall not discharge his duty towards him, or if the bound
servant or apprentice shall abscond or absent himself from the service of his
master without leave, or shall not discharge his duty to his master, in any of these
cases, there will be a sufficient cause to release the aggrieved party from his
engagement, or to grant him such other redress as the equity and nature of the case
may require, at the discretion of the judge.
ARTICLE 1 72.

The death of the master of the apprentice dissolves the engagement

of the latter, in the condition in which it is, and there can be n o claim for
remuneration on either side. But if the heir or one of the heirs of the master be a
man of the same condition, trade or profession, he can cause himself to be
authorized to take the place of the deceased with regard to the apprentice.
ARTICLE 173.

A

master may correct his i ndented servant or apprentice for

negligence or other misbehavior, provided he does it with moderation, and
provided he does not make use of the whip; but he can not exercise such rights
with those who only let their services.
LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 1 65-173 (West 1 972). Each of these articles was derived from a
similar provision of the Code of 1825 and the Digest of 1 808. See LA. DIGEST OF 1 808,
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1 990 on the ground

that it had become essentially anachronistic.36
By contrast, Chapter

3 of Title IX of Book III of the Code, the

chapter which governs the contractual relations of employers and
employees, has remained essentially unchanged from the initial
organization of the Territory of Orleans until the present day.37 Then,
as now, the contractual relation between an employer and a free
employee was conceptualized as a species of "lease"-specificall y, a
"lease of services"-and was made subject to the Code provisions
governing obligations in general and leases in particular.38 This Title
of the Civil Code also distinguished amon g three categories of free
employees: one general category of "servants" or "laborers"; and two
supra note 3 1 , arts. 6- 1 0, at 36-38; LA. Civ. CODE ANN arts. 1 57-1 67 (1 825). Prior to repeal,
the only significant amendments to the text were the 1964 change in articles 167 and 1 68
extending the maximum term for an engagement from five to ten years, and the repeal o f
article 1 66 in 1974. A c t N o . 355, 1 964 La. Acts; Act No. 89 § 2, 1 974 La. Acts.
35.
Louisiana Civil Code articles 174 through 1 77 provided the following:

ARTICLE 174. A master may bring an action against any man for beating o r
maiming his servant, b u t i n such case he must assign a s a cause o f action, his own
damage arising from the loss of services, and this loss must be proved upon the
trial.
ARTICLE 175. A master may justify an assault in defense of his servant, and a
servant may justify an assault in defense of his master, the master because he has
an interest in his servant, not to be deprived of his services; the servant because it
is part of his duty for which he receives wages, to stand by and defend his master.
ARTICLE 176. The master is answerable for the offenses and quasi offenses
committed by his servants, according to the rules which are explained under the
title: Of quasi-contracts, and of offenses and quasi-offenses.
-

ARTICLE 177. The master is answerable for the damage caused to individuals or
to the community in general by whatever is thrown out of his house into the street
or public road, and i n asmuch as the master has the superintendence and police of
his house, and is responsible for the faults committed therein.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1 74- 1 77 (West 1972). These provisions were likewise derived
from substantially similar predecessors in the 1 808 Digest and 1 825 Civil Code. See LA.
DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 , arts. 1 1 - 14, at 38; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 168- 1 7 1 ( 1 8 25).
36.
Act, No. 705 § I , 1 990 La. Acts. The only provision o f this Title that was
retained was article 1 76, making an employer liable for offenses or quasi-offenses
committed by his servant, which was redesignated as paragraph four of article 2320.
37.
Compare LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 27 1 7-272 1 with LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra
note 3 1 , arts. 56-60, at 382.
38.
Until its repeal in 1 990, article 164 of the Louisiana Civil Code made this point
expressly, stating that such employment contracts were subject to the rules "established i n
the title: Of Letting and Hiring." See supra note 33 (quoting article 164). Although article
164 has been repealed, other provisions contained within Title IX of Book Ill, "Of Lease,"'
make it clear that the employees are still generally considered to be "leasing" their services
to their employer. See infra notes 222-226 and accompanying text.
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specialized categories of workers-"carriers and w atermen" and
"workmen who hire out their labor or i ndustry to make buildings or
works"-whose

other

regulation.39

occupations

subjected

them

to

special

Today, as in the past, the five articles dealing with the

contractual rights and duties of "laborers" and "servants" in general
have been regarded as applicable to all employees not fall ing into
either of those special categories.40
While all five of these articles address the broad issue of tenure
of employment, they differ markedly
application.

as

to the breadth of their

Article 2746 applies to all types of laborers and sets out

the important principle that a worker cannot enforceably bind herself
to service in perpetuity.41 The remaining articles, in contrast, appear by
their terms to apply to more limited classes of employees.

Article

2747 refers on its face to servants "attached to [the] person or family"
of their master, and provides that such servants can be dismissed or
can depart at any time, without the need to assign any reason for doing
so, and without legal liability on either part.42 Article 2748 applies to

39.

Article

2745,

which introduces the chapter "Of the Letting Out of Labor or

Industry," explains:

ARTICLE 2745. Labor may be let out in three ways:
1.

2.

Laborers may hire their services to another person.
Carriers and watermen hire out their services for t h e conveyance

either of persons or of goods and merchandise.

3.

Workmen hire out their labor or industry to make buildings or other

works.
The special regulations applicable to carriers and watermen are set out at articles
through

2755,

or "work by the job" are set out in articles 2756 through

2777.

Neither set of articles are

applicable to the issues raised here.

40.

275 1

and those applicable to contractors, or other workmen who "build by a plot"

This does not mean, however, that all provisions of articles

2746

through

2750

apply to all employees who are neither "carriers and watermen" nor contractors who hire out
"to make buildings or other works." Article 2748, for example, applies b y its terms only to a
more limited class of "[l] aborers, who hire themselves out to serve on plantations or to work
in manufactures," and article

2747 applies

by its terms only to "hired servant[s] attached to

[the master's] person or family."

41. Article 2746 provides the following: "A man can only hire out his services for a
certain limited time, or for the performance of a certain enterprise." LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art.
2746 (West 1 994). For the history and interpretation of this article, see infra notes 130- 1 34
and accompanyin g text.

42. Article 2747 provides the following: "A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired
servant �ttached to his person or family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The
servant ts also free to depart without assigning any cause." LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2747
(West 1 994). For the history and interpretatio n of this
article' see the discussion in Part II,
infra.
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laborers "who hire themselves out to work on plantations or to work in
manufactures,"43 and articles

2749

and

2750

apply to those who are

parties to fixed-term employment contracts .44 Employees covered by
these latter three articles can neither be dismissed nor leave their
employment before their contractual terms expire, unless "just cause"
or a "serious groun d of complaint" can be shown.
These are the relevant articles. What remains for discussion are
the concepts that lay behind the articles and the way in which those
concepts have been i nterpreted and applied by Louisiana courts.
II.

A SHORT HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL IN LOUISIANA
The great majority of the avai l able nineteenth

and

early

twentieth century Louisiana cases dealing with what we today would
call

allegations

of

"wrongful

termination"

admitted fixed-term employment contracts.

involve alleged

or

These cases u s u al l y

turned o n whether s u c h a contract existed and, i f so, whether "good
cause" existed to terminate that contract.45 These cases are important
for their clear negative implication that "good cause" need not be

43.

Article 2748 provides the following:

Laborers, who hire themselves out to serve on plantations or to work i n
manufactures, have not the right of leaving the person who has hired them, nor
can they be sent away by t h e proprietor, until the time has expired during which
they had agreed to serve, unless good and just causes be assigned.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2748 (West 1 994).

44.

Articles 2749

and

2750 provide the following:

ARTICLE 2749.
I f. without any serious ground of complaint, a man should send
away a labourer whose services he has hired for a certain time. before that time
has expi red, he shall be bound to pay to such labourer the whole of the salaries
which he would have been entitled to receive, had the full tenn of his services
arrived.
ARTICLE 2750.
B u t if, on the other hand, a laborer, after having hired out h i s
services, should leave h i s employer before the time of his engagement has
expired, without having just cause of complaint agai nst his employer, the laborer
shall then forfeit all the wages that may be due to him, and shall moreover he
compelled to repay al l the money he has received, either as due for his wages, or
in advance thereof on the running year or on the time of his engagement.
LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. arts. 2749, 2750 (West 1994).
45. See, e.g., Berl i n v. P.L. Cusachs, L td., 1 1 4 La. 744, 38 So. 539. 544 ( 1 905)

(finding no good cause for defendants to discharge plaintiff and awarding him the damages
specified by article 2749); Dietzgen Co. v. Kokosky. 1 1 3 La. 449, 37 So. 24 ( 1 904); Ford v.
Danks, 16 La. Ann. 1 1 7 ( 1 86 1 ); Shoemaker v. Bryan. 1 2 La. Ann. 698 ( 1 857): Lartique v.
Peet, 5 Rob. 91 ( 1 843); Sherburne v. Orleans Cotton Press, 1 5 La. 360 ( 1 840); Beckman v.
New Orleans Co tto n Press Co., 1 2 La. 67, 70 ( 1 838).
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shown to dismiss an employee without a fixed-term contract.

In

other words, an important distinction has long been recognized
between fixed-term and at-will employment. However, the cases say
little about the central inquiry here, n amely, whether an employer's
right to dismiss an at-will employee should be limited by the
requirement of good faith which applies to similar obligations under
the Louisiana Civil Code.
issue

directly,

some

Although no early case discusses this
indication

of

the

original

judicial

understanding-and of how this original understanding came to be
obscured--can be discerned.
Glimpses of an Original Understanding: Nineteenth and Early

A

Twentieth Century Jurisprudence on Termination ofAt- Will
Employees
Few reported cases from

the nineteenth or early twentieth

centuries i nvolve termination o f at-will employees.

Fewer still

involve any allegation of overreaching or abusive conduct on the part
of the employer.

However, the few cases indicate some judicial

attention

equities

to

the

of

the

particular

situation

and an

unwillingness to allow employers to use their right to terminate at
will in unfair or abusive ways. Where the employer ' s exercise of the
right to terminate an at-will employee was uphe l d , courts were
careful to make clear that the employer was not exercising his right
in such a way

as

to take undue advantage of the empl o yee.

For example, in Long

v.

Kee,46 the Louisiana Supreme Court was

called upon to resolve a dispute between the owner of a plantation and
the person he had hired to manage that plantation.

Although the

employment contract at issue "fixe[d] no period for its duration,"47 the
court clearly recognized that the employer was not completely free to
fire the manager at any time. Rather, the employer's undisputed power
to terminate the contract could only be exercised at the end of a year
in other words, when the manager had had a chance to reap the fruits
of his labors for the year.

Because the employer did notify the

manager of his termination at the proper time, the termination was
upheld.48

.

46.
47.
48.

42 La. Ann. 899, 8 So. 610 (1 890).
Id. at 902, 8 So. at 61 1 .
Id. at 904, 8 So. at 612. It could be argued that Long is not a real employment at

will case at all because its
outcome could be explained by reference to a specific code
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The Louisiana S upreme Court's dec i sion i n Baron v. Placide49 i s
also illustrative.

There, the court considered the claims o f a French

dancer who contracted to perform as a danseuse and mime at the
defendant's New Orleans theater. Although the contract contemp lated
a fixed term, the employer reserved the right to discharge the plaintiff
wi thout cause upon two months notice . The contract also contained a
penalty clause in the amount of
either party.

15,000 francs in the event of breach by

A di spute developed,50 and the defendant peremptori ly

fire d the dancer w ithout notice.

The defendant, in addition to

contesting l i abil ity, contended that the maximum damages which h e
could be required to pay would be the t w o months salary to which the
pl aintiff would have been entitled had h e properly exercised his option
to di smiss her according to the contract.

The court found for the

plaintiff on both i ss u es, rejecting the defendant's broad construction of
his

rights under the

at-will clause

as

i nherently unfair to

the

employee.51 Notably, the court also rejected the pl aintiff's de m a n d for

the ful l 1 5,000 francs that would have been due to her under the
penalty clause and, i nstead, rel ied on a Code article app l icahle to
provi s i on. art icle 2748, which provides t hat " [ I Jahorers, who hire t hemselves o u t to serve 0 1 1
p l a n t ations" cannot "he sent a w a y by t he proprietor. u n 1 i l t he t i me h a s expired d u r i n g whid1
t hey had agreed to serve. u n less goo<l an<l jusJ causes he assigned . " LA. C1v. Col li . i\ N N . art .

2748 ! West 1 952).
r;1st• t here was

Howe ver. two points m i litate aga i mt such a rnndusion.

hrsl . i n J h i .,

no set "time" <l u ri ng which the defendant ;igrecd to serve. 1h11s mak i n i.:

app l i t· at ion of art i c le 2748 p ro bl emat i c at best. SernnJ. t h e opi n ion in l.1111g nowh r re rl'lns
t o article 2748 or any of its predecessors; J l appears to hased, instead. on what the court saw
as more general pri nci p l e s of law.

St'I' also Le on ard

v. Sparks.

J ( �J La. .'i4.1 . .H So. 'i'l4

( I <JO.l l. I n Lnmarcl. the Lo ui sia n a Su p re me Cou rt u phe ld the right of an employn to t i n·
one of twn at-wi l l empl oyees, des pit e t he all egat i on J h at Jhe e m pl oy,· es had ll>1111nl ;1
partnership Jo perform the assigned work, and t h ;1 t one cou ld not h,· fired wi1h11u1 Jhe othc1

' l lH>u )!h the hu l k of the di scussion in the case rel ate s to t he separate issue of whet hn 1 h c
e mplo y ees actua l l y were partners i111a st'. 1 h e court was also careful t o po111t out t h .it t he
e mpl oyer had not ahuse<l hi s ri ghts hy lir1 11i: one of t h e t wo.

On the n>nt rary. Jhe ;1pparcn1
prq1ondcr;mce of the e v idence was thal the p l a i n t i ff had "grossly insulted" h1' e111pln\l' I
and. as the court noted. the e m ployer ' s n)!hl to J 1 s ml ' s the plaintiff . .,·;m rltll " el l he

q11estr oned, 1•11rtic11larl,· if tht• change 1n1.1 ji1r good n111s1·. "

Id at .'i-19 . . 1 . 1 So. ;1t

'i'Jll

< e mphasis added ) .

4lJ.
50.

7 Li. i\nn. 2 2 9 ( I 8.'i2l.
The di spute arose when the defendant dm:cted t he pla111till to. ; 1mon )! hn 1 1t her

duties. "dance parlor dances in parlor dress. with

the tii:urants of till' l'<>mpany .. 1 11 .1

t heatrical play which was hcmg pre sented at his tht·ater.

The plaintiff ult1 1na1L·h· rdu ,cd t < 1

d o "" on the grou nd that such employment was outside her du!les tanJ apparent!\ 1-enc;llh
her dignity) as ;1 premiae .feco11,Jr densrrw·. Id. at 2.�0.

51.

The rnurt reasoned hoth that such a c11nstrm:tion would render the lr4111d.1tt·d

1fam;1ges clause nugatory agamst the empl oyer and. apparent l y. th;ll the employee h;1J lx·cn
hamicd by the ahru p t way m wh..-h she ha<l hct-n fi red . Id. at :!.1 1 .
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conventional obligations to order what would be a more fair settlement
under the circumstances-that the plaintiff recover only the amount
that would have been due her under the unexpired term of the
contract. 52
It also appears that during the early years of this century,
Louisiana courts were far more willing than they later became to infer
that an employment contract was for a definite term, particularly where
doing so
employee.

was

necessary to

avoid unfairness

Such a presumption

was

to

the

terminated

long common w ith respect to

agricultural employees-and remains clearly reflected in Civil Code
article 2748-because of the evident impropriety

of allowing a

landowner to take advantage of a hired cultivator by dismissing him
3
after the work of planting is done, but before the crops are reaped.5
But the principle was not originally limited to this agricultural
paradigm.

Thus, for example, in Woods

v.

WA. Shumard Co. ,54 the

plaintiff sued on a verbal employment contract, a contract which both
parties agreed "was for no definite fixed time."55

The court

nonetheless held that since their arrangement obl igated the employee
to pay certain taxes and expenses on behalf of the employer, the
contract must have been intended to extend for at least one year.
Otherwise, the court reasoned, "defendant could have appropriated the
plaintiff's earnings for the payment of license taxes and other
expenses,

and terminated his

employment,"

rai sing

an

obvious

potential for abuse of rights that the contract should be construed to
avoid.56

Similarly, in Kramer

v.

Dixie

Laundry

Co. ,57 the court

resolved a conflict in testimony in favor of a plaintiff's contention that
his oral employment contract

was

for a one-year term, l argely because

the employee had relocated from another city in order to take the job.
The court held that he therefore "should have been given some

52. Id. (relying on article 2 1 23 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825, which
authorized the court to modify a penalty when the principal obligation has been partially
executed).
See, e.g., Miller v. Gidiere, 3 6 La. Ann. 201 , 204 ( l 884) (finding that a
53.
.
dtsch
"!'ged overseer had an oral contract of employment for one year, but finding that the
owner s subsequent discharge of the overseer was "for cause".
54.
l l4 La. 452, 38 So. 416 ( 1 905).
55.
Id. at 453, 38 So. at 4 1 8.
56. Id. , 3 8 So. at 419.
57. 8 Orleans App. 284 (191 1 ).
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assurance that his employment would be of a character sufficiently
stable to justify" that move.58
In sum, the early case law on the rights and obligations that
accompany employment contracts is sparse and for the most part
indirect. However, i t i s noteworthy that this admittedly meager record
gives no indication that, prior to the 1 920s, Louisiana courts treated
employment contracts without a fixed term as inherently different
from other types of contracts terminable at the will of the parties. On
the contrary, Louisiana courts appear to have treated employment
contracts as subject to the same general regime as other types of
conventional obligations.59 There is also at least some evidence that
courts were unwilling to allow employers to impose undue hardship
on the terminated employee.60 Finally, there is no indication that the
Louisiana courts originally interpreted article 2747 to apply to ordinary
at will employees or relied on that article to justify treating the legal
rights and obligations of such employees as an exception to the general
rules governing leases or other obligations terminable at will.
B.

Pitcher and Its Progeny: Importing the Common-Law
Interpretation of Employers ' Power over At-Will Employees

Louisiana courts in the 1920s and 1 930s often based decisions
on perceived analogies to common-law precedents from other
j urisdictions, rathe r than reasoning directly from the Louisiana Civil
Code, as interpreted by civilian methodology. 6 1 This pattern also

58.
59.

Id. at 285.
See. e.g. , Berli n v. P.L. Cusachs, Ltd.,

1 1 4 La. 744, 38 So. 539 ( 1 905)

(determining the amount of damages by referring to provisions of the Civil Code d e al i ng
with conventional obligations in general).

60.

The Long, Woods, and Kramer cases are discussed at notes 46-48 and 54-58,

supra.

61.

See, e.g. , Peter Stein, Judge and JurisI in 1he Civil law:

A Hislorica/

Interpretation, 46 LA. L. REV. 24 1 , 257 ( 1 985) (noting Louisiana's "drift towards the
common-law for over a century and a half after the end of colonial rule," a drift that has
been arrested only in "recent decades"). This tendency was particularly noticeable in the
law of obligations, when Louisiana decisions from the 1 920s and 1 930s are full of analyses
predicated on concepts of "consideration" and other common-law notions unknown to both
the civilian tradition in general and the Louisiana Civil Code in particular. See. e.g. United
.

States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Crais, 127 So. 4 1 4 (La. Ct. App. Ori. Cir. 1 930) (defining
the relevant legal issue, for a contract governed by Louisiana law,

as

whether "the contract is

supported by valid and legal consideration," and citing Corpus Juris. a common-law treatise,

as

controlling authority on the issue of the sufficiency of that "consideration").
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prevai led

with

respect

to

the

Louisiana

[Vol. 69
courts'

analysis

of

employment at will.

The first indication of the Louisiana courts' adoption of a

common-law approach came not in cases raising i ssues of wrongful
tennination per se, but rather in cases involving the related issue of
whether, if an employee continues to perform after the expiration of an
originall y fixed-term employment contract, the employment relation
will be considered tacitly renewed for another term.

During the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a line of Louisiana cases had
held that employment contract s could be tacitly renewed in this
fashion,62 a conclusion that appears to have been based on an analogy
between leases of services and leases of property, which the Code
specifically makes renewable for a term by such tacit reconduction.63
However, in its 1 926 decision in Russell

v.

White Oil Corp.,64 the

See, e.g., Sullivan v. New Orleans Stave & Heading Co., 44 La. Ann. 787, 79 1 ,
62.
1 1 So. 89, 90 ( 1 892) (denying a terminated employee any recovery i n quantum meruit
because his contract was considered to have been tacitly renewed); Lalande v. Aldrich, 4 1
La. Ann. 307, 3 1 1 , 6 So. 28, 29 ( 1 899) (holding that contract o f plantation overseer was
tacitly renewed for another year); Alba v. Moriarty & Co., 36 La. Ann. 680, 68 1 -82 ( 1884)
(holding contract of salesman tacitly renewed). Cf National Automatic Fire Alarm Co. v.
New Orleans & N.E.R.R. Co., 1 1 5 La. 633, 3 9 So. 738 ( 1 905). The importance of National
Automatic is somewhat obscure. The plaintiff i n that case rendered services under a contract
originally set for a two-year term. After that initial term expired, the plaintiff continued to
render services for an additional three months before the defendant terminated the services.
The plaintiff contended that the contract had been tacitly renewed for an additional two
years, and that he was entitled to that which he would have earned at the contract price
during those two years. It appears that the court was, at that time, still willing to admit the
possibility that an employment contract could, like a lease of property, be tacitly renewed for
a term. Id. at 636, 39 So. at 739 ("A contract for hire of services may also be continued by
reconduction."). However, the court was clearly unwilling to adopt the logical consequence
of that principle and award the plaintiff his full contract damages. Instead, the court
distinguished Sullivan and Lalande, pointing out that in neither case did the employee
recover for work not actually performed. Accordingly, the court awarded the plaintiff
.
recovery only for the three months he actually provided services. Apparen tly, the co ncl usion
that the contract had been renewed did not preclude the court from further conclu ding that
the renewed contract could nonetheless be terminated prior to the expiration of its tenn. Id.
at 638, 39 So. at 740.
63.
LA. Ov. CODE ANN. arts. 2668, 2669 (West 1994). Alba and the other cases
permitting tacit reconduction in the employment context failed to explain the conceptu al
basis for their holdings. The inference that the decisions were based upon an analogy
bet�een l�ases of property and leases of services is based primarily on the statements �y
�hief Justice Bennudez, dissenting in Alba, and Chief Justice Breaux, co1IUTienting on thi s
.,
h�e of cases in National Automatic. See A lba,
36 La. Ann. at 682-84 (Bermudez, CJ
dissenting); National Automatic, 1 1 5 La. at 638, 39
So. at 740.
.
64·
1 62 La. 9, 1 10 So. 70 ( 1 926); see also Williamson v. National Beneficial Life
Ins. Co., 133 So. 5 1 5 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1 9 3 1 ).
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Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this prior line of Louisiana
jurisprudence, holding instead that when such an employee continues
to work after the expiration of a fixed-term contract, he reverts to at
will status. In doing so, the court conducted little analysis of Louisiana
law in general, or the Civil Code in particular.65 Instead, the court
relied on common-law authority for the proposition that the
employment relatio n must be mutual in its outlines-that if the
employee is free to leave his job without liability, the employer must
be reciprocally and equally free to fire the employee at any time, also
without liability.66 Because the court found that the plaintiff Russell
would not have to serve another term, the employer White Oil was not
bound to employ h i m either.67
The Louisiana Supreme Court first applied this new approach to
terminations of pure at-will employees-and first signaled Louisiana's
adherence to the absolutist, common-law analysis of employment at
will-in its 1 932 decision in Pitcher v. United O il & Gas Syndicate,
Inc. 68 There, the plaintiff alleged that he was fired by the defendant
without cause and sought damages. The trial court granted the
defendant's exception of no cause of action, and the Supreme Court
affirmed, despite the plaintiff's proffer of a written employment
contract that explicitly provided that "this contract of employment is to
continue as long as [the defendant company] is operating."69 In
reaching this result, the court once again did not rely on coda] or
civilian authority of any kind; indeed, it, cited only one Louisiana case,
Russell, and only for the general (and unexceptional) proposition that
contracts that are not for a fixed term can be terminated at will. On the
crucial question of the legal effect of the contractual language, the
65. The Russell court cited only a single Louisiana precedent, National Automatic
Fire Alarm Co. v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R. Co., 1 1 5 La. 633, 39 So. 738. Russell, 1 62 La.
at 1 0, 1 1 0 So. at 7 1 . Although Russell cited National A utomatic as having "overruled" Alba
and its progeny, that reading seems overstated. The National Automatic court explicitly
reaffirmed the principle that employment contracts could be tacitly renewed for a term.
Indeed, lower court opinions continued long after National Automatic to cite Alba as
controlling authority on this point. See, e.g., Newman v. Longshoremen's P.U. Benevolent
Assoc., 11 Teiss. 38, 39 (La. Ct. App. 1913) (citing A lba for the proposition that, "[i]n a
general way, the principle of tacit reconduction applies to a contract of hiring as well as to a
lease upon property").
66. Russell, 1 62 La. at 1 1 , I IO So. at 71 (citing CORPUS JURIS and Cutter v. Powell,
6 T.R. 320 ( 1 795), reprinted in 2 SMITH'S LEADING CASES I (London 1929)).
67. Id. at 1 2, 1 1 0 S o. at 7 1 .
68.
174 La. 66, 1 39 So. 760 ( 1932).
69.
Id. at 66, 1 39 So. at 761 .
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court in Pitcher

relied entirely

common-law

reasoning,

requirements

that

and

on

c ommon-law

particularly

c ontractual promises

on

the

autho rity

and

common-law

must be "mutual"

and

supported by "consideration."70 The Pitcher court's reliance o n these
common-law doctrines was explicit,

permitting the court,

in a

rhetorical flourish, to expand on the public policy and legal issues it
saw as relevant:
An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently,
thereby cutting himself off from all

chances of improving his

condition; indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public
policy and the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus
handicap himself; and the law will presume almost juris et de jure that
he did not so intend. And if the contract of employment be not binding
on the employee fo r the whole term of such employment, it cannot be
binding upon the employer; there would be lack of "mutuality." But if
the employee has given, in addition to the services which he promised
to perform, a consideration, whatever the nature of such consideration
be, then he has in effect purchased, for a valuable consideration, an
option to keep the employment for the term specified; and such a
71
contract is a valid one.

There are multiple ironies here. First, this opi nion was written
in 1932, at the depth of the worst economic depression in American
hist ory.

At that time, few workers were likely to be "improving

[their] condition" by trading steady empl oyment for membership in
the ranks of the jobless.

Second, the court's rhet oric-and its

adoption of the mutuality requirement-allowed it to obs cure the
real issue at stake.

Public policy might well forbid enfor c ement of

promises by employees to remain i n a particular job permanently.
70.

Id.

The Pitcher court's analysis was based in part on two cases, both from
Sullivan v. Detroit, Ypsilanti & Ann Arbor Ry., 98 N.W. 756 (Mich
1904), and Rape v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., JOO So. 585 (Miss. 1924). However, the court

common-law states:

appeared to place primary reliance, not on particular decisions, but rather on excerpts from
two compilations of United States authority, "Ruling Case Law" and "American Law
Reports"---excerpts which were themselves, as the Pitcher court proudly i nformed the
reader, variously supported by case law from the following jurisdictions :
Arkansas,
California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas,

West Virginia, and England. As a roster of common-la w jurisdictions, this listing is indeed
impressive. But as a guide to interpreting the unique legal traditions
of Louisiana, such a
recitation of authority should be somewhat less persuasive. See
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
1 967 cmt. c (West 1987) (distinguishing cause from consideration).

71.

Pitcher, 174 La. at 69, 139 So. at 761.
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Legal authority ranging from the Thirteenth Amendment t o the
United States Constitution, to article

2746 of the Louisiana Civil

Code might be cited in support of such a view.

However, the case

simply did not involve any issue regarding an alleged right of an
employer to force an employee to remain on a job against his will.
Unless one imports the common-law doctrine of mutuality, the
contractual

responsibilities

of the

parties

should be

analyzed

separately, and pub l i c policy arguments relating to one would seem
to have little relevance to the other. Finally, for reasons that s h ould
be obvious to any Louisiana lawyer, the argument made in Pitcher
bears no relation to the Louisiana law of obligations.

On the

contrary, the terminology and the reasoning make sense only in the
context of common-law analysis of contracts.72
In any event, applying those common-law requirements, the
Pitcher court refused to enforce the employer's contractual promise
not to fire Mr. Pitcher. Because the plaintiff was free to quit his j ob ,
mutuality required that the employer must-regardless of the words o f
the contract-remain similarly free t o terminate the employee's
services.73

Such a unilateral promise not to fire would only be

enforced when it

was supported by

"special consideration,"

a

requirement which the court found absent from the case.74
Regardless of one's views of the proper relations between
employers and employees, the conclusion seems inescapable that
Pitcher was flawed in its reasoning, if not wrong in its result.75

72.

The

See infra note 227 (discussing briefly the i rrelevance of these tradi tional

common-law concepts

of "consideration" and "mutuality" to the Louisiana law

of

obligations.

73.
74.

Pitcher, 1 74 La. a t 69, 1 39 So. at 761 .
See id. The court stated the following:

But if the employee has given, in addition to the services which he promised to
perform, a consideration, whatever the nature of such consideration be, then he
has in effect purchased, for a valuable consideration, an option to keep the
employment for the tenn specified; and such a contract is a valid one.

Id. As the court was quick to explain, "special consideration" had to be something that the
employee gives to the employer over and above mere faithful performance by the employee
of his work. Id.

75.

The ultimate question of whether the court reached the right result in Pitcher

depends in large part on issues of fact which the court did not explore.

For example,

whether sufficient cause could be found to support the employer's unilateral promise not to
fire the employee might depend on the specific facts of the situation, including whether the
employee reasonably relied on that promise to his detriment. See LA CJV. CooE ANN . art.

l 967 (West 1987). Alternatively, such a contract might have been rendered unenforceable
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court was no

doubt

correct

in

its

basic

legal

premise-that

employment contracts for an indefinite term, like any other contracts
for an indefinite term-can ordinarily be terminated at the will of
e ither party.

However, the court clearly failed in its analysis of

whether the written contract, in which the employer had specifically
promised to retain its employee
should have been interpreted

as

long

as

as

the company was operating,

falling within that category of

contracts terminable at will. Moreover, rather than analyze the parties '
rights and obligations under the contract according to the established
principles of the Louisiana Civil Code-including the established
principle that parties to contracts terminable at will remain subject to
the requirements o f good faith in exercising their termination rights
the court chose instead to simply regard the employer's promise as
unenforceable

as

a matter of law.

In doing so, the Pitcher court

imported into Louisiana law a set of alien concepts, concepts which
continued to distort Louisiana's law of employment at will even after
the revival of codal analysis in the Louisiana courts.

Nonetheless,

despite its flaws, Pitcher has deeply influenced subsequent Louisiana
courts' consideration of all claims alleging wrongful termination of at
will employees.
From 1 932 until 1 988, the Louisiana Supreme Court took only a
limited role in defining the contours of the at-will doctrine.

The

supreme court did act to some extent to c onfirm and extend the rule of

Pitcher, holding that every employment contract reverts to at-will
status after five years, regardless of the terms of the contract or any
"special consideration" contributed by the employee.76

However, on

by article 2746, which provides that, "A man can only hire out his services for a certain
limited time . . . . " Or, if the contract had already been in operation for more than five years,
perhaps it could have been argued that the contract converted to at-will status after that time.

See LA. CIV. CODE ANN .

art. 1 67 (West 1972). However, the relevance of article 1 67 to free

See infra note 127.
76. See, e.g., Pechon v. National Corp. Serv. , 234 La. 397, 408, 100 So. 2d 2 1 3, 2 1 8
( 1 958) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that he gave special consideration in the form of giving up
a better job); Lowther v. Fireside Mutual Life Ins. Co., 228 La. 946, 950, 84 So. 2d 596, 597
( 1 955) (rejecting the argument that article 167 was anachronistic); Page v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc., 1 84 La. 6 1 7 , 620, 167 So. 99, 1 00 ( 1936) (holding that giving up a

employees is not at all clear.

lucrative job in California is not special consideration justifying departure from the rule of
employment at will and interpreting article 1 67 according to the doctrine of mutuality

Pitcher); see also Shaughnessy v. D' Antoni, 100 F.2d 422, 424-25 (5 th Cir.
1938) (holding ten-year employment contract valid for five years only); Hill v. Missouri Pac.
Ry. , 8 F. Supp. 80, 8 1 (W.D. La. 1933) (holding plaintiff had no claim for wrongful

articulated in

discharge despite employer's contract to employ plaintiff for life or until retirement on full
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the broader issue of interpreting the at-will rule, the Louisiana
S upreme Court spoke rarely and with moderation.77
Despite the S upreme Court's quiescence, a distinct radicalization
of the law took place in the Louisiana Courts of Appeal. Though there
were occasional exceptions,78 those courts tended to adopt a much
pension; contract entered into in return for plaintiff's agreement to abandon claim for
injuries); Griffith v. Sollay Foundation Drilling Inc., 373 So. 2d 979 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1 979) (relying on Pitcher to hold employee terminable without cause or notice, despite his
having moved from Atlanta and accepted a job based on an oral promise of "lifetime
employment"); Thaxton v. Roberson, 224 So. 2d 1 83, 1 85-86 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 969)
(holding that a contract for a fixed-tenn of employment converts to at-will status after five
years, but does not bar employee's recovery for services actually rendered thereafter); Smith
v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 1 63 So. 2d 124, 126 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (finding c ontract
converts to at-will status after five years).
Several of these decisions were criticized at the time they were rendered. See, e.g.,
M .J.S., Note, 13 TuL. L. REv. 467 ( 1 939) (criticizing Shaughnessy on the ground that article
1 67 should be interpreted to refer only to the maximum term for which apprentices and
similar bound servants may bind themselves, not to any limitation on the contractual
freedom of employers and free employees); Note, Recent Jurisprudence, supra note 5
(criticizing Hill for failure to recognize that the public policy behind article 1 67 does not
extend to preventing employers from making unilateral promises limiting what would
otherwise be their power to fire at will, especially when that promise was made in return for
another valuable promise).
77.
Between 1 95 8 and 1 988, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided only two cases
which touched directly on issues of employment at will. In Long v. Foster & Associates,
242 La. 295, 1 36 So. 2d 48 ( 1 96 1 ), the parties had entered into an employment contract for
a five-year tenn, but the contract reserved to the employee the right to leave at any time,
without liability. The employer fired the employee before the term had elapsed, but resisted
liability on the ground that the contract was not "mutual" and that he could not be bound by
a term unless the employee was likewise bound. The court enforced the contract, holding
that the employer was bound despite the unilateral potestative condition. Id. at 53-54, 1 3 6
So. 2 d at 309- 1 4; see Note, 22 LA. L. REV. 872 ( 1 962) (discussing Long). I n Moore v.
McDermott, Inc., 48 1 So. 2d 602 (La. 1986), the court, in dictum, appeared to cast some
doubt on the propriety of an absolutist reading of the at-will doctrine. Rather than argue in
support of such an approach, the court instead quoted approvingly from Wiley v. M issouri
Pacific R.R., 430 So. 2d 1 0 1 6 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 982), seemingly adopting the Wiley
court's concerns regarding employers' superior bargaining power and the consequent
movement away from an absolutist interpretation of the at-will rule in other jurisdictions.
Moore, 48 1 So. 2d at 605.
In other cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to take into account the typical
difference in bargaining power between employers and employees, though in no case did
this result appear in an express holding modifying the rigors of the at-will rule in Louisiana.
See Wiley, 430 So. 2d at I 0 1 8 (discussing in dictum the social reasons for the decline of an
absolutist interpretation of employment at will in other states).
78.
In a few cases from this period, lower courts seemed willing to find an oral
contract of employment for a fixed-tenn based on nothing more than the "custom" of a
particular industry. See, e.g. , Roussel v. James U. Blanchard & Co., 430 So. 2d 247, 249
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 983) (finding an oral employment contract for a six-month term and
holding where no term is expressed, the ''understanding of the parties is to be detennined
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more absolutist interpretation of the at-will rule than the Louisiana
Supreme Court, relying on Pitcher to uphold the employer's right to
tenninate employees regardless of the circumstances.

Particularly

during the 1 970s and 1980s, lower courts in the state began to
routinely uphold the employers' right to fire an at-will employee

as

a

matter of law, without even permitting employees to present evidence
that the firings violated public policy79 or contradicted the employer's
promises to the employee,80 or that the circumstances otherwise
from their written or oral negotiations, usages of the business and, in general, nature of the
employment and its surrounding circumstances"); Aguillard v. Lake Charles Stevedores,
Inc., 284 So. 2d 1 24, 1 26 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 974) (relying on the custom of a particular
workplace to hold that an at-will employee who was injured on the j o b could not be
terminated; rather, the employer was required to pay salary and benefits for an additional
term of two-and-a-half years); Harrosh v. Fife B ros. Health Ass'n, I So. 2d 3 2 3 , 327 (La. Ct.
App. Orleans 1 94 1 ) (finding an oral contract of e mpl oyment for a fixed term on weak facts;
relying to a large extent on the inference that it would have been unreasonable to believe that
the employee would have rejected a better offer, as he did, unless he was promised some sort
of job security).
79. See, e.g. , Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 4 1 2 So. 2d 706 , 70 8 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.)
(holding that at-will employee who was fired when he refused to participate in employer's
deceptive trade practices had no cause of action for wrongful termination, and rejecting the
argument that then-article 1 1 (now article 7) embodies a public policy exception to the at
will rule), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La. 1 982); Baynard v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 399 So. 2d 1 200, 1 20 2 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 198 1 ) (holding i n a case arising before
enactment of the federal Age Discrimination Act and its Louisiana equivalents, that an
employee who was fired solely because of age states no cause of action against his
employer) ; Freeman v. Ebilco, Inc., 338 So. 2d 967, 96 8 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 976)
(holding, in case arising before enactment of LA. R.S. 23:136 1 , that i njured employee who
allegedly was fired in retaliation for claiming workers' compensation stated no cause of
action); see also Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv., Inc., 50 1 F.2d 1 04, 10 7 (5th Cir.
1974) (holding that the plaintiff who alleged that he was fired in retaliation for making a
complaint to the Wage and Hour Division of the federal Department of Labor stated no
claim).
80 . See, e.g., Wall v. Tulane Uni v. , 499 So. 2d 375, 376 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.)

(holding that since employee was at will, empl oy er was free not only to fire him at any time
but also to unil aterall y revoke benefits descri bed in the employer's Staff Handbook), writ
denied, 500 So. 2d 427 (La. 1 987); Thebner v. Xerox Corp., 480 So. 2d 454, 455 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 1985) (holding at-will employee wh o alleges that he was fired in violation of
procedures set out in company policy manual states no claim), writ denied, 484 So. 2d 1 239
(La. 1986); Terrebonne v. Louisiana Ass'n of Educators, 444 So. 2d 2 0 6 (La. Ct. App. 1 st
Cir. 1983)(holding that where teacher was fired despite Board resolution to re-employ all
staff until a particular date, Board resolution was not binding and that teacher remained at
will because there was no "meeting of the minds" and because teacher remained free to
quit); Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 4 1 6 S o . 2d 637, 6 38 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1982)
(holding at-will employee who was fired wi th out receiving the three prior warnings called
for by employer s personnel policy stated no claim); Senac v. L. M. Berry Co., 299 So. 2d
433, 434 (La. Ct App. 4th Cir. 1974) (holding plaintiff failed to state cause of action where
'

.
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indicated that the employer may have been exercising his rights i n bad
faith.81
Equally important was the gradual shift in the purported codal
basis for these holdings. Pitcher did not rely on Civil Code authority
at all. Shortly thereafter, however, lower courts rooted this line of
cases in the Louisiana Civil Code. Article 1 6782 was the first article
courts seized upon. Post-Pitcher decisions initially relied on article
1 67 to justify their conclusions that employees who had employment
contracts of indefinite term, or who had worked for more than five
years, reverted to at-will status.83 Later cases found an equivalent

he was fired without cause, despite allegedly having been induced to leave another job based
on an oral contract that h e would not be dismissed without cause).
81.
See, e.g. , Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 52 I So. 2d 48 I (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir.) (holding employer had not corrunitted an abuse of rights when it fired employees, who
were willing to take employer-mandated lie detector test but refused to sign a consent form
waiving all rights again s t the company administering those tests), writ denied, 522 So. 2d
5 7 1 (La. 1988); O' Neal v. Chris Steak House, 525 So. 2d 325, 328 (La. Ct. App. ! st Cir.
I 988) (finding plaintiff stated no cause of action despite his claim that the employer fired
him in order to prevent h i m from collecting on substantial conditional benefits); Clements v.
Ryan, 382 So. 2d 279, 282 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 980) (holding employee who was accused
of stealing, and was fired despite having twice passed lie detector tests, stated no cause o f
action for wrongful termination or defamation); Ingram v . Kaiser Aluminum & Chern.
Corp., 323 So. 2d 92 1 , 923 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 975) (finding plaintiffs who claimed
employer and union conspired to have them dismissed stated no cause of action under
Louisiana law); Copeland v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 288 So. 2d 404, 407-09 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir.) (holding employee who was discharged twenty-one days before he could exercise
option to purchase stock had no claim for wrongful tennination or for value of the stock),
writ denied, 290 So. 2d 9 1 1 (La. 1 974).
82.
Prior to 1 964, article 1 67 of the Louisiana Civil Code provided the following:
"Persons who have attained the age of majority cannot bind themselves for a longer term
than five years." In 1 964, the article was amended to provide a maximum term of ten years.
Act No. 355, 1 964 La. Acts. In 1 990, article 1 67 was repealed, along with most of the rest
of Book I, Tttle VI, "Of Master and Servant." Act No. 705 § I 1 990 La. Acts.
83.
See. e.g. , Lowther v. Fireside Mutual Life Ins. Co., 228 La. 946, 950, 84 So. 2d
596, 597 ( 1 955) (rejecting argument that article 1 67 was anachronistic and thus ought he
narrowly interpreted); Page v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 1 84 La. 6 1 7, 6 1 8, 1 67 So. 99,
I 00 ( 1 936) (relying on article 1 67); see also Shaughnessy v. D' Antoni, 100 F.2d 422, 425
(5th Cir. 1938) (relying on article 1 67); Hill v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 8 F. Supp. 80, 8 1 (W.D.
La. 1 933) (relying on article 1 67 to uphold dismissal of employee who had agreed to
abandon a claim for injuries in return for a promise to employ him until retirement): Thaxton
v. Roberson, 224 So. 2d 1 83 , 1 86 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 969) (holding that article 1 67 not a
bar to recovery for time actually worked beyond five years, but converts contract to at-will
status after that time). Remarkably, article 1 67 continued to be cited for this proposition
that long-term contracts convert to at-will status after a period of years-even after it had
been repealed. See Chauvin v. Tandy Corp., 984 F.2d 695, 697-98 (5th Cir. 1 993).
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principle in article 2746.84 Only in the early 1960s did courts begin to
focus on article 274785 and the perceived dichotomy between articles

2747 and 274986 as the codal locus of the employment at-will rule in
Louisiana. However, though this focus on article 2747 is of recent
vintage, it quickly became and remains canonical.

Since

1 962,

virtually all decisions involving the rights of at-will employees have
relied on article 2747 to establish that employment at will is
entrenched in the Civil Code of Louisiana. 87

84.
See, e.g. , Pechon v. National Corp. Serv., 234 La. 397, 408, I 00 So. 2d 2 1 3 , 2 1 8
( 1 958) (rejecting employee's claim that he enjoyed a n oral contract of employment "for
life," based on articles 1 67 and 2746); Manning v. Shreveport Transit Co., 1 30 So. 2d 497,
498 (La. Ct. App. !st Cir. 1 96 1 ) (citing article 2746 as the locus of the Louisiana doctrine of
employment at will). See supra note 41 (quoting article 2746).
85.
The first case which referred to article 2747 as the fount of Louisiana's law of
employment at will appears to have been Phillips v. Mid-Continent Life Insurance Co., 1 30
So. 2d 791 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 961 ). However, since the Phillips court foun d that the
employee in that case enjoyed a contract for a term, that statement was arguably only
dictum. Phillips, 1 30 So. 2d at 798. In Baker v. Union Tank Car Co., 140 So. 2d 397, 402
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1 962), that proposition first became a clear holding. The plaintiff in
Baker had been employed by the defendant for twenty years. Although the collective
bargaining agreement covering the plaintiff had expired, he and other workers continued to
work during negotiations for a new agreement. Before that new agreement was finalized,
the defendant fired the plaintiff. The court held that, u nder article 2747, in the absence of a
fixed-term contract or a bargaining agreement in force, the plaintiff was an at-will employee
who could be fired at any time. Baker, 140 So. 2d at 3 98-402.
86. See, e.g., Breaux v. South Louisiana Elec. Coop. Ass'n, 471 So. 2d 967, 968-69
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Hoover v. Livingston Bank, 45 1 So. 2d 3, 4-5 (La. Ct. App. 1 st
Cir. 1 984).
87. The cases from this period which refer to article 2747 as the source of
Louisiana's at-will rule are far too numerous to list. See, e.g., John P. Harris, M.D., Inc. v.
Parmley, 480 So. 2d 500, 503 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1 9 85); Thebner v. Xerox Corp., 480 So.
2d 454, 455 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 985), writ denied, 484 So. 2d 1 39 (La. 1 986) ; Aldahir v.
Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., 420 So. 2d 714 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1 147 (La. 1 982); Gil v. Metal S erv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706, 707 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 4 1 4 So. 2d 379 (La. 1 982); Jackson v. East B aton Rouge
Parish Sch. Bd., 393 So. 2d 243, 245 (La. Ct. App. 1 st Cir. 1 980); Linzay v. Tangipahoa
Parish Farm Bureau, 387 S o . 2d 1 343, 1345 (La. Ct. App. 1 st Cir.), writ denied, 393 So. 2d
748 (La. 1980); Clements v. Ryan, 382 So. 2d 279, 281 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 980);
Jackson v. East Baton Rouge Parish Indigent Defender's Bd., 353 So. 2d 344, 345 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1 977); Griffith v. Sollay Found. Drillin g Inc., 373 So. 2d 979, 9 8 1 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 1979); Ingram v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 323 So. 2d 9 2 1 , 923 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 975).
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From Brannan to the Present: Absolutism Triumphant
In 1 988, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs in Brannan

v. l-l)reth Laboratories Inc.,88 a grant which gave the court, for the
first time in thirty years, an opportunity to review Louisiana's l aw of
employment at will. But instead of re-examining that doctrine, the
supreme court merely reaffirmed the flawed precedent of Pitche r and
placed its imprimatur on the lower courts ' reliance on article 2747 as
the source of the at-will principle in Louisiana.
The facts of Brannan were not disputed. In 1964, the plaintiff
left a secure civil service job to take a position as a pharmaceutical
salesman with Wyeth Labs.89 Though his employment was not for a
fixed term, the plaintiff alleged, and the jury evidently believed, that he
took the Wyeth job in reliance on oral assurances that he would not be
fired except for just c ause.90 Although his performance was not stellar,
the plaintiff received raises every year from 1 964 until 1 982.9 1 In
1 982, the employer received complaints from doctors, stating that
Brannan had failed to take their orders for Wyeth Products.92 After an
investigation, the employer discovered that Brannan had falsified some
"doctor call" reports; Brannan claimed to h ave made solicitations that
he never made. Wyeth dismissed the plaintiff.93
Brannan brought suit alleging, among other things, wrongful
termination of an oral employment contract. After trial, the jury found
in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $250,000 in damages on that
claim.94 The Fifth Circuit affirrned.95 The court of appeal correctly
acknowledged that, as a general rule, at-will employees can quit or be
88.

526 So. 2d 1 1 0 I (La. 1 988).

89.

Brannan, 526 So. 2d at 1 1 02.

90.

Id. The plaintiff also relied on the defendant's 'Territory Managers Manual,"

which set out a multistep process for dealing with employees who do not perform
adequately. According to that manual, such employees are to be first put in a "performance
improvement program"; then, if their performance does not improve, on probation.

Only

after probation can an employee be fired. Id. at 1 1 02-03.
91.

Id. at 1 1 03.

In 1 979, Brannan was placed on the performance improvement

program in an effort to increase his number of daily doctor calls from approximately six to a
minimum of seven calls per day. Though he did not improve, he continued to be employed.

Id. at 1 1 02-03.
92.

Id.

93 .

Id.

94.

Id. at I 102.

The plaintiff was awarded an additional $60,000 for defamation,

wrongful denial of stock option rights, and accrued dental benefits.
95.

Brannan v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 5 1 6 So. 2d 1 57, 1 73 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1 987),

ajf'd in part and rev'd in part, 526 So. 2d 1 1 01 (La. 1 9 8 8).
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fired at any time without liability, and that employment c ontracts
generally could not at that time extend beyond ten years.96 However,
the court went on to hold that both of these principles c ould be
modified. First, the ten-year rule would not apply where the employee
gives "special consideration" in return for lifetime emp loyment.
Second, employers could contractually agree to modify or c o ndition
what would otherwise be their right t o terminate employees at will.
Third, the manuals and other documents relied on by the plaintiff,
while not contracts in themselves, n o netheless could be used as
evidence of an underlying oral agreement not to fire the plaintiff
without sufficient cause.97 Applying these principles, the Fifth Circuit
found that sufficient evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the
employer had orally agreed not to fire the p laintiff except for just
cause, and that sufficient cause was lacking in this case.98
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.99

The court cited four

Civil Code articles as "pertinent to" the issue of wrongful termination:
the familiar articles 167 and 2746 and, for the first time in the supreme
court, articles 2747 and 2024

as

well.100 The court did not, h owever,

engage in any thorough re-examination of the importance of these
articles. Rather, it simply relied on Pitcher and the line of post-Pitcher
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 164.
Id.

Id. at 1 65-68.

The Fifth Circuit was less specific on the issue of whether

sufficient special consideration existed to support modification of the ten-year rule in this
case. However, the implication seems to have been that the special consideration here was
the plaintiff's deci sion to g]ve up a secure civil service job. But see Page v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv. , Inc., 184 La. 6 1 7, 1 67 So. 99, 100 (1936) (holding that plaintiff's act of giving
up a lucrative job in California not special consideration justifying modification of the rule
of article 167).

99. Brannan, 526 So. 2d 1101 (reversing the decision below except with respect to
plaintiffs claim for $50 worth of unpaid dental benefits).

100. Id. at 1103. Of these articles, articles 167 and 2746, which at that time
precluded an employee from binding himself for more than ten years, were familiar bases for
prior Louisiana Supreme Court decisions on these issues. See, e.g. , Pechon v. National

Corp. Serv., 234 La. 397, 408, 1 00 So. 2d 213, 2 1 8 (1958). Brannan did, however, break
new ground, at least for the Louisiana Supreme Court because the court relied on articles

2747 and 2040. Specifi cally, Brannan marked the first time that the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that article 2747, which provides that a servant attached to the person or family
of the employer can quit or be dismissed at any time without liability, embodied a principle

of employment at will applicable to the generality o f employees. It also marked the first
Louisiana Supreme Court reference to employment at will in connection with article 2024,
which provides generally that contracts of unspecified duration can
be terminated by either
party, on reasonable notice to the other. See supra notes 34,
41, 42 (quoting articles 1 67,

2746, and 2747, respectively); see also infra note 1 22 (quoting article 2024).
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jurisprudence to reaffirm that employment contracts for an indefinite
term or for a term in excess of ten years are treated as terminable at
will, at least i n the absence of "special consideration."IoI In particular,
the court approvi ngly quoted the passage from
these doctrines

in

the common-law

consideration.

Applying these principles,

Pitcher,

which rooted

concepts of mutuality

and

the court found

that

Brannan's decision to leave his civil service job to take a higher paying
position with Wyeth Labs did not constitute "special consideration"
and that his employment was therefore terminable at will, regardless of
whether the employer had made any promises to the contrary.

I02

His

claim for wrongful termination was therefore denied.

In one sense, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Brannan
should not be surprising.

The facts of the case presented l ittle

evidence of bad faith or abusive conduct by the employer; on the
contrary, dismissal of Brannan could have been justified o n any
interpretation of employment at will . Im Indeed, as the court went out
of its way to poi n t out, Brannan 's conduct would likely have provided
good cause for termination of an employee with a fixed-term
contract. I04 However, the court's analysi s of the issues could be taken
as evidence that easy cases can make (or at least perpetuate) bad l aw.
The Brannan court's adoption of article

2747 as the source of the

at-will rule and its reaffirmation of the Pitcher analysis resulted in a
continuation and intensification of the hostil ity with which

lower

courts in Louisiana have regarded all claims of wrongful termination
brought by at-wi l l employees, a hostil ity which ha'i often prevai led
regardless of circumstances indicating bad faith on the part of the
employer. Thus, s i nce Brannan, Louisian a courts have relied on these
principles to hold that an employer, though statutorily barred from
direct retal iation against a workers ' compensation claimant,
nonetheless
I0I .

retal i ate

by dismissing

the

may

claimant's relative I 05

or

Brannan. 256 So. 2d at 1 1 03-04.
1 02. Id. at 1 1 04.
I 03. II is noteworth y that. although Ihc jury in the case detcnnined Ihat Wyeth lacked
adequate grounds to fire Brannan. the Louisiana Supreme Court devoied more than a page
of its opinion to a detailed recitation of his deficiencies. particularly his falsification of
doctor call reports. Id. at 1 1 02-03.
I 04. Id. at I 004-05.
1 05. Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat Serv.. Inc .. 634 So. 2d 1 324. 1 326 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 1 994) (holding t h at workers' compensation c l ai mant stated no cause of action when
employer retaliated by firing claimant's brother). The court ruled that article 2747 and
Brannan insulate the employer from liability for dismissal of at-will employees unless that
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spouse.106 They have relied on article 2747 to distinguish federal law
and hold that an employer may escape liability for violating state laws
against employment
nondiscriminatory

discrimination

reason

also

simply

contributed

by showing
to

the

that

a
dismissal. 1 07

Louisiana courts have also held that at-w ill employees who claimed
that they were fired solely in order to deprive them of accrued
8
retirement benefits, 1 0 or as part of an internal corporate power
struggle,109 or because of a soured sexual relationship w i th their
boss,1 10 or

as

the result of nothing more than an error by a co-

firing contravenes a specific statutory exception, and that LA. R.S. 23: 1 36 1 i s a "penal
statute" which must be narrowly interpreted to grant protection only to the compensation
claimant himself. Id.
106. Woodson v. Alarm Protection Servs., Inc . , 5 3 1 So. 2d 542, 543-44 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir.) (holding that the wife of a workers' compensation claimant had no claim despite
being fired in retaliation for her husband's claim; holding also that section 1 3 6 1 protects
only the individual employee asserting the claim), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 358 (La. 1 9 88).
1 07. Bradley v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 559 So. 2d 46, 48 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 566 So. 2d 397 (La. 1 990).
Louisiana courts generally interpret LA. R.S.
23 : 1 006(8), a Louisiana statute outlawing employment discrimination, in conformity with
federal law interpreting Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2000h. However, in Bradley, the court relied on article 2747 to articulate a rare analysis
different from-and less favorable to employees-that which was applied under federal law.
In Bradley, a terminated probationary employee brought an action under LA. R.S.
23: 1 006(8), alleging that she was fired because of her gender. The employer countered by
alleging that the plaintiff had been excessively absent. Under federal antidiscrimination law,
as it existed at the time, the employee could prevail unless the employer showed that he
would have reached the same decision to fire solely on the basis of its asserted legitimate
nondiscriminatory motive. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 ( 1 989).
The Bradley court, relying on the strong tradition of employment at will in Louisiana, held
in contrast that LA. R.S. 2 3 : I 006(B) imposed no similar burden on the employer to show the
absence of "but for" causation. Rather, the employer can apparently prevail in such a case
simply by showing that nondiscriminatory reasons contributed to the decision to fire, even if
that decision was also the result of prohibited discrimination.
1 08. Williams v. Touro Infirmary, 578 So. 2d I 006, I 0 I 0 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 99 1 )
(holding that at-will employees who claimed they were fired i n an effort t o deprive them o f
accrued retirement benefits stated n o claim fo r wrongful discharge).
109. Dunbar v. Williams, 554 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), reh 'g granted in part,
No. CA-8330, 1989 La. App. LEXIS 899 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. May 9, 1 9 89). A minority
shareholder was deprived of the vice presidency and later fired, all as part of an intra
corporate dispute. The court held that, despite any possible equities, the minority
shareholder enjoyed neither a contract for a term nor express statutory protection, and was
therefore terminable at will. Id. at 69.
1 10. Hammond v. Medical Arts Group, Inc., 574 So. 2d 521 , 523 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 1991). In Hammond, the plaintiff nurse had a consensual sexual relationship with one
of the members of the medical partnership which employed her. After the affair ended,
tension developed between the plaintiff and that doctor. The plaintiff finally quit and
brought an action alleging constructive discharge. The court held that the plaintiff stated no
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did not state claims sufficient to pennit the employees to

i ntroduce evidence of their contentions.
article
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Courts have even rel ie d on

2747 and Brannan to bar dismissed employees from asserting

otherwise applicable tort claims against employers1 12 or third parties. 1 1 3

In a related l ine of cases, Louisiana courts have likewise upheld
employers' power to fire at-will employees without liability even when
the termination breached the employer's express representations to the
employee that he would not be fired unless certain procedures were
claim either for wrongful d i scharge or for intentional i n fliction of emotional distress. Id. at
525.
1 1 1 . See, e.g., Johnson v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 808, 809 (5th Cir. 1 990)
(holding at-will plaintiff who was fired after failing polygraph exam allegedly negligently
administered by co-employee was precluded by article 2747 and Brannan from stati n g any
claim for wrongful termination); Martin v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp., 588 So. 2d 1 329, 1 337-38
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 99 1 ) (reversing jury verdict i n favor of an at-will employee fired
because of a co-employee' s apparently inaccurate reports of financial improprieties, and
holding that article 2747 precludes all claims for wrongful discharge), writ denied, 592 So.
2d 1 302 (La. 1 992).
1 1 2. See, e.g. , Massey v. G.B. Cooley Hosp., 593 So. 2d 460, 464 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1 992) (denying fired employee's claims against employer for wrongful termination and
intentional infliction of emotional distress on the ground that employer's conduct was not
s ufficiently "outrageous"; citing Gil for the proposition that Louisiana law gives employer
"the right to fire [an employee] for any reason at all"), judgment set aside, 6 1 6 So. 2d 1 242
(La. 1 993); Roberts v. Louisiana Bank & Trust, 550 S o . 2d 809, 8 1 2 (La. Ct. App. 2 d C i r. )
(finding the fired bank teller stated no cause o f action for wrongful termination or
defamation), writ denied, 552 So. 2d 398 (La. 1 989).
1 1 3. See, e.g., Durand v. McGaw, 635 So. 2d 409, 4 1 1 - 1 2 (La. Ct. App. 4th C i r. )
(holding that fired employee could state no claim against third party for intentional

or

negligent interference with contract; since employee was terminable at wi ll, he h ad "no
contract or legally protected interest in his employment necessary for a claim for tortious
interference with contract."), writ denied, 640 So. 2d 1 3 1 8 (La. 1 994); Herbert v. Placid Ref.
Co., 564 So. 2d 37 1 , 373-74 (La. Ct. App. ! st Cir.) (holding that employee stated no claim
for negligence or negl igent interference with contract rights against drug lah that a l l egedly
negligently performed drug test, causing termination; since employee was at will. he cannot
complain about reasons for that firing), writ denied, 569 So. 2d 981 (La. 1 990).

8111

sec

Neel v. Citrus Lands of Louisiana, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1 299, 1 30 1 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 99 3 )
(holding that at-will employee o f mineral lessee who lost job when lessor barred h i m from
land states a cause of action against that lessor for intentional interference with contractual
relations); Neherenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d 9 1 5. 9 1 8 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 992) ( a l lowing
claim against drug lab whose al legedly negligent tests led to plaintiff's dismissal: plai n t i ff's
at-will status not a bar); Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of A m . . 588 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1 99 1 ) (same as Neherenz). As the court in lewis explained:
Even when employment is terminable at wi ll, La. Civ. Code article 2747, the
employment is a subsisting relationship. of value to the employee until it i s
terminated.

Thus while the possibility of employment termination at any time

affects the amount of d amages sustained by the employee, it should not affect t h e
employee's right of recovery.
588 So. 2d at 1 7 1 n.4.
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followed. 1 1 4 Thus, for example, the plaintiff in Mix

v.

University of

New Orleans,1 1 5 a discharged employee at will alleged that his
termination was invalid because the employer failed to follow its own
"Grievance Procedure for Unclassified Personnel."

The court of

appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment
in favor of the defendant, holding that the grievance procedure was not
bargained for and instead was presented as an inducement for the
employee to accept employment.

In the court's eyes, the grievance

procedure was nothing more than a "unilateral expression of company
policy" or a "mere gratuity,"

as

to which there was no "meeting of the

minds," and thus was not binding on the employee. 1 16 The plaintiff
could therefore be fired at any time with no procedures or reason
required.1 17 It is particularly noteworthy that while the court in Mix
was insistent that Louisiana's doctrine of employment at will is based
in civil rather than common law, and that therefore common-law

1 1 4.

See also M arson v. Northwestern State Univ., 607 So. 2d 1 093, 1 09 6 (La. Ct.

App. 3d Cir. 1992) (holding against discharged nontenured faculty member who claimed
that notice of termination was not sent in accord with Faculty Handbook; and upholding
summary judgment for defendant, announcing what appears to be a per se rule that, as a
matter of law, "policy handbooks do not constitute a part of the contract per se"); Miceli v.
Universal Health Servs . , Inc., 606 So. 2d 908, 9 1 0 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.) (holding that
employee was at will, despite language in employee handbook; court both

applied

disclaimer to find that the h andbook was not part of employee's contract, and then recited all
of the provisions of this noncontract that the employee assertedly breached), writ denied,
609 So. 2d 227 (La. 1 99 2) ; Keller v. Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word, 597 S o . 2d 1 1 1 3,
1 1 1 5 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 992) (holding employer's personnel manual , which laid out
graded levels of disci pline preceding termination, not to be a contract).

The Keller court

followed Thebner v. Xerox Corp., 400 So. 2d 454 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 985), writ denied,
484 So. 2d 139 (La. 1 986), in asserting that the "elements for confection [of a contract were
not] not present," but did not specify which element was missing. See also Gilbert v. Tulane
Univ., 909 F.2d 1 24, 1 26 (5th Cir. 1 990) (following Wall v. Tulane Univ., 499 So. 2d 375
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 986), writ denied, 500 So. 2d 427 (La. 1987), and holding that the
Tulane employee handbook is not an enforceable contract). But see Cowart v. Lee, 626 So.
2d 93, 94-96 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (holding that LA. R.S. 17:8 1 .5 does place some
procedural restraints on school boards who tenninate employees, and thus removes
employees from category of employees at will).
1 1 5.

609 So. 2d 958 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 99 3 ) .

1 1 6. Id. at 96 1 (citing Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Synd., 1 7 4 La. 6 6 , 1 39 S o . 760
( 1 932); State v. Motor, 5 5 1 P.2d 783 (Kan. 1976)).
1 1 7. As the court stated: 'The reasons for tennination need not be accurate, fair or
reasonable . . . . The question of why Mix was tenninated is irrelevant and c onsequently
raises no genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 964.
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1
"exceptions" to that doctrine cannot apply, 1 8 the court's actual analysis
1
employed common-law concepts and methodology throughout.1 9
Perhaps the ultimate expression of the lower courts' hostility to
the claims of terminated employees can be found in the Fifth Circuit's
recent decision in Finkle v. Majik Market.120 The plaintiff, a
discharged assistant store manager, conceded that he was employed at
will and could thus be fired without cause. 1 2 1 However, he contended
that company policy and Louisiana Civil Code article 2024, the article
1
which governs termination of contracts terminable at will, 22 both
required that such firing be preceded by reasonable notice. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. In an effort to justify the failure to provide the
employee even the minimal "notice" rights embodied in article 2024,
the Finkle court embarked on a novel analysis, arguing that

1 1 8. Id. at 96 1 n. 1 .
1 1 9. The Mix court was sensitive to the potential for conflation of common- and c i vil
law authority, at least to some extent. Thus, while t h e court noted that the defendant had
relied on "several excellent, well reasoned cases from around the country involving
remarkably similar facts," i t decli ned to rely expressly on them, except "to refute the
contention that Louisiana policy is somehow abberrational or anachronistic." Id. at 96 1 n. I .
However, on a deeper level, the court's implicit reliance on common-law concepts and
reasoning is apparent. Nowhere in Mix does the court discuss the parties' contract in terms
of "cause" or any other codal requirement for enforceability of conventional obligations;
rather, the grievance procedure relied on by the plaintiff was held to be unenforceable
essentially because of

the

lack

of the common-law

requirements of mutual i t y

or

consideration. Nor did t h e court attempt to reason from the language and purpose of article
2747, the only Civil Code article which it apparently found relevant to the dispute before it.
Instead, the court relied solely on precedent and appeared to regard the lack of precedent
which squarely supported the plaintiff as dispositive against him. Id. at 962-64.
Again, it may be that the same result could have been reached through civilian analysis.
Or perhaps not. But in either event, it is clear that the reasoning process which Louisiana
courts have actually followed in Mix and elsewhere continues to bear all the hallmarks of its
common-law origin.
1 20.

628 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. I 993 ).

121.

Id. at 260.

1 22.

Louisiana Civil Code article 2024 provides the following:

ARTICLE 2024. A contract of unspecified duration may be lerminated at the will o f

either party b y giving notice, reasonable i n time and form, t o the other party.
This article was added i n I 984.

However, as the revision comments make clear, the

concept it states was not new, but rather only makes generally applicable a principle of good
faith that had previously been embodied in other more specific code articles. LA. Clv. CODE
ANN. art. 2024 cmts. (West 1 987).

Remarkably, in light of the result in

Finkle,

revision

comment (c) following article 2024 explicitly states that d ischarge of at-wi ll employees is
governed by that article: "(c) Under this Anicle. a contract for employment for an indefinite
duration may be tenninated at the will or either party."' (Emphasis added.)
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employment relations can be classified into three, rather than the
traditional two, separate regimes : those in which the employment is
for a definite term; those in which the employee is employed
according to a contract of unspecified duration; and employees at will,
now conceived of as a third category of employees guvemed by article
2747 alone.123 Thus, the court accepted the defendant's argument that
this last category of employment relations is not even contractual in
nature, and thus article 2024 did not apply. 124 Apparently, acc ording to
the court in Finkle, the employee just happened to show up to work
each day, and the employer just happened to give him money each
week, without any promise on either side or any understanding that the
payment was in return for the performance.
The purpose behind presenting the case law has not been to imply
that all of the . cases reached the wrong result, or that Louisia n a should
abandon the doctrine of employment at will .

Rather, the cases

highlight two important points about the Louisiana courts ' current
approach to these issues. First, the current approach did not develop
organically out of the Louisiana Civil Code and was not interpreted by
traditional civilian methods of analysis. Instead, that approach has its
roots in common-law analysis and concepts.

Although later cases

have attempted to root their analyses in various articles of the
Louisiana Civil Code-initially article 1 67 , later article 2746, and after
1 96 1 and continuing until today, in article 2747-the historical process
shows that the courts' analysis has been "grafted onto" rather than
"derived from" those articles.

Louisiana's adoption of absolutist

common-law concepts of employment at will came first.
Code was cited in support of that analysis only later.

The Civil

Second, the

Louisiana Supreme C ourt has never definitively ruled that issues such
as good faith or reliance on representations by employers are irrelevant
to an analysis of employment at will in Louisiana.

Although the

absolutist tradition is strong in Louisiana, the actual holdings that
123. Finkle, 628 So. 2d at 26 1 -62.
124. In the court' s words:
In this case, defendant has provided ample evidence to show that the
relationship between it and plaintiff was simple, at-will employment.
The
affidavits of the company personnel state that plaintiff was not hired under a
contract for an indefinite or definite term.
v. \fyeth Labs, Inc. , 526 So. 2d 1 1 O l (La. 1988) (identifying article
2024 as one of the articles of the Civil Code "pertinent to" terminatio n of at-will
employees).

Id. at 262. Cf Brannan
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embody this extreme version of the doctrine exist only among the
courts of appeal ; the views of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal have
never been ratified or adopted by the Louisian a Supreme Court.

It is not enough, however, to demonstrate that Louisiana's
doctrine of employment at will has been shaped by common-law
influences, or that the state's highest court has not yet definitively ruled
on the more extreme uses to which that analysis has been put. What
remains unclear i s how that analysis should proceed so that it
c onforms to the terms and methodology of the Louisiana Civil Code.

ill.

ON 1HE MISINTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 1 67, 2746, AND 2747 :
WHY AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AGREE1\1ENTS S HOULD BE TREA1ED

LIKE ALL 0rn:ER 0BI...IGATIONS 'TERMINABLE AT WILL
Louisiana courts have treated at-wi l l employment contracts as

sui generis, to be a n al yzed without reference to the analysis accorded
similar obligations terminable at wil l . Although original ly borrowed
from common-law sources, this specialized treatment has been
j ustified by reference to certain specific Louisiana Civil Code
articles-former arti cle 1 67 (present article 2746) and today article
2747-and by the implicit rule that specific coda! provisions pre vail
over general ones.

Thus, the first step i n analysis must be to

determine the importance of these articles, whether they appl y to
ordi nary employees and, if so, whether they should be interpreted i n
a manner that subj ects ordinary employees to a special ized regi me,
not apply to similar leases and convent i o n al

one which does
obl i gations.

A.

Former Article 167
Former articl e 1 67 can be disposed of quickly. Until its repeal

in

1 990, that article provided the following:

"Persons who h ave

attained the age of m ajority cannot bind themselves for
than ten years . " 1 25

a

longer term

Because article 1 67 has been repealed , 1 26 it

certainly provides no current basis for i nterpreting the re lations o f
employers and employees according t o a special regime. However, i t

125.

LA. CIY. CODE ANN. art. 167 (West 1972).

permi tted by article 167

was

five years. It

years. Act No. 355 1964 La. Acts.

126. Act No. 705, § 1 1990 La. Acts.

was

Originally. the maximum term

amended in 1964 to extend the term to ten
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is worth noting that even when still in effect, article 1 67 provided no
justification for
terminate
conclusion.

an

at-will

absolutist approach to an employers ' right to
employees.

Several

reasons

underlie

this

First, the sources and context of article 1 67 strongly

suggest that it was intended to apply only to "bound" servants, such
as apprentices or indentured servants, who were considered to have
"sold" rather than "leased" their services . 1 27 Second, article 1 67 was
intended, and should have been interpreted, to protect rather than to
justify bad faith conduct toward employees. 128

Finally, even if

1 27. Several items of evidence converge to support the conclusion that article 167
was intended to apply only to bound servants. First, the drafting history of the group of
articles of which article 1 67 was a part indicates that all-including article 1 67-were
intended to apply only t o bound servants. Articles 1 65 through 173 were derived from
substantially similar provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825. LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
arts. 1 57-167 ( 1 825); see supra note 34 (presenting articles 165 through 1 73). In particular,
article 167 was a verbatim copy of a predecessor provision i n the Code of 1 825, a provision
which had no cognate in the Digest of 1 808. LA. Crv. CODE ANN art. 160 ( 1 825). As the
Projet for the 1 825 Civil Code made clear, these articles were all added, as a group, in order
to conform the Code to statutory law regulating bound servants:
We have been under the necessity of altering this chapter in order to insert in it the
principal dispositions of the act of May 2 1 , 1 806, entitled "an act to regulate the
duties and rights of apprentices, & c."
LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES: A REPUBLICATION OF THE PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
LOUISIANA OF 1 825, at 1 1 ( 1 937) [hereinafter PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA OF
1 825).
The plain language of articles 165 through 173 also clearly indicates that they are of
limited application, either because they specifically refer to apprentices or "bound" servants,
or because they would make little sense in any other context. See supra note 34 (setting out
the full texts of the relevant articles). Thus, although the English text of article 1 67 does not
specifically limit its application to apprentices or indentured servants, the context in which
that article appears is certainly suggestive.
Finally, this pervasive unity of application is particularly evident in the French texts of
the corresponding articles of the 1 825 Civil Code, which use the verb "s'engager" to
describe the process by which an apprentice or indentured servant becomes bound, and the
cognate noun "engage" throughout the predecessors of the above articles to describe the
class of servants to which they apply. The French text of the 1 825 predecessor of article
167, in particular, used this same term, "engage," to identify those servants to which it
applied. See generally M.J.S., supra note 76, at 467 (arguing that article 1 67 should be
understood, from its context, to apply only to bound servants).
1 28. When the predecessor of article 167 was first inserted into the Louisiana Civil
Code in 1825, the drafters chose to shorten the maximum term for engagement from the
seven years permitted b y the then-applicable statute t o the five years originally permitted by
the Code. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1 60 (1 825). As the drafters of the 1 825 Projet explained:
'The term formerly permitted was seven, but it is better for the person employed to renew
his engagement, if he thinks proper, than to be boun d for so long a time." PROJET OF THE
CIVIL. CODE OF LoUISIANA OF 1 825. supra note 1 27' at 1 2.
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expansively interpreted, article 1 67 provided only that contracts for
more than a
thereafter.1 29

set

n umber of years

reverted to at-will

status

Article 1 67, by itself, limited only the permissible

length of the contracts to which it refers.

Article 1 67 contained no

language suggesting how the substantive rights of employers and
employees in

at-wi l l

relationships

should

be interpreted,

nor

provided any authority for interpreting such contracts differently than
any other contract terminable at will.

B.

Article 2746
Article 2746 likewise provides no justification for treating

employment contracts as inherently different from other sorts of
contracts terminable at will. That article provides the following: "A
man can only hire out his services for a certain limited time, or for
the performance of a certain enterprise."130

Unlike former article

1 67 , article 2746 remains in effect and does appear to apply to
ordinary employees. 1 3 1 However, the drafting history132 and ultimate
Subsequent courts and commentators have recognized the dominant purpose of article

1 67 to protect, rather than disadvantage, employees. See, e.g., Thaxton v. Roberson, 224 So.
2d 1 8 3, 1 85 (La. Ct. App. 3 d Cir.

1969) (holding that since arti cle 1 67 was intended to

protect employees, i t should not be interpreted to bar recovery, at the contract rate, for time
an employee actually worked beyond the maximum five-year term of his contract); Recenr
Jurisprudence, supra note 76 (discussing a plethora of civilian and Louisiana authority for
the proposition that article 1 67 was i ntended only to prevent employees from being bound
for more than five years, and not to confer any rights on the employer).

1 29. See supra note 76 (discussion therein).
1 30.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2746 (West 1 994).

131.

The grounds for distinguishing the applicability of article 2746 from that o f

former article 1 67 are a t least twofold. First i s their respective contexts. Former article 1 67
appeared in the Code among a series of other articles which unmistakably applied only to
apprentices, indentured servants, and the like. See supra note 1 27 (discussion therein).
Article 2746, in contrast, is placed in Book III, Title IX, Chapter 3, the chapter which
discusses the contractual relations of employers and employees in general.

The second

difference between article 2746 and former article l 67 is their language. Former article 1 67
spoke of the maximum length of time for which employees may "bind themsel ves"
("s 'engage," in the French version of the 1 825 predecessor), a choice of words which
suggests some form of bound servitude. Article 2746, in contrast, speaks of the limits on a
person 's ability to "hire out h i s services," ("engager ses services" in the French versio n of
the 1 825 predecessor), a choice which suggests a more limited, and thus more typical, kind
of employer-employee relation.
1 3 2.

Current article 2746 is a verbatim copy of a predecessor in the Louisiana Civil

Code of 1 825, which was itself copied, without substantial change, from the Louisiana
Digest of 1808. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2717 (1 825); La. Digest of 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,

art.

56, at 382. The French text of the article was also copied verbatim from the Digest of 1 808
to the Code of 1 825, and reads as follows: "On ne peut engager ses services qu'a terns. ou
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s ources133 of article 2746 clearly indicate that this article too was
intended only for a limited purpose-i.e., to protect employees by
preventing them from alienating the whole of their life 's working
capacity, an act which the original French sources of article 2746
saw as equivalent to selling oneself into slavery. 134 At most, article
pour une enterprise detenninee." LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 , art. 56 at 3 8 3 ; LA.

CN. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1 972) (notes). As can be seen, the English text is, in this
case, an accurate translation o f the French original.

1 33. The French text of this article was copied verbatim from the French Code Civil

of 1 804, the Code Napoleon. CODE Clvn.. art. 1 780 ( 1 804); LA. Clv. CODE ANN. a11. 2746

(West 1 972) (notes). See generally Rodol fo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: !rs

Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TuL. L. REV. 4, 1 1 3 ( 1 971 ). Article I 780 of the

French Code Civil of 1 804 was in tum derived from a somewhat differently phrased article

of the French Projet of 1 800, the study that led to the Code Napoleon:

" 1 1 1 . On ne peut

engager ses services qu' a temps, et non pour la vie." P ROJ ET DE CODE CIVIL, PRESENTE PAR

LA COMMISSION NOMINEE PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT LE 24 THERM[J){)R AN VIII. bk. Ill, tit.
XII, art. 1 1 1 (1 800) [hereinafter FRENCH PROJET OF 1 800] .
1 34. The draft version of this article as it originally appeared in the French Projet of
1 800 made this purpose explicit because it expressly forbade enforcement of employment
contracts "for life" ("pour la vie").
This understanding was also made clear in the "Observations" of the French Appellate
Tribunals on the draft text of the Projet of 1 800, and in the "Discussions" of the Conseil
d'Etat, in which that draft text was amended and cast into its final form.

Several of the

Tribunaux d'Appel suggested that a reasonably short maximum term for employment

contracts should be established in order to prevent employment from degenerating into a

kind of servitude. 5 P.A FENET RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATO!RES DE CODE
,

Crvn. 84 (Paris 1836) (comments of the Tribunal d ' Orleans); 4 FENET, supra, at 209
(comments of the Tribunal de Lyon). The Conseil d ' Etat was also clear that this was the
reason for the provision, and that the change in terminology between the Proj et o f 1 800 and
the Code Civil of 1804 was not intended to change its meaning:
A !'occasion du louage des domestiques et ouvriers, ii etatit convenable de
consacrer de nouveau le principe de la liberte individuelle; c'est ce que fait le
projet en statuant qu'on ne peut engager ses services qu'a temps ou pour une
entreprise determinee.

4 FENET, supra, at 339.
Yillaume, in his nineteenth century commentary of the Code Napoleon, was even more
explicit, both as to the reason for the inclusion of this article in the Code Napoleon, and its
intent to protect the employee. The employer, according to Villaume, gained no rights by
virtue of this article. He wrote:
La Joi n'admet pas comme valable !'obligation prise par un homme de
servir toute sa vie, ce que serait contraire a la liberte naturelle et a Ia <lignite
humaine. II en serait de meme si )' engagement etatit fait pour un temps fixe ou un
entreprise determinee, si ce temps ou la durc�e de I' entreprise etaient assez
considerables pour absorber la vie de celui qui s' oblige.

Mais je ne vois pas ce qui empecherait le mfutre de s' obliger a garder un

domestique pendant toute sa vie; dans cette convention, rien de contraire a I' ordre

public, rien a la liberte; cet article ne s'y oppose pas; seulement, si l ' ou vrier
manque a ses engagements, le miiitre peut le renvoyer.
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provides some authority for the proposition that contracts

without a specific end point should be considered terminable at w i l l ;
i t also says nothing about whether exercise of the right to fire an at
will employee req uires good faith, or whether the right can be
modified by contract .

C.

Article 2747
Article

challenge.

2747,

i n contrast, poses a more difficult interpre t i ve

Louisiana courts have relied on this article for the l as t

thirty years to justify their absolutist approach t o employment a t wi l l .

In contrast to forme r article

1 67

and artic l e

274 6,

article

2747

does

provide authority for a n absolutist approach to an employer's right to
fire, at least in the c i rcumstances to whi c h it refers. Article

2 747

provides as follows :

A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or
family, without as signi ng any reason for so doing. The servant is also

free to depart wit
. hout ass1gmng
. . any cause. 135

Remarkably, although this article has been ci ted and quoted by
Louisiana courts on many occasions, no court has expressly considered
the question of whether article

2747

appl ies to all employees who

work without a fixed-term contract, or rather to only a limi ted
subcategory of such employees.

While many courts have assumed

without discussion that the article can be broadly applied,1.16 the pl ain
language of article

2747

suggests that it does not apply to every

employee. Instead, the article, on its face, appears to apply to only a
restricted class of employees-to servants who are "attached to [the
master's] person or family." The question is whether this apparently
l imiting language should be interpreted in accord with its ostensible
meaning. 1 37 To answer this question, it will be necessary to investigate
the sources from which the article was drawn, the specific language
M. F. YU!LLAUME, COMMENTAIRE ANALYTIQUE OU CODE NAPOLEON 598 (Paris 1 858).

LA CIY. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1 988).
See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
I am indebted to a col league, Robert Pascal, for pointing out the signifi cance o f
this limiting language. Like the courts o f Louisiana, I too read article 2747 for years without
1 3 5.

1 3 6.
1 3 7.

ever paying attention to those words or reflecting on their possible meaning. That we did so
i s a testament to the power of a received understanding lo obscure what should h a ve
otherwise been obvious. That Professor Pascal perceived the plain meaning of the words i s
a testament to the value o f rigorous civilian scholarship an d t o the virtues o f critical
awareness of and fidelity 10 texts which such training engenders.
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which it employs, the relation between article 2747 and other articles
of the Louisiana Civil Code which also deal with similar categories of
employees, and the early case law defining those special categories.
Origin and Sources of Article 2747

1.

The drafting history of article 2747 is clear, although not in
itself helpful in elucidating the meaning of the relevant phrase.
Article 2747 has never been amended, and is thus not accompanied
by any Revision Comments.

Its text was copied verbatim from a

predecessor article of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825, 138 which
was itself copied from the Louisiana Digest of 1 808. 139

Moreau

Lislet's "source notes" to the Louisiana Digest of 1 808 do not list
any source for the predecessor of present article 2747 . 1 40 However,
the text of the relevant article of the Louisiana Digest of 1 808 is a
close copy from the French Projet du Gouvemement of 1 800, 141 the
study that led to the Code Napoleon. 142 Thus, scholars have had no
difficulty in concluding that the ultimate source of current article
2747-like that of all the other Code articles on lease of services
was the French Projet of 1 800143 and more broadly, the Roman and
French legal traditions which underlay that Projet.

1 3 8. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 27 18 (1 825).
1 39. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 , art. 57, at 382. The English text of this
article in the Digest is identical to current article 2747. The French text of the article
which, as the language in which the Digest was composed, is the more authoritative-reads
slightly differently than the English version, as follows:

ARTICLE 57. Les domestiques attaches a la personne du mfutre, ou au service des
maisons, peuvent etre renvoyes en tout terns sans expression de cause, et peuvent
de meme quitter leurs mfiltres.

1 40. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra, note 3 1 , opp. at 382.

See generally Mitchell

Franklin, An Important Document in the History of American Roman and Civil Law:

The

de la Vergne Manuscript, 33 TuL. L. R.Ev. 35 ( 1 958) (describing the discovery and initial
evaluation of the de la Vergne manuscript) ; Robert Pascal, A Recent Discovery: A Copy of
the "Digest of the Civil l.Aws " of 1808 with Marginal Source References in Moreau-Lislet's
Hand, 26 LA. L. REV. 25 (1 965) (describing the discovery of and evaluating another volume
apparently containing the original draft of Moreau-Lislet's notes).

1 4 1 . FRENCH PROJET OF 1 800, supra note 133, bk. III, tit. XII, art. 1 1 2.
1 42. Interestingly, the relevant article from the French Projet of 1800 was never
incorporated into the Code Napoleon, or into any subsequent version of the French Code
Civil.

It lives today only in the Civil Code of Louisiana.

See infra notes 1 6 1 - 1 66 and

accompanying text.

1 43 . LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1972) (notes); Batiza, supra note 1 33, at
1 1 3.
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The Anci enne Regime: Of Rome and Pothier

a.

A central institution of Roman private law was the "family," an
expansive concept

that included not just blood and adoptive

relations, but also the servants and retainers attached to the family.
All who lived within and as part of that extended family-sons,
slaves, and everyon e i n between-lived under the originally absolute
and always substantial power of the paterfamilias, who alone owned
and disposed of family property.144 Productive labor was generally
performed within the context of the nearly self-sufficient household
and by its members. For this reason, the lease of labor or services by
nonfamily outsider s , though recognized at Roman law,145 w as a
relatively rare and u n important institution, one which was never well
1 6
articulated or developed in Roman law. 4 It is clear, however, that
Roman law maintained an important disti nction between workers
who resided within the master's household and were subject to his
general authority, and workers who were not part of the household
and whose relations to the

paterfamilias

n ature. 147

1 44.

were solely contractual m

As one commentator has stated:

The word Familia has many meanings, but i n its strict sense it denotes a
group consisting of a paterfamilias and those under his control, i.e., his children,
adoptive or natural, who have not passed out of the family by emancipation or the
like, remoter issue through males, in the same case, the wife, . . . civil bondsmen
and slaves.
WllLJAM W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 1 02
( 1 92 1 ); see also HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 1 35-46 (Legal Classics Library ed. 1 982);
BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 65-67 ( 1 962).
1 45 . This lease could take one of two forms: the locatio conductio operarum, in
which the worker, as lessor, places his services at the disposal of the employer, as lessee; and
the locatio conductio operis, in which the employer, as lessor, places out a piece of work to
be done (the worker, as lessee, in effect leases the job). Interestingly, only certain forms of
work-those relatively laborious, menial or "illiberal" arts which could be valued in
money-could be the subject of the locatio. Exercise of the "liberal arts" such as the
services of an attorney, were not considered appropriate for lease. See generally BUCKLAND,
supra note 144, at 500-03; L. B. CURZON, ROMAN LAW 1 52-54 ( 1 966); NICHOLAS, supra

note 1 44, at 1 82-83.
1 46. Wll1JAM BUCKLAND, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 276
( 1 9 1 2) ("In view of the large part which locatio plays i n modem life, and it seems, must
have played at Rome, the paucity of our information in the texts is somewhat surprising." );
NICHOLAS, supra note 1 44, at 1 83-84; Thomas Tucker, Sources of Louisiana 's Law of
Persons: Blackstone, Domat and the French Codes, 44 TUL. L. REY. 264, 268-69 ( 1 970).
1 47. Tucker, supra note 1 46, at 268-69.
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The law of pre-revolutionary France was broadly similar to that
of Rome. Although the family no longer held unquestioned primacy
as the organizing principle of civil society in pre-revolutionary
France, 148 members of the household still performed much work
w ithin the context of the household.

Lease of services, thoug h still

recognized, continued to be a relatively undeveloped category of legal
analysis.149 Jurists of the time typically discussed the overall topic of
leases and hires almost entirely in the context of leases of things, and
generally dealt with problems arising out of the lease of services only
as relatively minor specifications of or deviations from the basic rules
governing leases in general.150 It appears, however, that the important
1 48.

See, e.g., I JEAN D OM AT, THE CIVIL LAW

IN

ITS NATURAL OR DER tit. 2, § 2, at
,

1 4 1 -42 (Luther Cushing trans., William Strahan ed., 1 85 3 ) (noting that the Roman-derived
distinction between fathers and sons remained important as a basis for French law, but
adding that new distinctions among persons unknown to Roman law-such as those
regarding the nobi lity, burgesses, and vassals-had also become important as well).
1 49 .

One French commentator summed it up this way:
Our ancient authors, with Pothier at their head, were not concerned with the

letting of work; they did not detennine either its nature, nor its conditions, nor its
effects, and there are two reasons for that:

( I ) the Roman law could not serve

them as a guide, having known only servile work;

(2) under the ancient monarchy,

industrial work was subjected either to a corporative regime regulated by interior
rules of the corps of industry, or to the regime of privileged manufacturers, the
first form of big industry, governed by royal ordinances. All that was considered
as a matter of policy, much more than of law.
found

as

And the jurists, such as Pothier,

submitted to juristic principles, only the hiring of domestics, a small and

infertile matter, especially at that time.
2 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL No. 1 828, at 102 (Louisiana State
Law Institute, 1 1 th ed. 1 93 9 , 1 959); see also Tucker, supra note 1 46, at 273.
1 5 0.

Thus, for example, Domat's treatment of leases of services was limited to such

specialized issues as the degree of care which the worker must exercise with regard to the
employer's property, the special duties of carriers and w atermen, allocating the risk when the
project is destroyed before completion, and the liability of the employer for wages under
various eventualities. DOMAT, supra note 148, bk. I, tit. IV, §§ 8 & 9, at 278 -83 .

Domat

treated the issue of lease of property, especially real property, first and most extensively.
Only the two relatively short sections of his treatise noted above dealt with the location

operarum, the leases of services.
Pothier, in his treatise on leases, wrote extensively about leases of labor o r industry
only in two places. The more lengthy of the two treatments, Part Seven of the treatise, dealt
with the locatio operis, the letting and hiring of a piece of work. Though important, the
legal relationship contemplated in this Part was more akin to what we would classify as the
relationship between a principal and an independent contractor, rather than that existing
between an employer and an employee. ROBERT POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF

LETTING AND HIRING §§ 392-457, at 146-7 1 (G.A. Mulligan trans., 1 953).

That latter

relationship, conceptualized as the letting or hiring of services by a worker to an employer

(locatio operarum), was discussed by Pothier in only a single article of thirteen sections.
The only issues discussed in that article were the questions of whether and to what extent
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distinction betwee n servants who were members of the employer's
household and those who only leased their labor was maintained.
Thus, for example, Pothier, in his limited discussion of the lease of
services, seems to speak of at least two different types of persons who
enter into such leases, distinguishing between serviteurs or
domestiques (domestic or personal servants) and ouvriers (workers or
artisans).15 1 Pothier also clearly distinguished between servants who
live with the master and those who do not, stating, for example, that a
master must ordinarily pay wages to servants of the former class even
when the servants are ill and cannot work, but that the master owes no
5
similar obligation to servants of the latter class. 1 2
More important for purposes of this article, however, Pothier
specifically noted that while it was customary to hire farmworkers or
artisans for a fixed period, the custom of the time permitted masters to
discharge servants who "serve the person of their master" at any time,
without cause or liability. Section 1 7 6 of Pothier's treatise states:
To hire servants for fixed periods is customary in the case of rural
servants, such as plough-men, vintagers, millers, etc. and also in the
case of farm-maids. Hirings for fixed periods are likewise customary

general principles regarding the remission of rent s h ould be applied to the analogous
problem of remission of wages in situations where an employee is unable to perform the
tasks assigned. POTHIER, supra, §§ 1 65- 1 77, at 65-69.

151.

POTHIER, supra note 1 50, §§ 1 65- 1 78 , at 92-98; see Tucker, supra note 1 46, at

274 (quoting POTIIlER, supra note 1 50, § 10. Tucker read Pothier as distinguishing between
three types of servants:
Whenever the lease of services was distinguished in Pothier's Traite from
the lease of a thing, i t was only with reference to the three sorts of servants
mentioned [in § 1 0, "serviteurs et servantes," "manouvres," and "artisans"],
though the tenn, serviteur, seems to have been used interchangeably with

domestique, and manouvres with ouvriers. These are the same three referred to i n
the Projet [of 1 800], which used domestique, ouvrier, and ouvrier artiste.
Tucker, supra note 146, at 274.

1 52.

Pothier wrote:
Now, one can say that our servants, living with us, are in our service, even

while they are ill, and that they do not cease to be in our service, nor cease to be
able to describe themselves as being our servants. This cannot, however, have any
application to a contract of lease, for when a man lets me his services for a year
for a certain sum, the sum which I undertake to pay h i m, is intended by both of us
to be a wage for the actual services he is to render, and not to be a consideration
paid to him for merely occupying the position of servant: he must have rendered
me the services or have been in a position to do so during the whole of the period
of his contract. The cases are, therefore, not parallel . . . .

POTHIER, supra note 1 50, § 1 6 8 , at 66-67.
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in towns in the case of artisans.

But as to servants who let their

services to persons in town of the bourgeois class, or in the country to
members of the nobility to serve the person of their master; though
suchlike services are let at so much per annum, they are nevertheless
considered to be let only for such time as it may please the masters to
retain them. That is why masters can dismiss at will such servants,
without giving a reason, and paying them only up to the date of
1 53
dismissal.

Notably, Pothier was equally clear that the freedom to terminate the
relationship did not apply in both directions.154

The

second

paragraph of § 1 76 stated that house and family retainers, though
subject to dismissal at any time, were not free to quit before the end
of their term. Pothier wrote:
These servants, however, are not allowed to leave their master's
service without his permission, and if they do they will be ordered by
the Court to return and to remain in their master's service, either until
the day of the next term up to which it is customary in the locality to
hire servants, or during such a period of time as will be sufficient to
enable the master to obtain another servant, this period to be
detennined by the judge.

In this matter the various customs of the

various localities must be observed.

155

Re gardles s of how one might view this l ack of mutuality, the crucial
point is that for Pothier, it is only a special, limited custom which
pertains only to limited classes of servants who perform d omestic

tasks within the household or who are otherwise attached to the

1 53. Id. § 1 76, at 69. The distinctions which Pothier draws-between industrial
workers ("ouvriers") and farmworkers ("serviteurs de campagne") on the one hand, and
domestic or personal servants ("service de la personne du maitre") on the other-are more
evident in the French text:
Ces louages de services pour un temps detennine sont d'usage a l'egard des
serviteurs de campagne, tels que Jes serviteurs de labour, de vigneron s , de
meuniers, etc., !es servantes de cour. Ils sont aussi d' usage dans Jes villes a
l'egard des ouvriers. A l'egard des serviteurs qui louent leurs services aux
bourgeois des villes ou meme a la campagne aux gentilshommes pour le service
de la personne du mfutre; quoiqu'ils !es louent a raison de tant par an, ils sont
neanmoins censes ne les louer que pour le temps qu' ii plaira au mil.itre de les avoir
a son service. C' est pourquoi le maitre peut !es renvoyer quand bon lui semble, et
sans en dire la raison, en leur payant leurs services jusqu'au jour qu'ils les
renvoie.
1 54. ROBERT PonIIER , OUVRES DE POTHIER:

ThAITE DU CONTRAT DE LoUAGE ET

TRArrE DES CHEPTELS § 1 76, at 97 (Nouvelle ed., 1806).
155. POTHIER, supra note 150, § 176, at 69.
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of the master that gives the master the right to dismiss such
servants at will w i th out assigning a reason and without incurrin g any
liability for future wages. Moreover, since Pothier found it necessary
to state that domestics subject to dismissal at will could nonetheless
be required to remain at service "until the day of the next term up to
which it is customary in the locality to h ire servants," it is clear that
the employer's unilateral right to discharge the servant at will would
apply even if the servant and master had entered into a contract
which, by custom or otherwise, contemplated a set term of
employment. In other words, for Pothier, the kind of "employment
at will" contemplated in § 1 76 is not the converse of employment for
a fixed term. It is, rather, a limited exception to the general rules
governing lease of services-an exception that applies regardless of
whether those services are let by the day or by the year, but one that
applies to only a very limited class of employees.
person

b.

The Frenc h Projet of 1 800

The French Projet de Code Civil of 1 800 156 continued these
distinctions, embodying them in a series of articles which retained
the traditional differentiations among types of servants noted by
Pothier. Those articles appear to have been carefully drafted to
maintain a distinction between three types of workers: domestiques,
ouvriers, and ouvriers artiste (artisans). 1 57 More specifically, the
Projet carefully and clearly distinguished between two types of
domestiques: those who were "attached to the person of the master,
or to service of the house," who could quit or be dismissed at will

1 56.

FRENCH PROJET O F 1 800, supra note 1 33 .

1 57.

I n addition t o t h e articles quoted i n the text, section 1 1 6 articulates a special rule

of nonliability for a limited class of artisans ("ouvriers artiste") employed by the day.
Section 1 1 6 states in part: "1 1 6. L' ouvrier artiste employe a la joumee, n'est pas tenu de la
FRENCH PROJET OF 1 800, supra note 1 33, art. 1 1 6.
See
generally M. F. VU!Ll.AUME, COMMENTAIRE ANALYTIQUE DU CODE NAPOLEON art. 1 780, at
598 ( 1 855) (distinguishing between domestiques and ouvriers). Yuillame wrote:
mal-fa�on de son ouvrage."

Je crois que I' o n doit donner la qualification de domestiques aux serviteurs

a gages qui donnent leurs SOinS a Ja personne OU au menage, OU qui aident dans Jes
travaux agricoles, qui logent et vivent dans la maison.

La denominatio n d'ouvriers est donnee aux gens de travail qui louent leurs
services a tant par jour, ou dont la profession est classee panni Jes arts
mecaniques.
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without cause; and those who worked in other capacities, w h o could
not:
1 12. Les domestiques attaches a la personne du maitre,

OU au

service des maisons, peuvent etre renvoyes en tout temps

sans

expression de cause, et peuvent de meme quitter leurs maitres.

1 1 3. Les domestiques attaches a la culture, Jes servantes de cour, les
ouvriers artistes, ne peuvent ni quitter leurs maitres, ni etre renvoyes
par eux, avant le temps convenu, que pour le cause grave.

1 14. Si, hors le cas de cause grave, le maitre renvoie

son

domestique ou son ouvrier avant le temps convenu, ii doit Jui payer le
salaire entier de l ' annee, ou du temps pour lequel ii l' avait loue,
deduction faite de la somme que le domestique ou l'ouvrier pourra
vraisemblablement gagner ailleurs, pendant le temps qui reste a courir.

1 1 5. Si c' est le domestique ou I' ouvrier qui quitte sans cause
legitime, ii doit etre condarnne, envers le maitre, a une indemnite qui
est fixee sur ce qu' il en coute de plus au maitre pour obtenir d'un autre
les mernes services. 1 5

8

The Projet took at least a small step in the direction of egalitarianism
by providing that the servants attached to the master 's person or
household were as free to quit as the master was free to discharge
1 9
them. 5 However, the Projet, like Planiol, made it clear that only
that limited class of house or personal servants was subject to this
absolute rule of termination at will.

As the articles quoted above

make clear, other types of domestics, like other workers or artisans,
were not covered by article 1 1 2 and thus could neither quit nor be
fired without good cause before the expiration of their terms of
60
employment. 1
Nor would there be any basis in Pothier or the Projet

1 58. FRENCH PROJET OF 1 800, supra note 133, arts. 1 1 2- 1 1 5.
1 59. Note, however, that not all vestiges of class di stinction were eliminated from the
Projet's treatment of these issues.

For example, the Projet provided that the master's

affirmation was to be considered conclusive in any d ispute over the amount of a servant's
wages or over what sums, if any, were due to that servant. Id. art. 1 10.

1 60. This point was also made explicitly in the "Observations" of the Tribunal de
Colmar, one of the appellate courts which made official comments on the draft text of the
Projet of 1800. That tribunal expressed concern that article 1 1 2 made no express provision
for payment of wages due to dismissed house and personal servants. While article 1 1 3 did
include such a provision, the Tribunal de Colmar decided that article 1 1 3 would not apply to
house and personal servants of the sort referred to in article 1 1 2:
L'article 1 1 2 et suivans traitent des domestiques. Le premier porte que Jes
domestiques attaches a la personne du mfutre ou au service des maisons peuvent
etre renvoyes, en tout temps, sans expression de cause, et peuvent de meme quitter
leurs mfutres; mais ii ne statue pas sur le mode de paiement de leurs gages.

Les
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to argue that leases of services for an indeterminate term by other
types of domestics or ordinary workers would be treated any
differently than any other form of lease for an indeterminate term.
The rationale for such a tradition of exceptional treatment of
house or body servants seems reasonably self-evident. As Roman and
traditional law recognized, family or personal retainers effectively
constituted a part of the master's family. Such retainers, and those
whom they serve, participate in a relationship that presupposes and
requires a unique kind of intimacy and trust. As Pothier and the
French Projet of 1 800 seem to h ave recognized, such an intimate
relationship cannot subsist in the absence of mutual trust.
Despite these policy arguments, h owever, the articles quoted
above were not ultimately incorporated into the French Civil Code,
which was adopted in 1 804.161 The reasons for this rejection are not
entirely clear. The collected Observations of the Tribunal de
Cassations and the Tibunaux d' Appel on the proposed text of the
Projet contain few references to the relevant articles, none of which
shed light on why the articles were dropped.162 In addition, the
articles suivans contiennent des dispositions a cet egard; mais comme ils ne
parlent que des domestiques attaches a culture, on pourrait dire que le mode de
paiement de ceux-ci n'est pas applicable aux domestiques dont parle !'article 1 1 2.
II serait bon, par consequent, que la Joi s'expliquat plus particulierement.
3 FENET, supra note 1 34 , at 49 1 .

I t i s also interesting t o note that the Tribunal d e Nancy suggested that articles 1 1 2
through 1 1 5 should be combined into a single article, which would have subjected all
employees who work for wages to a single, unilateral regime: All wage earners could be
fired at-will by their employer, but none could quit without good cause. 4 FENET, supra note
1 34, at 616. This suggestion was never acted on. However, the fact that it was made further
demonstrates that the regimes contemplated by articles 1 1 2 and by 1 1 3 through 1 1 5 apply to
different categories of servants, not just different types of contracts.
1 6 1 . The French Civil Code of 1 804, the Code Napoleon, retained only two of the
Projet's articles concerning workers and domestics in general:
1 780. On ne peut engager ses services qu' a temps, ou pour une entreprise

determinee.
1781. Le miiitres est cru sur son affirmation, Pour las quotite des gages;
Pour le paiement du salaire de I' annee echue; Et pour Jes a-comptes donnes pour
I' annee courante.
CODE CrvIL arts. 1 780, 1 78 1 ( 1 804). Plainly, none of these articles deal with issues
regarding the tenninability of leases of services.
1 62. Other than the comments of the Tribunals of Colmar and Nancy (see supra note
1 60), the observations relevant to the articles discussed here were few and relatively
nonsubstantive: ( I ) the Tribunal de Cassation suggested only that article 1 1 4 be amended to
deny employers the benefit of a deduction for wages that the unreasonably discharged
employee could earn elsewhere, 2 FENET, supra note 1 34, at 732; (2) the Tribunal de
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relevant articles already had been deleted from the later draft which
was discussed and amended by the Conseil d'Etat. 163

Nevertheless,

one can at least sunnise, with Planiol, both that the egalitarian and
individualist thrust of the French revolution made legal distinctions
based on personal status unpalatable,164 and that the simultaneous
enactment of an extensive industrial law by the Consulate rendered
unnecessary any detailed codal treatment of the rights and duties of
employers and employees. 1 65
Finally, it is worth noting that the common law of England,
though starting from different basic principles, had given ris e to a
similar distinction between those servants who are and those who are
not part of the master 's household.

Thus, for example, Bl ackstone

distinguished between "menial servants; so called from bein g intra

Montpelier and the Tribunal de Toulouse both suggested that articles 1 1 4 and 1 1 5 should be
amended to provide for liquidated damages equivalent to a set fraction of the annual salary,

4 FENET, supra note I 34, at 462; 5 FENET, supra note 1 34, at 623; (3) the Tribunal de Paris
wanted to substitute the term "artisans" for "ouvriers artistes" in articles 1 1 3 and 1 1 6 5
,

FENET, supra note 1 34, at 277; (4) the Tribunal de Poitiers wanted to add a provision to
article 1 1 2 limiting any indellUlity due to masters whose servants leave (or to servants
terminated without cause), 5 id. at 3 1 7; and

(5) the Tribunal de Rauen noted only

that police

regulations would be required to carry out the purposes of article 1 1 2, id. at 543.

I 63. 4 FENET,

note 1 34,

supra

at

23 1 -32, 255-56, 287-88, 303-04 (recording the

proceedings during which a draft of the Code Civil--one which did not include any of the
Projet articles quoted in the text-was discussed and amended by the Conseil d ' Etat).
Despite the absence of an equivalent to Projet article I 1 2 , some comments indicate that the
Conseil d'Etat also understood that legal distinctions n eeded to be made between "domestic
servants" and ordinary "workers."

Id. at 255

(quoting M. Defennon that "Jes regles relatives

aux ouvriers ne sont pas Jes memes que celles qui concernent !es domestiques"); see also id.
at 320- 2 1 , 339 (stating the "Communication Officielle A u Tribunal" which accompanied the
transmission of the final amended draft of the Code Ci vi 1 to the French General Assembly).

1 64.

See, e.g., 1

Pl.ANIOL, supra note 149,

at

No. 584 (commenting on the

applicability of other provisions of the Civil Code, which established the domicile of a
servant as that of his master). Planiol suggested:

First of all, it is necessary that the person really work in the capacity o f a
domestic, though it is not designated as such in the Code, through scruples

probably, but which it describes is beyond a doubt. The coda! text is addressed to
persons who serve

or

work habitually for another person and who Jive with him

and in the same house.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Tucker, supra note 146, at 275. But see CODE Crvn.. art.

I 78 1

( 1 804) (depriving servants of the opportunity to be heard to contest masters' affirmations

regarding the amount

and payment of their wages). See generally infra notes 1 85-2 1 9 and

accompanying text.

1 65 . 2 PI.ANIOL, supra note 1 49, at No. 1 829 (discussing the Jaw of 22 Germi n al,
Year

�I).

been,

m

Since

that time,

the law governing the relations of employers and employees has

France, governed almost completely by statute rather than by the Civil Code.
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166
moema, or domest1cs," and "laborers, who are only h'tred by the day
or week, and do not live intra moenia, as part of the family. " 167
Although Blackstone was apparently not the direct source of those
·

provisions of the Louisiana Digest of 1 808 that dealt specifically with
leases of services , it is clear that the drafters of the Digest were

familiar with his work and relied on it in drafting other portions o f that
168
Digest, including several articles relating to the relations of masters
and servants. 1 69
c.

Loui s i an a Digest and Civil Codes:

Incorporation and

Early Interpretation
While the French Projet of 1 800 had only a limited influence on
the ultimate shape o f employer-employee relations in France, i t was
the source of Louis i ana's law of lease of services. The drafters of the
Louisiana Digest o f 1 808 adhered close l y but not exactly to the text
of the French Proj et, writing as follows:
Art. 57.

Les domestiques attaches a la personne du mai'tre, OU a u

service des maisons, peuvent etre renvoyes e n tout temps sans
expression de cause, et peuvent de meme q u i tter leurs maitres .

Art. 58.

Les

personnes qui ont l oue

leurs services sur les

habitations, O U dans toutes autres manufactures pour y etre employees
ax travail qui say font, ne peuvent ni quitter le proprietaire auquel i l s

sont loues, n i etre renvoyes par eux avant l e terns convenu, que pour
cause grave.

Art. 59.

Si hors le cas de cause grave, le proprietaire ren voie la

personne qui lui a loue ses services, ainsi qu ' i l marque en ! ' article
precedent, avant ! ' expiration du temps convenu, ii doit lui payer le
salaire entier de l ' annee, ou du temps pour lequel i i l ' avait loue.

Art. 60.

Si c 'est au contraire la personne qui a engage ainsi scs

services, qui quitte le proprietaire, sans cause legitime, ii perdra le
salaire pour le terns qui s ' est ecoule j usq u ' alors sur son engagement.

as an

1 66.

1 WlUJAM B LACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425.

1 67.
1 68.

Id. at *426- *27.
Batiza. supra note 1 33. at 1 2. 45. 6 1 -62 (crediting Blackstone's COMMEl'fTARIL'i

imponant source of twenty-five articles of the Louisiana Digest of 1 808. including

articles on the application and construction of laws and the law of corporations).

1 69.

Id. at 5 1 (crediting Blackstone

as

the sole source of Book I, Title VI. a11iclcs 8-

14 of the Louisiana Digest of 1 808. which dealt with the rights and duties of indentured
servants and the effects o f the master-servant relationship on rhird pa!1ies).
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ou sera oblige de restituer au proprietaire c e qu'il aura re(j:u de lui
170

d'avance sur l'annee courante, ou sur le terns de l'engagement.

The changes made by the drafters of the Louisiana Digest from the
text of the French Projet of 1 800 appear to have been
intentional and meaningful .

both

In particular, it is noteworthy that the

Louisiana draftsmen retained the terminology of the Projet only in
article 57 of the

Digest of 1 808,

using the traditional

terms

"domestique" and "ma'itre" only when speaking of those servants
"attaches a la personne du maftre, ou au service des maisons," who
can be terminated at will.
"personne

qui

ant

In all other contexts, terms such as
[or

Laue

"proprietaire" were used.

engage1

leurs

and

services"

The obvious implication is that the

Louisiana draftsmen i ntended, by their c hoice of terms, to reinforce
the limiting language of article 57, namely, that article 57 applied
only to a limited c l ass of servants who form part of the master's
extended family b y living in his home and rendering personal or
household services while there. 171
Louisiana Digest

of

1 808,

The English version

a translation

of the

of the

original

and

authoritative French text, made the same distinctions that were made
in the French version, using the terms "servant" where the French
text u sed "domestique," "laborer" where the French text used
"personne qui ant loue [or engagel leurs services," and generally,
"proprietor"

or

"employer"

where

the

French

tex t

used

"proprietaire."172 This choice of English terminology may have been

1 70. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 , arts. 57-60, at 383.
1 7 1 . This implicatio n is strengthened by the use made of the term "domestique"
elsewhere in the Louisiana Digest of 1808. As is discussed in more detail at note 2 1 1 , infra,
the French text of Book I of the 1 808 Digest defines "free servants" as including
"domestiques de maison." LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 34, art. III, at 37.
1 72. In English, articles 57 through 60 provided as follows:
Article 57.

A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or

family, without assigning any reason for so doing.

The servant is also free to

depart without assigning any cause.
Article 58.

Labourers who hire themselves out to serve on plantations or to work

in manufactures, have not the right of leaving the person who has hired them, nor
can they be sent away by the proprietor, until the time has expired during which
they had agreed to serve, unless good and just causes can be assigned.
Article 59.

If, without any just ground of complaint, a man should send away a

labourer whose services he has hired for a certain time, before that time has
expired, he shall be bound to pay to said labourer, the whole of the salaries which
he would have been entitled to receive, had the full term of his services arrived '
whether said labourer was hired by the month or by the year.
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Because of the broader meaning which the

common law has often assigned to the term "servant," using the term
to refer to any sort of employee inadvertently increased the potential
for future misinterpretation.
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825 maintained these distinctions,
re-enacting both the French and the English texts of these articles
w ithout official c omment173 and without substantial change.174

The

Louisiana Civil C ode of 1 870, which was promulgated only in
English, reproduced only the English version of these articles (though
again without substantial change) yielding articles 2747 through 2750
as they exist today. 1 75
Louisiana cases from the nineteenth century clearly indicate that
the predecessors of present article 2747 were originally understood in
the traditional manner-as applying only to a narrowly defined
category of servants. Thus, the article was held to be applicable to the
claims of a household cook176 (but not to the claims of an attomey1 77),

Article 60.

But if, on the other hand, a labourer, after having hired out his

services, should leave his employer, before the time of his engagement has
expired, without having any just cause of complaint against said employer, the
labourer shall then forfeit all the wages that may be due to him and shall moreover
be compelled to repay all the money he may have received either as due for his
wages or in advance thereof on the running year or on the time of his engagement.
LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 , arts . 57-60, at 382.
1 73 . The Projet o f 1 823, the document which formed the basis of the Louisiana Civil

Code of 1 825, suggested many changes from its predecessor, the Louisiana Digest o f
1 808-including several c hanges t o other articles involving the lease of services. However,
that Projet made no reference to the particular articles under investigation here.

Those

articles were instead simply i ncorporated, without discussion, from the 1808 Digest. PROJET
OF THE CNil.. CODE OF LoUISIANAOF 1 825, supra note 1 27, at 325-26.
1 74.

LA. CN. CODE ANN. arts. 2747-2750 (West 1 972).

1 75.

See supra notes 42-44.

1 76.

Bethmont v. Davis, I I Mart. [o.s.J 1 95 (La. 1 822).

1 77.

Orphan Asylu m v. Mississippi Marine Ins. Co., 8 La. 1 8 1 ( 1 835). The plaintiff,

an attorney, had a contract to represent the defendant for one year. He was dismissed after
two-and-a-half months, and sued for the balance of h i s contractual salary. The trial court
held that the attorney could be discharged at will under the authority of article 27 1 8, the
predecessor of current article 2747. The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed:
[WJe are unable to admit [the correctness of the district court's opinion]
without relinquishing our understanding of language and opinions touching the
relations of men in civil society, counselors and attorneys are admitted to the
profession of law, o n the supposition of learning and integrity. To place them i n
the precise category of menial and domestic servants, appears to us would be
incongruous and unauthorized by the law.
Id. at 1 84 (emphasis added).
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p1·1 ot , 179 none o f
•
a supenntendent of a commerc1·ai busmess 178 or a nver
whom were found to fall into the category of "menial and domestic
18
servants." 0

Cases from that era make it equally clear that article 2747's
predecessors were understood in the manner of Pothier-as
establishing not the converse of employment for a fixed term, but

rather a narrow exception to the ordinary rules governing the ordinary
relations of employers and employees, an exception that would permit
termination at will even if the domestic servant was hired according to

a contract of fixed length. For example, in Bethmont v. Davis , 1 8 1 the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered the claims of a French cook, who
entered into a contract by which he was to leave France, travel to the

defendant's home in New Orleans, and there serve as a cook for
eighteen months. After some months, the defendant discharged the
The trial court rejected the
p laintiff, apparently without cause.

plaintiff's claim for his salary for eighteen months, awarding him only
a salary for the period he had actually w orked, apparently on the
ground that the predecessor of article 2747 permitted summary

discharge of domestics whether or not there was a contract of definite
length. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning:
Our Code declares, that a man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant,
attached to his person or family, without assigning any reason for it.
This argument cannot be shaken by the argument so strongly enforced
by plaintiff's counsel; that in the present case the parties had contracted
for a longer time. Because it is precisely for cases of this kind that we
182

must presume the law to have been made.

178. Beckman v. New Orleans Cotton Press Co., 1 2 La. 67 ( 1 838) (holding that
contract of superintendent of defendant's business was governed not by the predecessor of
article 2747, but rather by articles 27 1 9, 2720, and 272 1 of the 1 825 Code (current articles
2748-2750)).
1 79. Shoemaker v. H. & L. Bryan, 12 La. Ann. 697 (La. 1 857). The plaintiff was the
pilot of a river steamer. The court held that he could not be discharged without cause before
the end of his contract, arguing that article 2720 (predecessor to current 2749) applies "to all
persons, except menial servants, who hire out their services for a fixed period . . . . " Id. at
698 (citing Angelloz v. Rivollet, 2 La. Ann. 652 (1 847) (noting that article 2720, rather than
article 27 19, applies to claims of person hired to accompany defendant to Louisiana to aid
her in recovering an inheritance); Decamp v. Hewitt, 1 1 Rob. 290 (La. 1 845) (holding
claims of salesman governed by 2720); Lartigue v. Peet, 5 Rob. 91 (La. 1 843) (holding
claims of bookkeeper governed by 2720)).
1 80. Orphan Asylum v. Mississippi Marine Ins. Co., 8 La. 1 8 1 , 184 ( 1 835).
1 8 1 . 11 Mart. [o.s.] 195 (La. 1 822).
1 82. Id. at 198-99.
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By contrast, in Orphan Asylum v. Mississippi Marine Insurance
.
Co. , 183 the Lomsiana
.
s upreme Court held that an attorney is not a
"menial or domestic servant" of the sort contemplated by the
predecessor to current article 2747, and that therefore his fixed-term
contract had to be enforced according to its terms.184
In short, the original Roman, French, and common-law sources
of article 2747, the words chosen by the drafters of the article, and the
original case law interpreting it, demonstrate that article 2747 was
never intended or understood to apply as broadly as modem courts
have applied it. Rather, article 2747 was intended only as a specific
exception to otherwise applicable law, an exception that applies only
to a narrow class of domestic-that is to say, household and
personal-servants who reside and work within the family of those
whom they serve.

2.

Article 2747 in Context: Concepts of "Domestic" and "Servant"
in Other Articles of the Louisiana Civil Code

A number of sources reinforce by analogy the conclusion that
article 2747 should be interpreted narrowly. The sources include
Book III, Title XXI, which establishes the privilege enjoyed by
certain "servants" for satisfaction of wage claims; Book I, Title VI,
which describes the various types of "servant" as well as the impact
of those relations on third parties; and B ook III, Title XXIV, which
1 83 .

Orphan Asylum, 8 La. at 1 8 1 .

1 84.

In the court's words:
Any license given to parties bound by contracts to dissolve the obligation

arising from them at the will of either, forms an exception to the general rule o f
inviolability which

should prevail i n all agreements legally made between

individuals. The attorney employed by the defendants in the present case, does
not come within any exception to the general rule; he and those under him have
therefore a right to c l ai m its benefit.

Id. at 1 85 .
Soon after Orphan Asylum was decided, the l a w became clear that

an

attorney can be

dismissed at will, and that such an attorney has only a claim for quantum meruit for services
already rendered.

However, that result was not based on any claim that attorneys arc

governed by article 2747 or its predecessors. Rather, the analysis came to be that attorneys
are not lessors of services or "employees" of any sort; racher they are agents. governed b y
the Civil Code articles concerning mandate. See, e.g. , Gurley v. City of New Orleans. 4 1 La.
Ann. 75, 5 So. 659-6 1 (La. 1 889). But see In
S o. 2d 8 1 5, 8 1 9-20

(La.

re

Dissolucion of Mosquito Hawks, Inc . . I 09

Ct. App. Ori. Cir. 1 959) (following Orphan Asylum in holding that

an attorney is nol covered by article 2747, and chat cherefore article 2749 and rules app lyin g
to ordinary laborers apply).
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relates to prescription. All reaffirm the conclusions drawn above as
to the meaning of article 2747, and

as

to the identity of the l imited

class of "domestiques" to which article 2747 was intended to refer.
a.

Analogies from Book ill, Title XXI: Servants Entitled to
Privilege

The closest analogue in the current Code to the language of
article 2747 can be found in Book ill, Title XXI, which establishes a
system of special privileges entitling spe cific classes of creditors to a
preference in satisfying their claims out of their debtors' assets . 185
Among those entitle d to a general privilege on movables are certain
domestic servants who live with and work for the master's family.
Articles 3 1 9 1 and 3205 provide in part:
AKTICLE 3 1 9 1 . The debts which are privileged in all the movables in
general, are those hereafter enumerated, and are paid in the following
order:
*

*

*

4. The wages of servants for the year past, and so much as is due for
the current year.
*

*

*

ARTICLE 3205 . Servants or domestics are those who receive wages,
and stay in the house of the person paying and employing them for his
service or that of his family; such are valets, footmen, cooks, butlers,
and others who reside in the house.186

1 85. LA. C!Y. CooE ANN. arts. 3 1 84-3 1 89 (West 1 994).
1 86. LA. C!Y. CODE ANN. arts. 3 19 1 , 3205 (West 1 994). The limited nature of the
class of servants to which article 3 1 9 1 subdivision 4 applies is underlined by the language in
some of the other articles of that chapter. Thus, where the drafters of the Code wished to
establish a privilege for clerks and secretaries, they found it necessary to acknowledge that
such employees are not "servants," but that they are entitled to a privilege anyway:

ARTICLE 3214. Although clerks, secretaries and other agents of that sort can not
be included under the denomination of servants, yet a privilege is granted them for
their salaries for the last year elapsed, and so much as has elapsed of the current
year.

LA.

CIV. CooE ANN.

art. 3 2 1 4 (West 1 994).

Note that article 3252 also lists "servants" seeking recovery of wages as one of the
classes of creditors entitled to a privilege on both movables and immovables.

However,

since that chapter does not contain any definition of "servant," it must be presumed that the
class referred to is the same as that defined in article 3205. LA. Civ.
(West 1 994).

CODE ANN.

art. 3252
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Article 3 1 9 1 was derived without substantive modification from a
corresponding article of the 1 825 Code , 1 87 which was in tum deri ved
from a somewhat differently phrased predecessor in the Digest of
1 808. 1 88 Article 3205, which defines the class of servants entitled to
the privilege, was also derived without substantive change from the
English text of t h e Code of 1 825, where it first appeared. 1 89

It i s

n oteworthy, however, that the French text of that provision i n the
1 8 25 Code was even more explicit i n confining the class of servants
entitled to the pri v i l ege to those who render "personal" service t o the
master or his fami l y.

The 1 825 French version of article 3205

provided the foll o w i ng:
On appelle domestiques ou gens de service, ceux qui re\:oivent des
gages, et demeu ren t dans Ia maison de la personne qu i les paye et Jes
emploie a son service personnel OU a celui de sa famille. Tels sont Jes
valets, laquais, cuisiniers, maltres d' hotel ou autres qui sont a demeure
1 90

dans la maison .

The similarity between the limited c l ass of domestic servants
described i n article 3205 and that described in 2747 is thus apparent,
both in the current Engl i sh texts of the articles 1 9 1 and in the original
French . 1 92

1 87. LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 3 1 58 ( 1 8 25).
The Lou i s i a n a Digest of 1 808 provided the following:
The dehls which arc privileged on all Ihc movcahlcs i n
1 8 8.

gen eral, arc t ho se
herei nafter enumerated. and they arc liquidated in the following order,
*

4Ihl y The sal aries of persons wh o lent thei r services ! per French text:
.

salaircs de gens de
year.

service''] for the year last

"

Les

past or for what is due on the curren t

I.A Dt<OJsr Of' 1 80 8 , supra note 3 1 . art. 73, at 468-69.
1 89. LA. Ov. CODE ANN. art. 3 1 7 2 ( 1 825). The new article defin i ng "servant" for
these purposes was first proposed in the Projct for the 1 8 25 Civil Code. though without a ny
rernrJcJ explanation or comment. PROJET OF THE Ctv n . CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 1 8 25. sup m
n ot e 1 27 . al 368.
LA. C'lv. Cor)I; ANN. art. 3205 ( West 1 97 2 ) ( notes) (emphasis added). The notes
of the adjective "personal" from the English text was a
mistranslation of the French original.
1 9 1 . Compan· LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2 7 1 8 ( 1 8 2 5 ) (speaking of "a hired servant
1 <JO.

point

out that omission

attached to [the master's J person or family") "'ith LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. art. 3 1 72 ( 1 8 2 5 )
( defining "servants" o r

"

d o mes t ic s a s "those w h o receive wages. and stay i n the h o u s e o f
"

t h e person employing th em for his se rvice or that of his fa m i ly") .

1 9 2.

Comport' LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2 7 1 9 ( Fr. text 1 8:!5) ("(l]cs domcstiqucs

attaches a la pcrsonne du mii trc. ou au service des ma1sons") '"ith LA. Ov CODE ANN.

art .

J:!06 ( Fr. text 1 8:!5) ( de fi n i ng "<lomestiqucs" as "ccux qui rccoivent des gages. c t dcmcurcnt
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Case law from the nineteenth century clearly indicates that this
article applied to a l imited class of household domestic servants .
Neither foremen, 193 laborers who maintained commercial buildings
19
195
and grounds, 4 laborers of other sorts,
nor even servmg persons m
9
commercial taverns and hotels196 were included i n this small group. 1 7
•

•

dans la maison de la personne qui !es paye et Jes emploie a son service personnel ou a celui
de sa famille" (emphasis added)).

1 9 3 . Lewis v. Patterson, 20 La. Ann. 294 (La. 1 868 (holding foreman in printing
as either a "servant" or a "secretary"); Lauran v. Hotz, 1 Mart.
[n.s.] 141 (Dist. Ct. E.D. 1 823) (finding foreman of tailor not entitled to privilege for salary
under Louisiana Digest of 1 808, articles 68, 73, and 76, and holding that article applies only

office not entitled to privilege

to domestic servants, narrowly defined).

194. World's Indus. & Cotton Centennial Exposition v. North, Central & South Am.
Exposition, 39 La. Ann. 1 , 1 So. 358 (1887). The c l aimants were "part of quite a large
number of employees engaged to do the current, simple manual or menial work at the
exposition, such as cleaning the grounds, sweeping and washing the floors, oiling the
machinery, cleaning lamps, stopping leaks on the roofs, and similar matters, as might be
required by the ordinary course of things or some emergency." Id. at 3, I So. at 359. The
Supreme Court affirmed that they were "neither servants nor domestics" and therefore not
entitled to any privilege. Id.

1 95. See, e.g., B arbour v. Duncan's Curator, 1 7 La. 439 (La. 1 84 1 ) (holding that
laborers employed at a sawmill at daily or monthly wages have no privilege against assets of
defunct employer).

1 96. Bartels & Dana v. Their Creditors & the Creditors of Stafford, Bartels & Co., 1 1
La. Ann. 433, 435 (1856) (holding that employees o f a hotel are not "servants" o f the sort
entitled to a privilege on movables under the 1 825 version of article 3 1 72); Cook v. Dodge,
6 La. Ann. 275 ( 1 85 1 ) (holding that serving persons in a tavern are not "servants" entitled to
a privilege under the 1 825 version of articles 3 1 58 and 3 172). The court in Cook was
particularly conscientious in its review, consulting both French and English texts of the
Code before concluding that:
We think it was the i ntention of the lawgiver in [article 3 1 72] to protect domestic
servants, that is to say those employed in the service of a family or the private
establishment of a person keeping house, and that the servants of a place of public
entertainment were not contemplated.

Id. at 277.

197. At least one case does appear to have given the concept of "servant" a broader
reading. Succession of Caldwell, 8 La. Ann. 42 (1853) (holding that a manager of a ten-pin
alley was entitled to a privilege, either as a "clerk" or a "servant").

Specifically, the

Caldwell court reasoned:
[Claimant] had charge of the ten pin alleys, and received the money paid at
them during the day, and made his returns when they were closed.

If this

occupation did not give him a privilege as an age n t under the articles cited, we are
of the opinion that it is included within the class of servants which is more
comprehensive in the sense of the Code, and authorizes the privilege allowed.

Id. at 43.

Although the court in Caldwell did suggest that the term "servant" could be

susceptible to a broad interpretation, the case does not lend much support to such a
construction.

As the above quote makes clear, the court in Caldwell placed its primary

reliance on subdivision 6 of article 3 191, one which gives a privilege to "clerks, secretaries
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Analogies from Book I, Title VI: Domestic Servants as

b.

"Family"
Until its repeal in

1 990,198 Title VI of Book I of the Louisiana

Civil Code dealt with the personal relationship of masters and
various types of servants.

Leaving aside those provisions which

dealt solely with i ssues peculiar to apprentices or other kinds of
bound or indentured servants, the relevant articles of Title VI c an be
classified into two groups:

those articles which classify different

types of servants, 1 99 and those articles which deal with the effects of
this master-servant relationship on third parties.200

and other persons o f t h a t kind."

These articles

Its comments on subdivision 4, granting a privilege t o

"servants," appear to be l i t t l e more than ill-considered dictum.
1 98.

Ac t .

No. 705, § I, 1 990 La.

Acts (repeal ing LA. Clv. CODE ANN. articles 1 62-

1 65, 1 67- 1 75, and 1 77, and redesignating article

1 76).

The reason for repeal was t hat those

articles. which dealt l argely with apprentices and si milar bound servan ts . had become
outmoded and anachronist i c . Article 1 66, which had provided that the time of engagement
of m i n ors (appren tices) would ex pire at age eighteen for males and age fifteen for fe males.
had previously been deleted. Act No.

1 99.

89, § 2, 1 974 La.

Acts.

Before repeal , the relevant articles of the Louisiana Civil Code

of 1 870 provi ded

the following:
ARTICLE

1 62.

There is onl y one class of servants in this State, to wit:

Free

servants.
ARTICLE 1 63 .

Free servants arc in general all free persons who let, hire or engage

their services to another i n this State, to be employed therein at any work.
commerce or occupation whatever for the benefit of him who has rnnt ractcd l(ir
t hem. for a certain price or retrihulion. or on certain co n d i t ion s .
ARl'lCl.E 1 64. There arc three kinds of free servants in this State, to wit:

I.

Thos e who only hire out their services by the day. wee k . mo n t h

or

year. in rnns iderati o n of ce rta in wages; the rules which fix the extent and l i mits of
those l'ontracts a rc established in the litlc:

2.

Of u11i11[i and Hiri11x.

Those w ho engage to serve for a fixed t i me for a ccnain rnnsideration.

and who arc therefore considered not as having h i red out but as ha vi ng sold t he i r

se rv i ces.

3.

A pp ren ti ces . that is. those who engage to serve any one. in order to

learn some art. t r ade or pro fession.

LA. Ctv CoDE ANN .
200.

Artides

ARTICLE 1 74.

ans.

1 62- 1 64 ( West 1 972).

1 74 through 1 77 prov ide the follo wing :
The master may bring

an

action against any man for beat i n g or

mai min g his servan t. but i n such case he must assign as a cause of action. his o w n
damage re su l ti n g from the loss of his service. and t h i s loss mu st he proved on t h e
t rial .
ARTICLE 1 75.

A master may justify

an

a.�sau l t in defense of his servant. and

a

scr.·ant in defense of his ma�ter. the ma.�ter because he has an in1erest in h i s

scr.· ant . not to be deprived of his service: the servant because it is pan of his d uty
for which he receives wages . to stand by and defend his master.
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were derived from the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825,201 which was
itself derived from the Digest of 1 808 . 202

Moreau-Lislet 's source

notes give little indication of the origin of the relevant provisions of
the 1 808 Digest.203

However, Professor Batiza assigns most of the

credit to Blackstone, though Batiza also recognized the contributions
of Domat and Pothier. 204
The presence of these articles in Book I, among other Titles
which deal with the bilateral personal relations of husbands and
wives,205 and of p arents and children,206 lends support to a narrow
ARTICLE 1 76.

The master is answerable for the offenses and quasi- offenses

conunitted by his servants, according to the rules which are explained under the
title of quasi-contracts, and of offenses and quasi-offenses.
ARTICLE

177.

The master is answerable for the damage caused to individuals or

to the community i n general by whatever is thrown out of his house into the street
or public road, and i n asmuch as the master has the superintendence of his house,
and is responsible for the faults conunitted therei n .

1 74- 177 (West 1972).
1 55-157, 1 6 8- 1 7 1 ( 1 825). The only substantive
change in the relevant articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825 to the Civil Code of 1 870
was the abolition of slavery. While the Code of 1 8 25, like its 1808 predecessor, provided
for that institution, the Code of 1 870 did not. Compare LA. CODE Civ. ANN. art. 1 55 (1 825)

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.

201 .

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.

('There are in this State two classes of servants, to wit: the free servants and slaves.") with

1 62 ( 1 870) ('There is only o n e class of servants in this State, to wit:
1 808 and the Civil Code of 1 825 each contained an extensive
chapter delineating the basic relations of master and sl ave. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1 72196 (1 825); LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 , arts. 1 5-27' at 38-43.
202. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 , arts. 1 -4, 1 1 - 14, at 36-39. The only
significant change in the articles under discussion here between the Digest of 1 808 and the
Civil Code of 1825, was the recognition of a new class of "free" but nonetheless "bound" or
indentured servants. Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 57 (1 825) with LA. DIGEST OF
1 808, supra note 3 1 , art. 3 , at 36, 37.
203. Moreau-Lislet's notes opposite the French text list no direct source for articles 1 4 , and the notes opposite the English text refer only t o the Digest's own article o n lease of
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.

free servants."). The Digest of

services and Pothier's Traite du Contrat de Louage as collateral material deal i n g with the
same subj ect. The notes opposite the French text of articles 1 1 - 1 4 list no source for article
1 1 , but refer to Las Siete Partidas as the source of the others. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra
note

31,

opp. at

36-39.

The relevance of the particular laws of the Partidas to which

Moreau-Lislet refers remains, however, obscure.

204.

Batiza, supra note

1 33,

at

51.

Professor B atiza cites Domat and Pothier as the

sources of article 4 of the Louisiana Digest of

277

1 808.

Id. (citing

1

DOMAT, supra note

148,

at

n.c. (analogizing a c ontractor's undertaking of a piece of work-the Roman "locatio

operis "-to

a "sale" of hi s labors); POTHIER, supra n ote 1 50, at No.

394

(same)).

For the

rest of the relevant articles discussed in text, Professor Batiza cites only Blackstone as a
source. Id. (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1 66, at

425

(distinguishing types of servants

and recounting the ways i n which third parties may be affected by the relation of master and
servant)).

205.
206.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN arts. 86- 101 (West 1 994).
.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN arts.
.

178-245 (West

1 994).
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2747.
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As is shown by its placement, the

drafters of the Louisiana Civil Code evidently grouped at least some
"servants" with other members of a master 's household.

Moreover,

several of the specific provisions of these former articles-such as
provisions which obligated "servants" to physically defend their
master against assault,207 or which held the master responsible for
damage caused by objects thrown by servants from the master's
house208-woul d make little sense i n the context of a l imited, purely
contractual relationship such as that between ordinary employers and
employees. On the contrary, such provisions make sense only if some
"servants" are part of the master's household and subject to his general
authority.

In any event, even if this concept of the servants as members of
the master's fami l y were only implicit i n the Digest
concept was made quite explicit in the Lou isiana

of 1 808, the
Civil Codes of 1 825

and

1 870. Both of those Codes express l y included "servants of the
fam i l y" in the extended definition of "fami l y," as that te1m is used in
the Codes. Article 3506( 1 2) provides the following:
Family, in a limited sense, signifies father, moth e r and chi ldren.
more extensive se n se

,

In

a

it comprehends a l l the individuals who l i ve

under the authority of another, and includes the servants of the

family.209
The sources and drafting history of th i s

article also make clear
that the class of "servants" referred to as members of the family
inc ludes only a limited class of personal o r h ouse h ol d servants-those
com mon ly referred to in current parlance as domestic servants. and i n
t h e French text o f the Codes a<; domcs t i q ucs
Blackstone and
Po th ier, the sources of this Title, all differentiated among servants
along these prec i se lines, t reati ng such domest ic servants as
analytically d i s tin gu ishable from all others. 2 1 0
"

.''

LA. Clv. CODE ANN. a/1 . 1 75 (West 1 97 2 ) .
LA. CIY. CODE ANN. art. 1 77 (West 1 97 2 ) .
209. LA. Clv. COD E ANN. art. 3506( 1 2) ( West 1 994). This art1dc was 1110\ L'LI. wilh
minimal change. from its original location in the Code or 1 870. LA. Clv. Colli ANN. ;1rt .
3556( 1 2 ) ( 1 870) ( i ncludi ng servants of "the father or· the family in the tkli m t u>n of
"fami ly"); see also LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3522( 1 6 ) ( 1 8 2 5 ) ( including also "slaves nr the
father or· the fami ly).
See genera/Ir Tucker. supra no te 1 46 ( tracing this cnncert " '
"servants" as members of t h e family. t o the Louisiana C i v i l Code of 1 825. t h e D1�est of
1 808. and Lns Siere Partidas) .
2 1 0. See supra notes 1 53 - 1 56. 1 66- 1 67 and accompanyi n g te�L
207.
208.
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Moreover, the original French text indicates that the drafters of
the Digest and the Code of 1825 had just such a distinction in mind
when they composed Book I, just as they did when they composed the
predecessor of article 2747. Book I, Title VI, article 3 of the Digest of
1 808-the provision which set up the basic classifications of free
servants in Louisiana-reads, in the original French,

as

follows:

Art. ID. II y a deux sortes de serviteurs libres dans ce Territoire

sav01r:
Les serviteurs proprement dits, c ' est-a-dire ceux qui se louent ou
s' engagent envers un autre pour etre employes a un travail ordinaire ou
de force; tels que Les domestiques de maison, les ouvriers, manceuvriers
et tous ceux qui s'engagent pour travailler aux champs et sur les
21 1
habitations &c.
While the main purpose of this article w as doubtless to distinguish
apprentices from all other workers, the l i sting of "types" of workers
is suggestive.

The drafters were c areful to mention domestic

servants ("domestiques") as a specific a n d separate class of workers .
However, this distinction was not c arried over when the French
text of article ill was translated into English.
mistranslated and the reference

to

The passage was

"household domestics"

was

inexplicably dropped from the English version:
Art. ID. There are two sorts of servants in this territory, to wit:

Servants properly so called, or those who let or engage themselves
to another, to be employed at some ordinary or hard labor; such are
workmen, laborers, and all those who engage to serve in husbandry or
212
upon plantations.
Remarkably,

this

anomaly-a

French

text

that

spoke

of

"domestiques de maison" and an English text that did not-was
carried forward without apparent recognition or comment into the
213
Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825.
To make matters worse, the Code
of 1 870 distributed only in English, carried forward only the English
214

text, without rectifying its omissions.

Nevertheless, the erroneous translation of article ill of the 1 808
Digest (an error that persisted in the English text of article 1 64 until its
21 l .
212.
2 1 3.

LA. DIGEST OF
Id. at 36.

214.

Id.

1 808, supra note 3 1 , art.

III, at

37

(emphasis added).

See LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 164 (West 1972) (notes) (reproducing the French
and English texts of article 1 57 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825).
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repeal in 1 990) does not alter the conclusion that important l an guage
within the original French text of artic l e ill was left out of the English
translation.

Indeed, the location, sources, and original text of the

rel evant articles of Book I lend support to the conclusion that the class
of servants (or

"domestiques")

attached to the master's person or

family is a narrow one indeed.
c.

Anal og i e s from Former Book ID, Title XXill:

Prescri

bing S e rvants' Wage Claims
Before the 1 983 amendments,215 Louisiana Civil Code article
3534 established a prescriptive period of one year for wage c l aims
brought by "workmen, l aborers and servants, for the payment of their
wages."216 That article was derived without substantial change from
a corresponding article of the Code of 1 825,2 1 7 which was i n tum
derived from a somewhat differently phrased article of the Lou i siana
Di gest of 1 808 .

218

While these articles made no distinction between

domestic servant s and other types of empl oyees for purposes of
prescription, the fact that each version was carefully drafted to
include "servants," "workmen ," and "laborers" lends additional

Act No. 1 73 , 1 983 La. ACIS (comprehensively rev isin g C hapter 4 of lit le X X I V

2 1 5.

o f Rook I l l of t h e Civil Code o f Louisiana. Th e prescr i p l i ve pe riod for wage daims i n now
set hy a11ide 3494, which cstahli shes a three- y ear pe ri od for a l l claims for wage. kes. and
the like.

2 1 6.

LA. Ov. ConE ANN. art. 3534 ( West 1 97 2 ).

2 1 7.

LA. Clv. Com: ANN. art. 3499 ( 1 8 25). The French text of Ihc 1 8 25 ve rs i on of

t h e a11icle is simi l ar. d i s ti n gu i shi ng hetwcen "gens de travail" ( lahorcrs) and "!!ens de
servi ce" (scrv an l s ) :
Celle des ouvriers. g ens de travail ct de servil·e. pour le paye me nl de !curs
joumecs . gages ct s a l a i res.

LA. Civ. COI.>E ANN. art. 3 5 34 (notes).
2 1 8.

Article 7 7 provides the following:

ARTICLE 77. TI1e c l a i m s of Ic ac h crs o r school masters . . . may he prcsni hed
agains t . after a yl·ar has e lapsed.
The pro v i s i o n s of t h i s ar1icle extend l i kewise to . . Ihat of work men ;111d
day bhourers for t h e payment of thei r days works and of Ihc

mal cn als

hy t h e m

fu rnished: and f o r t h at o f Ihe dorncslics w h 1 C h lent Iheir scrv1c-cs hy the ye ar.

LA. DI<ilsr OF 1 808 . .<1qm1 not e J I . ar1. 77. at 4XX. ·n1c French
A11iclc 77.

I L'acllon J des

ou wi ers

I n l 1s s111ular:

ct gen s de trava i l . pour le ravcment de k;1urs

fou miturcs. Jnumees ct sal aires: Celle de domcsti4ues 4u1 sc lnucnl a
pour l e

r ayc ment de lcurs gages:

Sc prcsn i\·cnl par un an .

Id

) ' ;111nc.'c.
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support to the argument that the terms referred to different types of
employees. That i s to say, codal refere nces t o "servants" (or, in the
French version of the Digest of 1 808, "domestiques") should not be
understood to include ordinary workers.
understanding of these provisions.

Such was the original

Several cases from the early

nineteenth century state specifically that the term "servant" in the
articles on prescription applies only to "menial" servants and not to
ordinary workers.219
Thus, from all the foregoing, it should be clear that neither article

2747 nor any other provision of the Louisiana Civil Code provides any
legitimate reason t o regard the vast majority of at- will employees
that is, all who work in capacities other than that of d omestic
servants-as subject to any special regime.

Properly i nterpreted,

neither article 2747 nor any other provision of the Code grants such
"ordinary" employees and employers any special rights or obligations
that would serve to distinguish their legal relations from those of
parties to any other sort of contract terminable at the will of the parties.
Does this then mean that the principle of employment at will
should be abandoned, that the existence of a contract for a fixed term
is irrelevant, or that good cause should be required for termination of
all employees regardless of contractual status?

Clearly not.

Unlike

article 2747, Louisiana Civil Code arti cles 2749 and 2750 apply to
ordinary employees.220

These latter articles clearly ascribe legal

consequences to the existence of a c ontract for a fixed term
specifically, that an employee with such a contract can neither quit nor
be fired without good cause, without incurring liability for d amages.
By negative implic ation, employees who do not work according to a
2 1 9.

See, e.g. , Coote v. Cotton, S La. 1 2, 14 ( 1 8 3 2) (holding that a plaintiff seeking

compensation for services rendered in collecting, superintending, and trading in slaves
owned by defendant was not limited by the one-year prescription period applicable to a
"servant, laborer or workman"). As the court in Coote explained, "[t]he plaintiff was neither
a workman nor a laborer, and the word servant in the Civil Code, 3499, is in our opinion to
be restricted to menial servants." Id. at 15; see also Keaghey v. Barnes, 1 1 Rob. 1 39 (La.
1 845) ('The plaintiff was neither a workman, nor a laborer.

The word servant is nomen

generalissimum, and in this article of the Code it must be confined to menial servants,
otherwise it would extend to every one employed by another."); Cresap v. Winter, 14 La.
553, 555 ( 1 840) (tracing the origin of article 3500 of the Code of 1 825-providing that

claims for back wages can be brought

even

though the claimant is still employed-to the

need to overcome French authority prohibiting menial servants from instituting such claims
against the master they were presently serving).

220. The texts of these articles are quoted at note 44, supra.

language limiting the types of employees to which they refer.

They contain no
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contract of fixed term can quit and can be fired without good cause
and w ithout incurring liability. In other words, the basic doctrine of
employment at will is alive and well in the Louisiana Civil Code.
However, the shift in codal basis for the doctrine-from the
narrow but express command of article

2747, to the negative

implication of articles 2749 and 2750--h as important consequences.
Although courts may read article 2747 as a specific exception to the
ordinary rules that would normally apply, no such implication can be
drawn from articles 2749 and 2750. Thus, while it remains the c ase
that employment contracts without a fixed term can be tenninated at
the will of either party, nothing in articles 2749 or 2750 suggests that
such contracts shoul d be interpreted or enforced in any special or
unique manner. On the contrary, employment agreements terminable
at will should be subject to the same regime that the Civil Code
applies to all other agreements terminable at the will of the parties.
IV.

INTERPRETING EMPLOYMENT AT WILL ACCORDING TO THE
LoUISIANA CIVIL CODE: APPLYING 11ffi REQUIREMENT OF GOOD

FAIDI
Despite the

novel

analysis set

forth

in

Finkle

v.

Majik

Markets,221 the Loui siana Civil Code is clear in its classification and
treatment of employment at will. The Louisiana Civil Code, like its
Roman and French predecessors,222 classifies employment as a
bil ateral nominate contract and, specifically, as a type of "lease," one
m

which the employee lets out his labor or industry for a fee . 223
22 1 .

628 So. 2d 259

(La.

accompanying text .
222.
BOOK 1

§§

See, e.g.,

6 SAUL

Ct .

App.

5th Cir. 1 993 ) .

LrrvINOFF, LOUISIANA

Crvn.

See supra

notes 1 20- 1 24 and

LAW TREATISE: OBLIGATIONS:

1 24-125, at 207 ( 1 969) (noting that Planiol treated contracts relative to labor,

including contracts for the lease of labor, as one of the three major cl asses of contracts).

generally discussion at notes
223.

See

1 48- 1 55, supra.

Louisiana Civil Code articles 2669, 2673, and 2675 make clear that

the

employment relation-that is, any arrangement by which an employee leases out his labor in
return for wages-is contractual in nature and is conceived
ARTICLE 2669.

Lease or hire

as

a type of "lease":

is a synallagmatic contract, to which consent alone

is sufficient, and by which one party gives to the other the enjoyment of a thing, or
his labor, at a fixed pri ce .
ARTICLE 2673.

There are two species of contracts of lease, to wit:

I.

The letting out of things.

2.

the letting out of labor or industry.
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Notwithstanding the holding in Finkle, this conclusion follows
regardless of whether the particular employment contract at i ssue is
25
oral or written224 or terminable at will or for a fixed term. 2
Thus,
employment agreements remain subject to basic requirements which
makes

the Civil Code

all

to

applicable

similar conventional

obligations, and to all similar leases.226 Determining what l imits, if
any, those basic requirements place o n the employer's otherwise
absolute authority to terminate an at-wil l employee is thus the central
question which mus t now be answered.
A complete answer to this question would require a thorough

analysis of a wide range of issues, including: the characterization and
promises not to fire

an

principles-of

civilian

true

enforceability-under

employers '

employee except for cause, or after certain

procedures are first followed;227 the possible application

ARTICLE 2675.

of the

To let out labor or industry is a contract by which one of the

parties binds himself to do something for the other, in consideration of a certain
price agreed on by them both.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.

2669, 2673, 2675

1 994).

(West

These articles have not been

substantively amended since the present Code was enacted, and have remained virtually

1808. Cf LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 26 3 9, 2643, 2645 ( 1 825); LA. DIGEST
1 808, supra note 3 1 , arts. 1 , 3, at 372.
224. Article 1 927 states that "unless the law prescribes a certain formality" for a

unchanged since
OF

particular type of contract, either the offer or the acceptance, or both, may be oral. LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art.

1927.

Contracts of employment are not among those which require any

particular formality.

225.

Louisiana Civil Code article

1770

makes clear that contracts tenninable at the

will of one or both of the parties are still contracts, and that the option to tenninate must be
perfonned in good faith. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.

226.

1 770 (West 1987).

Article 2668, the first article of Book III, Title IX of the Code, "Of Lease,"

makes the point explicitly:
ARTICLE 2668. The contract of lease or letting out (besides the rules in which it is
subject in common with other agreements, and which are explained under the
title:

Of Conventional Obligations) is governed

by particular rules, which are the

subject of the present title.

227. LA. CIV. CODE ANN.

art.

2668

(West

1994).

Though a full codal analysis of the

enforceability of such promises might well be an artic l e i n itself, a few basic principles seem
reasonably clear.
First,

an

employer i s free, under the Code, to contractually limit what would otherwise

be his absolute freedom to tenninate
procedures. Fonner article

11

an

at-will employee without cause or particular

1 870 expressly stated that any person
(c) to current article 7 explains that the

of the Civil Code of

may renounce such a right or privilege. Comment

express language was dropped because the propositio n was "self evident." LA. CIY. CODE
ANN . art. 7 cmt. (c) (West

1 993); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN.

arts.

197 1 , 1983 (West 1993).
See, e.g., C h auvin v.

Louisiana courts have recognized this freedom, in principle at least.
Tandy Corp.,

984

F.2d

695, 689-99

(5th Cir.

1993)

(holding that an issue o f fact was
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presented as to whether an employer's request that the employee remain in a particular post
for an additional year amounted to an enforceable promise not to fire that employee for one
year); Mix v. University of New Orleans, 609 So. 2d 958, 963 (La. Ct. App. 4th C i r. 1 993)
(noting the possibility of a contractual modification of the employer's tights); Morgan v.
Avondale Shipyards, 376 So. 2d 5 1 6, 5 1 7 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 979) (same).
Second, Louisiana courts which have found such promises by employers to be
unenforceable have done so for reasons which do not appear to withstand analysis according
to the Louisiana Civil Code. In Brannan v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 526 So. 2d 1 1 0 1 , 1 1 04
(La. 1 988), the leading modem case on these issues, the court found an alleged promise
unenforceable for three reasons: ( I ) enforcement would violate the command of what was
then article 1 67, limiting employment contracts to a maximum term of ten years; (2) the
promise was made without "consideration"; and (3) the obligation was not "mutual."
Brannan, 526 So. 2d at 1 1 04 (quoting Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 1 74 La. 66,
1 39 So. 760 ( 1 932)). However, this reasoning has been undermined by recent amendments
to the Civil Code and i s at odds with basic Civil Code principles governing conventional
obligations.
Article 1 67, which limited employment contracts to a maximum of ten years, was
repealed in 1 990, along with almost all of the rest of Book I, Title VI, "Of Master and
Servant." To be sure, article 2746 still provides that, "A man can only hire out his services
for a certain limited period of time, or for the performance of a certain enterprise."
However, this article, unlike former article 167, appears to have been intended only for the
l imited purpose of precluding contracts that unduly limit the employee's freedom by
consigning her to perpetual service. Like article 1 67, it was not intended to preclude
employers from obligating themselves to exercise their power to terminate an employee only
under certain circumstances, or to provide certain procedures prior to termination. Thaxton
v. Roberson, 224 So. 2d 1 83, 1 85-86 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 969). For a discussion of the
limited purposes of articles 1 67 and 2746, see generally Recent Jurisprudence, supra note
76, and discussion at notes 1 25-34, supra.
The second alleged obstacle to enforcing such employer promises-lack of
"consideration"-appears to be, i f anything, even less firmly based on any principle that can
be legitimately derived from the civilian law of obligations, as embodied in the Louisiana
Civil Code. The Code makes clear that conventional obligations, including modifications of
the terms of existing contracts, need not be supported by "consideration." LA. Clv. CooE
ANN. arts. 1927, 1 966, 1 967 (West 1994); see LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts 1 967 cmt. (c)
(distinguishing the corrunon-law requirement of "consideration" from the civilian
requirement of "cause"). The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently recognized that
employers' promises may be enforced regardless of any additional "consideration" by the
employees. See Knecht v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges & Univs.. 59 1 So. 2d 690,
694-95 (La. 199 1 ) (holding that unclassified university employees who worked overtime
pursuant to a "compensatory leave" policy which contemplated paid time off for employees
who worked such overtime, had an enforceable contractual right to recei ve that
compensatory paid time off). After reciting the requirements for a valid conventional
obligation under the Civil Code. the court noted that, "[n)early every state has determined.
using precepts similar to our civilian principles. that when an employer promises a benefit to
employees. and the employees accept by their actions in meeting the conditions. the result i s
not a mere gratuity o r i l lusory promise but a vested right i n the employee to the promised
benefit." Id. The court concluded that a like result should be reached in that case.
Finally, the asserted problem of "mutuality"-that if the employee is free to leave his
employment without restriction, then the employer must be likewise free to fire the
employee without restriction-likewise rests on an asserted requirement derived originally
from common-law rather than civilian sources. The Louisiana Civil Code. unlike the
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principles of detrimental reliance or estoppel;228 the interpretation and
application of article 2024, which provides that contracts terminable at
will should be terminated only on provision of reasonable notice to the
other party;229 the relevance of the emerging tort of "abuse of

common law, does not require and has never requi red "mutuality" of obligations between
the parties to a contract.

Rather, the Code specifically contemplates contracts which are

"unilateral" in their entirety. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 907 (West 1 987). While it has been
held that an employment contract is a "synallagmatic" or "bilateral" relation, this does not

necessarily mean that every aspect of the contract must be bilateral. Nothing in the Code
precludes imposition o f particular unilateral duties or rights on one party to what is, overall,

a bilateral contractual relationship. Thus, in Long v. Foster & Associates, Inc . , 343 La. 48,

1 3 6 So. 2d 48 ( 1 962), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an employee could recover the

full amount of wages due him under the unexpired term of a five-year employment contract,
even though that contract pennitted the employee-but not the employer-to terminate that
contract at any time, on two weeks notice. The court had no trouble recognizing the contract
despite the nonmutual right of termination. Id. at 52-53. Other examples of valid contracts
with unilateral terms include the following:

Civil Code article 1975, which s pecifically

authorizes "output" or "requirements" contracts, by which one party to the contract has a
unilateral right to determine the "amount" of the contractual object; and the so-called "take
or pay" contracts, familiar from mineral law, which similarly give one contracting party a
unilateral right to determine how much oil or gas will be extracted.
It is also noteworthy that many common-law jurisdictions in the United States have
begun to abandon strict application of these requirements in the context of termination of
employment. Courts in many states have held that employer promises not to terminate an
employee without cause, or without following certain prior procedures, can be enforced
regardless of any lack o f mutuality or specific consideration for that promi se.
HOLLOWAY, supra note 1 3 , at 3 - 1 7 ; ROTHSTEIN ET

AL.,

See, e.g.,

supra note 22, at 526 (noting that

"about three quarters of the states hold that promises contained in an employment manual

may bind an employer," and that those "[c]ourts have addressed the consideration and
mutuality of obligation obstacles either by viewin g employment manuals as unilateral

contracts or by applying t h e doctrine of promissory estoppel").
228.

Claims that an employer's unilateral statements operate to estop the employer

from exercising the right to summarily fire at-will employees have been rej ected by
Louisiana courts. See, e.g., Thebner v. Xerox Corp. , 480 So. 2d 454, 458 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 1 985) (construing narrowly and ultimately rejecting plaintiffs claim that his employer's
decision to fire him violated principles of estoppel), writ denied, 484 So. 2d 1 39 (La. 1 986).
However, it may not be appropriate to dispose of the concept quite so summarily.
Common-law jurisdictions have relied on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to provide
protection to at-will employees who rely to their detriment on an employer 's promises. See
Mohammed Yehis Mattar, Promissory Estoppel: Common-law Wine in Civil Law Bottles, 4

TUL. Crv. L.F. 7 1 , 1 1 8- 1 9 ( 1 988). Moreover, while the term "estoppel" is of common-law

rather than civilian origin, the core idea that it expresses is reflected in closely related
concepts (including "detrimental reliance" and the need to perform obligations in good
faith) that are firmly rooted in the Civil Law in general and the Louisiana Civil Code in

particular. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1759, 1 967, 1 983 (West 1 987). See generally Mattar,
supra.
229.

Article 2024 provides the following:
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rights;"230 and the possible applicability of other tort theories.231 It is
thus a task that is best left for another day.
CONTRACT TERMINATED BY A PARTY'S INITIATNE. A contract of

ARTICLE 2024:

unspecified duration may be tenninated at the will of either party by giving notice,
reasonable i n time and form, to the other party.
LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (West 1 987). As comment (a) to this article points out, the
article is new. I t was not, however, intended to change the l aw. Rather it was i ntended to
make generally applicable the principle previously articulated in article 2686 of the
Louisiana Civil Code o f 1 870.
The difficult issue i s i n defining exactly what kind of notice is required by this article.
The revisors of article 2024 put it this way:
In proceeding under this Article, the parties must comply with

the

overriding duty o f good faith. Reasonable advance notice will usually be required
to avoid unwarranted injury to the interest of the other party.

LA. CN. CODE ANN art. 2024 cmt. (e) (West 1 98 7 ) .
.

Cases interpreting article 2024 are

relatively sparse, but appear sufficient to establish some basic notion of what the
requirement of "reasonable notice" entails.

See, e.g. , Jones v. Crescent City Health &

Racqetball Club, 489 So. 2d 3 8 1 , 383 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1 986) (upholding trial court
finding that a "lifetime" membership in a health club was a contract for an i ndefinite
duration, terminable by either party on giving of reasonable notice, and that, on the facts of
the case, a requiremen t of two years' notice was not unreasonable); Caston v. Woman's
Hosp. Found., Inc., 262 So. 2d 62, 64-65 (La. Ct. App. I st Cir.) (holding photographer had
contract of unspecified duration with hospital, under which he was permitted to p h otograph
newborn babies and sell photos to parents and awarding damages equal to six mon t h s ' profit
when hospital termi nated the arrangement without notice), writ denied, 266 So. 2d 220 (La.
1 972); see also System Fed. No. 59 v. Louisiana & A . Ry., 30 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. La. 1 940)
(holding if parties spe c i fy notice period in their contract, that period controls), ajf'd, 1 1 9
F.2d 509 (5th Cir.), and cert. denied, 3 1 4 U.S. 656 ( 1 94 1 ).
230.

In Louisiana, the tort of abuse of rights has been held applicable "only i n limited

circumstances" when the plaintiff can show:
that the holder of the right used it either:
(I)

to harm another or where the predominant motive was to cause h arm;

(2)

where there is no serious or legiti mate interest worthy of judi cial

or
protection; or
(3)

where the holder uses the right in violation o f moral rules, good fai th

or elementary fairness; or
(4)

where the holder uses it for a purpose other than that for which the

right was granted.
Dufour v. Westlawn Cemeteries, Inc., 639 So. 2d 843. 848 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1 994)
(citing Truschinger v. Pak, 5 1 3 So. 2d 1 1 5 1 , 1 1 54 (La. 1 987); Kok v. Harris, 563 So. 2d
374, 377 (La. Ct. App. l st Cir. 1 990)).
Some courts have interpreted these standards narrowly, rejecting claims of abuse of

rights in the context of alleged wrongful termination of at-will employees. See e.g . Walther
,

.

v. National Tea Co., 848 F.2d 5 1 8, 5 1 9-20 (5th C i r. 1 988): Jones v. New Orleans Legal
Assistance Corp., 568 So. 2d 663 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 990); Ballaron v. Equitable
Shipyards, Inc., 5 2 1 So. 2d 48 1 , 483 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. ). writ denied, 522 So. 2d 57 1

(La. 1 988); see also Johnson v. Delchamps. Inc . . 897 F.2d 808, 8 1 1 (5th C i r. 1 990)
(following

Ballaron).

Nonetheless, it is clear that the tort is recognized in this juri sdiction,
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It is, however, possible to at least begin sketching a few of the
most basic outlines of what a truly Civil Code-based analysis of
employment at will would require. Thus, for example, it appears that
some of the growing common-law "exceptions" to the strict rule of
employment at will,

such as the free

standing "public policy"
232

exception, have no legitimate place in Louisiana employment l aw.

and that it can be applied in the context of an abusive discharge of an at-will employee.
Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1 353, 1 370-71 (La. 1976) (granting recovery
to a terminated at-will employee whose employer terminated him solely to avoid paying him
substantial deferred compensation to which he would otherwise have been entitled).
It is also noteworthy that a variety of commentators have advocated the use o f the
concept in a variety of contexts, including some which bear analytic similarities to contracts
of employment. See, e.g., George M. Armstrong & John C. LaMaster, Retaliatory Eviction
as Abuse of Rights: A Civilian Approach to Landlord-Tenant Disputes, 47 LA. L. REY. I
( 1 986); Julio Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 965, 1004 ( 1 975); Hunter C.
Leake, II, Comment, Abuse of Rights in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 426 (1933); Comment,
"At-will" Franchise Tenninations and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine-The Ma turation of
Louisiana law, 42 LA. L. REV. 210, 218 (1981); see also Onorato v. Maestri , 1 73 La. 375,
1 37 So. 66, 69 (193 1 ) (granting recovery to lease broker when lessor attempted to avoid
payment of commission by exercising legal right to rescind lease negotiated by broker, then
re-entering into similar lease with same prospective lessee).
23 1 .

By far the most common tort claim made by discharged employees has been the

allegation that their termination constituted "intentional infliction of emotional distress." It
would seem, however, that this tort is at best a problematic vehicle to remedy workplace
unfairness. The tort has been narrowly construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which
has articulated the legal standard as whether the defendant's actions were "so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."

White v.

Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1 205, 1 209 (La. 199 1 ) . Lower courts in this state have continued
this tradition of narrow interpretation, uniformly refusing to grant discharged at-will
employees any recovery based on claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

See, e.g . , Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat

Serv., Inc., 634 So. 2d 1 324, 1 325 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 994) (employee fired in retaliation
for his brother filing a workers' compensation claim); Massey v. G.B. Cooley Hosp., 593
So. 2d 460, 461 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 992) (employer made allegedly defamatory
statements about employee), judgment set aside, 6 1 6 S o . 2d 1 242 (La. 1993); Hammond v.
Medical Arts Group, Inc. , 574 So. 2d 521

(La. Ct.

App. 3 d Cir. 1 991) (nurse fired because

of failed sexual relationship with employer); Ballaron, 5 2 1 So. 2d at 48 1

(employer

attempting to force employee to give up rights against a third party) See generally Dennis
.

D. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at-will:

The Case

Against "Tortification " ofLabor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 ( 1 994).
232.

One court in Louisiana has indicated, though in dictum, that discharge of an at

will employee would be actionable if it contravened "an established social

policy."

Schulteiss v. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, 592 F. Supp. 628, 630 n.2
(W.D. La. 1984) (citing, inter alia, dictum from Wiley v. Missouri. Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d
1 0 1 6, 1019 n.7

(La.

Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (noting the imposition of a good faith

requirement in other states), writ denied, 431 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1 983))). The precedential

force of this d�ision is limited, however. The relevant language was only dictum, and the
court . s reasomng was based more on an analogy to federal maritime law than on an analysi s
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By contrast, it appears equally clear that o ther potential limi ts on the
ri ght to terminate employment-in particular, the requiremen t that all
obligations mus t be perfonned in good fai th-should apply to a t-wil1
e m ployment i n exactly the same way as they have applied to all o ther
agreements which are subject to termination at the will of the parties.

The Requirement of Good Faith

A.

One of the most fundamental principles of the Louisiana Civil
C ode is the basic requirement of "good fai th," a requiremen t which
applies to and g o v erns all contractual rela tions. The universality of
this principle is explicitly stated in the Code233 and has bee n
repeatedly reaffirmed by leading commentators.234
Louisiana Civil

C ode article

In particular,

1770 specifically states that the

o f Louisiana law. More i mportantly, the free-standing "public policy" exception which has
been adopted by some common-law courts also seems out of place in Louisiana. The Civil
Code does have an article which implicates such concepts o f public policy:
ARTICLE 7:

LAWS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST. Persons may

not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the
public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws i s an absolute nullity.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 7 (West 1987).

However, article 7 is limited by its terms to

"juridical acts" which derogate from "laws enacted" by the legislature.

Even if an

employment contract could be considered a juridical act, article 7 would not provide courts a
mandate to determine for themselves whether a particular termination violated "public
policy"; that policy could only be determined by reference to specific statutes.

As noted

above, the legislature has added "anti-discrimination" or "anti-retaliation" provisions to its
statutes in some cases, presumably where it deemed necessary. Judicial assertion of a
"public policy" exceptio n to employment at-will would amount to engrafting such a
provision onto a statute for which the legislature has declined to provide, something a
Louisiana court should not do. Cf Christopher Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy
Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TuL.
L. REV. 1583 (1994) (reviewing and analyzing "public policy" decisions from a variety of

common-law jurisdictions, and advocating its use in such jurisdictions).
233.

Articles 1 759 and 1983 provide the following:

ARTICLE 1 759:

Gooo FAITH. Good faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor

and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation.
ARTICLE 1983:

LAW FOR THE PARTIES; PERFORMANCE IN GOOD FAITH.

Contracts

have the effect of law for the parties and may be dissolved only through the
consent of the parties or on grounds provided by law. Contracts must be
performed in good faith.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN . arts. 1 759, 1 983 (West 1994).

234.

See, e.g., 5 SAUL LITVINOFF, LoU!SIANA Crvn. LAW TREATISE:

THE LAW OF

OBLIGATIONS § 1 .8, at 17 ( 1 992); ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LoUISJANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS

IN

A PRECIS 23 ( 1 993) (describing the obligation of good faith rooted in Roman
law, but raised to the status of an explicit Code provision by a process of induction-as one
GENERAL:

which ''underlies the entire law of obligations").
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obligation of good faith governs termination of contracts terminable
at will:
ARTICLE

1770. A

suspensive condition that depends solely on the

whim of the obliger makes the obligation null.

A resolutory condition that depends solely on the will of the obliger
must be fulfilled in good faith.

235

Clearly, the power of either the employer or the employee to
terminate an at-wi l l employment contract ends the employment

contract, and is thus a "resolutory condition " as that term is used in
article 1770. 236 This power to terminate the contract is also one

235.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 770 (West 1994). Although this article is new (it was

adopted in 1984), it was not intended to change the law.

Rather, it was a consolidation of

the substance of three predecessor articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870. The change
was necessary to avoid the confusion that had been i n troduced into the law by j udicial
misinterpretation and misuse of the concept of the "potestative condition." LA. Crv. CODE

ANN. art. 1 770, cmts. (a) & (e) (West 1994) . The 1 870 predecessors of current article 1 770
provided as follows:

ARTICLE 2024.

The potestative condition is that which makes the execution of

the agreement depend on an event which it is in the power of one or the other of
the contracting parties to bring about or to hinder.

ARTICLE 2034.

Every

obligation is null,

that

has been contracted,

on

a

potestative condition, on the part of him who binds hi mself.

ARTICLE 2035.

The last preceding article is limited to potestative conditions,

which make the obligation depend solely on the exercise of the obligor's will; but
if the condition be, that the obligor shall do or not do a certain act, though the
doing or not doing of the act depends on the will of the obligor, yet the obligation
depending on such condition, is not void.
Article 2024 was derived without substantial change from the Louisiana Civil Code of
1 825 and the Digest of 1 808.

Articles 2034 and 2035 were derived without substantial

change from the Code of 1 825, but had no equivalents in the Digest of 1 808. See LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. arts. 20 1 9 , 2029, 2030 ( 1 925); LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 , art. 70, at
272.
Prior to the enactment of current article 1 770,

an

extensive body of jurisprudence had

developed which was devoted to distinguishing "potestative" conditions which rendered
contracts null from other conditions which did not have such an effect.

These cases

generally reached results paralleling the distinction between "will" and "whim" articulated
in article 1770. See, e.g., Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F. 2d 998,
1 00 1 -03 (5th Cir. 1 982); State v. Laconco, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1 376, 1 385 (D. D . C . 1 977);
Franks v. Louisiana Health Servs. & Indemnity Co., 382 So. 2d 1 064, 1068 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1 9 80); Professional Billing Agency, Inc. v. Taranti n o , 350 So. 2d 258, 260

(La. Ct.

App.

4th Cir. 1 977); Lee Lumber Co., Ltd. v. International Paper Co., 321 So. 2d 244, 247 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 975). See generally Vernon Palmer & Andrew L. Plauche, Jr. , A Review
of the Louisiana Law on Potestative Conditions, 47 TUL. L. REV. 284 (1973).
236. Article 1 767 defines a "resolutory condition" as follows: "If the obligation may

be immediately enforced but will come to an end when the uncertain event occurs, the
condition is resolutory." Clearly, an "at-will" employment contract is one which will come

1 995]

EMPLOYMENT AT WIU

which depends on
employer,237

and
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the "will" rather than the "whim" of the

therefore does

not

render

the employment

agreement null . 238 Indeed, that power must be regarded as dependent
on the parties' "will" rather than their mere "whim" in order to avoid
rendering at-will employment contracts wholly illusory.239 Thus, the

to

an

end if and when

an

uncertain event, the decision o f either party to tenninate the

arrangement, occurs.
237.

The distinction between "whim" and "will," as those terms are used in articl e

1 770, i s explained i n the 1 984 Revision Comments:

An event w h i c h is left to the obligor's whim is one whose occurrence
depends entirely on his will, such as his wishing or not wishing something . .

An event is not left to

an

.

.

obligor's whim when it is one that he may or may not

bring about after a considered weighing of interests, such as his entering a
contract with a third party.
*

*

*

Thus, in the traditional example, an obligation to buy a house if the obligor
moves to Paris is valid rather than null because it is assumed that moving to Paris
or not will be decided according to serious reasons such as obtaining a position
there or securing admi ssion to a school in that city. It is assumed, in other words,
that the obligor will not decide not to move to Paris for the sole purpose of
deceiving the other p arty.
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1 77 0 revision cmts. (d) & (e) (West 1 987).
By this definition, the decision of an employer to fire an employee (or of an employee
to quit her job) is clearly a matter of "will" rather than "whi m."

For either party, the

termination of the agreement will have meaningful consequences: The employer will have
to find and train another employee or do without the services that the fired employee
performed, and the employee will have to secure another job, one which will involve
different terms and conditi o n s than the job she left. Thus, for both employer and employee.
the decision is one which w i l l ordinarily reflect a "considered weighing of interests" rather
than mere caprice.
238.

Cf

Long v. Foster & Assoc., 242 La. 295, 303, 1 36 So. 2d 48, 52 53 ( 1 962)
-

(holding that the inclusion o f a unilateral right in the employee to terminate on two weeks
notice did not constitute a potestative condition nullifying what was otherwise a fixed-term
contract of employment).
239.

Application of this principle to contracts termi nable at will-and the necessity o f

l i miting the right to terminate in this way in order to prevent the underlying obligation from
becoming illusory-is explained in comment

(f)

of the official Revision Comments

following article 1 770:
COMMENT (!). Under the second paragraph of this Article. a resolutory condition
that depends solely on the obligor's will must be fu l fi l led in good faith. but docs
not make the obligations null .

Thus, a "tenni nation at-wi ll" clause is not

necessarily null if the right to tenninate is exercised in good faith.
•

•

•

Practical reasons prevent the conclusion that a resolutory condition that
depends on the will of the obligor should always make the obligation null. Thus.
in a simple sale in which the vendee reserves the choice of paying the price or
returning the thing, it is clear that there is a resolutory condition that depends on
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decision to end any at-will contract, including an at-will employment
contract, must necessarily be governed by the second sentence of
article 1770 and its requirement that the power be exercised in "good
faith."240 The hard questions, however, lie in determining what this
requirement of "good faith" means, and how it should be applied in
the context of employment at will.
B.

Defining the Requirement of "Good Faith "
Remarkably, although the concept of "good faith" appears in

many places in the Louisiana Civil Code,241 the Code nowhere
attempts to define that term.

However, commentary and case law

provide a working definition of the elusive concept of "good faith. "
As Professor Litvinoff has recently noted, the concept of "good
faith" has both subjective and somewhat objective (or at least inter-

the will of the vendee, who is obligor of the obligation to pay the price. Neither
the contract nor the vendee's obligation is null in such a case, however.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 770 revision cmt. (t) (West 1 994).
240. Though the Revision Comments to the relevant provisions of the Louisiana
Code are not as explicit as one might wish, they appear to contemplate that the analysis and
results proposed here do apply to termination of contracts of employment at-will. Comment
(t) to article 1770 contains a specific cross-reference: "For employment contracts, see
Comment (C) to C.C. Article 2024." That comment (c), in tum, states that "a contract of
employment for an indefinite duration may be terminated at the will of either party." While
that statement may seem like little more than a tautological definition, it appears that the use
of the word "will" in comment (c) was advised and intentional and should be understood in
light of the distinction between "will" and "whim" articulated in article 1770.
To be sure, a few decisions can be found which reject application of article 1 770 to at
will contracts of employment. See, e.g., Frichter v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 620
F. Supp. 922, 927 (E.D. La. 1 985) (denying that a "duty to perform the at-will contract in
good faith create[s] in and of itself an expectation of employment security" and does not
limit an employer's power to fire at-will), aff'd, 790 F.2d 89 1 (5th Cir. 1 986). These cases
have, however, reached these results on the basis of the erroneous assumption that article
2747 requires that employment contracts be interpreted sui generis, rather than according to
ordinary coda! principles.
For an interesting comparison, see generally Note, Protecting At-Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Tenninate only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1 8 16 (1 980) (advocating application of a good-faith requirement for discharge of at-will
employees in common-law jurisdictions).
24 1 . A very partial but representative list might i nclude LA. Clv. CODE ANN. arts. 96
(civil effects of absolutely null marriage extended to party who entered into it in good faith);
488 (possessor in good faith of products has right to reimbursement of expenses); 523
(defining "good faith" in the context of transfer of moveables); 1 963 (contract made with
third party to prevent threatened injury may not be rescinded for duress if third party was in
good faith); and 3475 (prescriptive period of 10 (rather than 30) years for possessor of
property if "good faith [and] just title").
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subjective) components. Specifically, good faith requires the actor to
sincerely (even if erroneously) believe that he is acting according to
law, and that his actions comport with minimal standards of probity,
honesty, and loyalty to other parties to the contract.242 In the particular
context of conventional

obligations,

these underlying principles

suggest that a party to a contract is not free to pursue his individual
ends without regard for the interests of the other parties to the contract.
Rather, each

party is required to collaborate with other parties to
(f) to

facilitate attainment of their mutual ends.243 Revision Comment

242.

Litvinoff explains:
Although t h e words "good faith" are of very current use, and though they

are used on the general assumption that everybody u nderstands what they mean,
the fact is that the c oncept of good faith is not easy to define. It has been said that,
i n a legal context, good faith has a psychological and an ethical component. The
former would cons i st in a belief that one is acti n g according to the law, and is
designated as good faith-belief. The latter would consist in conducting oneself
according to moral standards, and is designated as good faith-probity, or good
faith-honesty, and i s germane to the ideas of loyalty and respect for the pledged
word. From the vantage point of the psychological component, it does not matter
if the belief is erroneous, provided that it is sincere. That is recognized in other
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code that, for particular purposes. define a
person's good faith as ignorance of the existence of the adverse interest of other
persons.

From the vantage point of the ethical c omponent, good faith provi<les

one of the opportun i ties in which moral ity meets with the law.
5 LITVINOFF, supra note 234, § 1 .8, at 1 7 .
These observations can help resolve some apparent confusion in the cases as to
whether the standard o f "good faith" in the Louisiana Civil Code is an ohjcc t i ve or
subjective one. Compare National Safe Corp. v. Benedict & Myrick, Inc., 3 7 1 So. 2t.I 792.
794-95

(La.

1 979) (ho l d i n g that the standard is objective, and party held t o have hreached

contract by inducing away key employees of other party. even though nothing i n t he
agreement specifically forbade such conduct) with Brill v. Catfish Shaks of Am
Supp. 1 035, 1 040-4 1

(E.D.

..

Inc . . 727 F

La. 1 989) (upholding a subjective standard). The t rut h arrears

to be that the requirement of "good fai th" can be viol ated either hy consciousness o f
wrongdoing or by grossly i n appropriate conduct.
243 .

As Professor Litvinoff has suggested:

[The principle of good faith is] general and should be applicable to all kinds of
obl igations, regardless of their origin. In the case of contracts, however. fu rther
elaboration of the principle is possible:

they should be pcrfonned according to

the parties ' intent and i n conformity with recognized standards of honesty anJ
loyalty.
The idea of good faith in conventional obligations may he conce i ved in a
li velier and more complex fashion . . . .

In modem times. the emphasis once

pl aced on the individual end pursued by each of the parties has been shifted to the
end pursued in common by all the parties. as if every contract were a j o i n t
venture-almost a partnership-where the idea o f opposed interests dividing the
parties yields to the idea of a certain union of interests among them. Thus. insofar
as the expected performance is concerned. the creditor is no longer

a

creditor
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article 1770 of the Code elaborates on these principles, explaining that
to be in good faith, a party exercising the power to terminate a c ontract
at will "should consider not only his own advantage but also the
hardship which the other party will be subjected to because o f the
tennination," and that "tennination because of purely personal rather
than business reasons c ould constitute bad faith."244
The meaning

o f good faith can

also be derived from an

e xamination of its c onverse, "bad faith."245

Louisiana Civil Code

articles 1996 and 1 997 distinguish good a n d bad faith for purp oses of
assessing damages for breach of contract. 246 Comment (b) to article

1 997

defines

"bad

faith"

narrowly

as

an

"intentional[]

and

without more; he also becomes a debtor with a duty of collaboration, an
obligation to cooperate in the attainment of mutual ends.

7 SAUL LITVINOFF, LOUISIANA CrvIL LAW TREATISE:
( 1 975).

OBLIGATIONS, BOOK 2 § 4, at 6-7

The concept of good faith has come to be i nterpreted similarly in common-law
jurisdictions as requiring both honesty in fact and faithfulness to the parties' common
purpose. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmts. (a) & (d) ( 1 98 1 ).

244. The revision comment to article 1770 states the following:
In order to comply with the requirement of good faith, a party exercising his right
to terminate a contract at-will should consider n o t only his own advantage, but
also the hardship which the other party will be subjected to because of the
termination. Thus, a party to a requirements contract that chooses to terminate it
because he has an opportunity to sell the same things elsewhere at a higher profit
could violate the good faith requirement if the other party cannot find an
alternative source of supply.

Likewise, termination because of purely personal

rather than business reasons could constitute bad faith.

LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 1 770, revision cmt. (f) (citations omitted).
245. Louisiana courts have construed the terms "good faith" and "bad faith" as
complementary terms. Any act which is not taken in good faith is necessarily in bad faith,
and vice versa. See, e.g., Bond v. Broadway, 607 So. 2d 865, 866-67 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.)
(adopting the definition of bad faith found in Black ' s Law Dictionary as the "opposite of
good faith generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud"), writ denied, 6 1 2
So. 2d 88 (La. 1 993).

Defining one of these terms thus necessarily serves to define the

other.

246. Articles 1 996 and 1 997 provide the following:
Article 1996. Obligor in good faith. An obligor i n good faith is liable only for the
damages that were foreseeable at the time the contract was made.
Article 1997. Obligor in bad faith. An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the
damages, foreseeabl e or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to
perform.

LA. Crv. CODE ANN . arts. 1 996, 1 997. These articles are new but were not intended to make
any substantive change to the Jaw. They reproduce the substance of article 1 934( 1 ) of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, quoted at note 248, infra.
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malicious[)" failure to perform an obligation.247
article

1934( 1) of the 1 870 Louisiana Civil Code,
articles 1996 and 1 997 were derived, defines

1 593
Similarly, former
from which current
"bad faith" as "a

designed breach of [the contract] from some motive of interest or ill
will."248

However, case law interpreting these concepts has made it

clear that a showing of bad faith does not necessarily require a
showing that the defendant's conduct was intentional ; rather, other
types of "gross fault" may suffice.249

C.

Applying the Duty of "Good Faith " to Termination ofAt- Will
Employees
This definitio n of the obligation of "good faith" appli e s with

ful l force to a party's exercise of contractual rights.

Thi s i ncludes

situations where a contract allows one or both parties to exercise
discretion with respect to particular terms, such as an at-will
employment contract. It is, i n other words, n o contradiction i n terms
to say that a party to a contract exerc ised a contractual right, but did

so in bad faith .
247.

Comment (b) to article 1 997 stat es the fol lowing:

COMMENT

(B). An

obligor is i n bad faith i f he i n tentionally and maliciously fa i l s

Lo perform h i s obligation.
LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 1 997, revision cm t. (h) (West 1 994 ) .
248.

Article 1 934 provided the following:

Article 1 9 34.

I . when the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or had faith. he i s l 1 ahk
only for such damages as were contemp huc d .

or

may reasonably he supposed

have entered into t h e contemplation of the parties at the time of the ro111r;1c1

In

By

bad faith in this and the next rule is not meant the mere breach of faith i n 1101
.

complying with the contract. hut

;1

designed breach of it from some motive nf

interest or ill w i l l .
LA. Clv. CooE ANN. art. 1 934 (West 1 992).

Though former article 1 934 was repealed. Louisiana courts co11111111c l o hold t h;11 ;11l 1L·k
1 934 explains the meaning of current anicle 1 997. S1'<'. e.g . AAA B ril·k \. City ol
C arencro, 640 So. 2d 483 ( La. Ct. App. 3 J Cir.) ( relying on the languai:e of formn a rt i c l e
1 934 t o interpret current article 1 997). 11"1"it dl'!licd. 64 2 S o . 2J S 7 0 ( La. 1 99.f l : Wi l 1 1 ;1111. ' \.
.

Coe, 4 1 7 So. 2d 426 (La. Ct. App. ! st Cir. 1 982) (sarrn: l.
249.

As the Louisiana Supreme Cou rl has suggested:
Although it i s clear that "bad faith" or "lack o f good faith" 111 t h i s nH1lnl

means something more reprehensible t h a n ord111ary negligence. 1mprudt'rll"c or
want of ski l l . it is apparent that our courts have pcrccl \ ed the tenn

In

mc:lude

some fonns of gross fau l t as well as intentional and mahrnius fa i lure s h > perfnrrn
Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co. . 5 5 7 So. 2<l 966. %9 ( Lt 1 990)
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The point here is subtle but important. It is certainly true that the
statutory duty to perform obligations in good faith generally cannot
give parties rights inconsistent with the express terms
contract.250

of their

However, this does not mean that one must show a

violation of a specific contract term in order to show a violatio n of the
While certain language in article 1 997 and the

duty of good faith.
to

Comments

that

article

could

be

to

read

imply

such

an

i nterpretation,251 this view is too myopic.
Several reasons support this conclusion. First, the articles which
impose the obligation of good faith, articles 1 759 and 1 983, are
located in sections of the Louisiana Civil Code which purport to
establish general principles for the interpretation of all contracts.252 By
contrast, article 1 997 is located in a section of the Code which is
concerned

solely

with

a

single,

limited

issue-calculation

of

damages.253 This location strongly suggests that article 1 997 was not
intended to operate as a general limit on the applicability of the
principle of good faith established elsewhere in the Code. Second, any
interpretation of "bad faith" which would require a breach of a specific
250. See, e.g. , Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F. 2 d 480, 485
(5th Cir. 1984); Bonanza Int'!, Inc. v. Restaurant Management Consultants, Inc., 625 F.
Supp. 1 43 1 , 1448 (E.D. La. 1 986). In exceptional circumstances, however, when one party
attempts to make use of the terms of a contract in an obviously unfair way, courts have found
a breach of the duty of good faith even though the contract purported to pennit the
defendant to do what he did.

See, e.g., Andrus v. Cajun Insulation Co., 524 S o . 2d 1 239

(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 988). In Andrus, leased mobile telephone equipment had from the
beginning been so defective as to not serve the purposes for which it was purchased. Id. at

1 240.

The court denied the lessor's claim for delinquent rent even though the lease

agreement

contained

merchantability.

express

Id. at 1 245.

language

disclaiming

all

warranties

of

fitness

or

The court held that, despite the language purporting to

disclaim warranties, the duty to provide merchantable goods is correlative to the obligation
to pay rent, and that it would amount to a violation of the duty of good faith imposed by the
predecessor of current article 1 983 to simultaneously demand rent and disclaim all
warranties. Id. at 1239-45. Other Louisiana courts, h owever, have reached contrary results
on similar facts. See, e.g., Louisiana Nat'! Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv. , Inc., 377 So. 2d 92
(La. 1 979); First Continental Leasing Corp. v. Howard, 6 1 8 So. 2d 642, 645 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 1993).

25 1 . Both article 1 997, quoted at nr>te 248, supra, and comment (c) to that article
state that an obligor in bad faith is liable for all damages caused by his "failure to perform."
That terminology could be interpreted to require a failure to perform some particular
contractual obligation as a prerequisite to a finding of bad faith.

252. Article 1759 is l ocated in Book III, Title III, Chapter 1 of the Civil Code, a
Article 1 983 i s
located in Book III, Title VI, Chapter 8 , Section I , a section devoted t o explicating the

chapter entitled "General Principles" applicable to obligations in general.
"General Effects of Contracts."

253. LA. Civ. CODE ANN . bk. III, tit. IV, ch. 8, § 4 (entitled "Damages".)
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contractual term, or which would make the requirement of good faith
inapplicable to exercises of discretion contemplated by a contract,
would be inconsistent with Louisiana Civil Code article

1770. Article

1 770 expressly makes resolutory conditions dependent on the will of
the obliger subj ect to the requirements of good faith.254

Such

an

interpretation woul d also contradict a line of Louisiana authority which
has found a violation of the duty of good faith, or its equival ent , even
though the defendant's conduct did not violate any express term of the
contract255 or involved

an

issue which the contract expressly left to the

d efendant's discretion.256 Finally, such a crabbed interpretation of the

254.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 770.

255.

See, e.g., National Safe Corp. v. Benedict & Myrick, Inc., 371 So. 2d 792 (La.

1 979).

In National Safe, the defendant had solicited the plaintiff to become the exclusive

Louisiana distributor of the defendant's products.

The defendant later termin ated the

distributorship agreemen t with the plaintiff, without cause, and gave the business to a new
partnership formed by one o f the defendant's officers and one of the plaintiff's employees.
Although this course of conduct violated no express term of the distributorship agreement,
the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the defendant violated the underlying obligation of
good faith imposed by the Civil Code on all contracts by offering inducements to key
employees of its contract partner. Id. at 795; see also Azar v. Shilstone, 607 So. 2d 699, 70 I

(La.

Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 992) (holding that individual who was both the majority shareholder

and major creditor of a business violated the duty of good faith by, inter alia, structuring a
sale of the business in a form that would unfairly benefit himself (by taking most of the
purchase price in the form of payment for a personal covenant not to compete) rather than in
a form that would equitably benefit minority shareholders).
256.

See, e.g., Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 13 53 (La. 1 977).

In

Morse, an employer sought to avoid payment of deferred compensation to an at-will

employee by firing that employee before his entitlement to that deferred compensation could
vest. id. at 1 359. The court ordered compensation paid anyway, relying on former Civil
Code article 2040, which provides that a "cond ition is considered as fu lfilled, when
fulfillment of it has been prevented by the party bound to perform it." The court noted that
former article 2040 was subject to an exception when the party which prevents performance
does so through the exercise of a legal right. Id. at 1 3 59-60. However, the court refused to
apply that exception in the case before it on the ground that termination of an at-wi ll
empl oyee, without cause, solely to prevent vesting o f such deferred compensation,
constituted

an

abuse of right. Though the court did not explicitly analyze the case in terms

of the requirement of good faith, the analogy between concepts of ''bad faith" and "abuse of
rights" is evident.

The Morse case is discussed, and its impl ications explored. in Note.

Obligations-Deferred Compensation Supplemental Awards & Pension Plans. 52 Tut.. L.

REV. 427 ( 1 978); see also Onorato v. Maestri, 1 73 La. 375, 1 37 So. 67 ( 1 93 1 ). The plai nt i ff
in Onorato was a broker who arranged a fifteen year commercial lease in return for a
commission. The lease contained a clause which gave the owner the right to terminate that
l ease if certain events occurred.

The owner took advantage of that clause to resc ind the

original lease and then entered into replacement leases with the original lessee-a sequence
which had the effect of reestablishing essentially the same relations between owner and
lessee, while depriving the plaintiff of his commission.

Id. at 378. 1 37 So. at 68. As in
_
Morse, the court held that the condition for the payment of the comrmss1on should be
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applicability of the duty of good faith would have the perverse effect of
reducing a fundamental principle of contract law to a virtual nullity. If
violating a specific contract term were required, plaintiffs could i n all
cases base their suit solely on the alleged breach of that term.
Additional allegations that the breach

was

in bad faith would be

deemed irrelevant to any issue on the merits.
What then does the requirement of good faith mean, as applied i n
the specific context o f terminating at-will employees? At the outset, it
must be emphasized that a requirement of "good faith" in discharges
of at-will employees is not the same as a requirement of "good c ause"
for such a discharge. The absence of any requirement of good cause
for termination of at-will employment is clearly implicit in Civil Code
articles 2749 and 2750, which impose liability for discharge or
cessation of work in the absence of "good cause" only for fixed-term
employment.257
The distinction between good faith and good cause may not be
easy to pin down.

For example, if an employer fired an employee

because that employer sincerely but erroneously believed that an
employee was disloyal, such a discharge would likely not constitute
good cause. It might well, however, constitute good faith, at least if
the employer was not reckless in believing and acting as he did.
Termination on such facts would seem to s atisfy both the "subjective"
and the somewhat more "objective" tests for good faith.

The

employer's sincere belief satisfies the first criterion. The second prong
is also met because society generally recognizes that termination on
the basis of an employee's apparent disloyalty does not demonstrate
lack of probity, honesty, or loyalty, and does not indicate self-interest
or ill will. Likewise, the case law provides a number of examples in
which terminations were not made for "good cause," but were
nevertheless made

in

"good faith":

termination of an

engineer

employed by the outgoing governing board of the harbor and terminal
258 a
di strict in part so that the new board could hire their own engineer;
medical corporation's termination of a physician employee because

considered satisfied, under the authority of former Civil Code article 2040. While the owner
acted within his legal rights in rescinding the original lease, thus preventing the plaintiff
from completing the conditions for payment of his commission, the court found, in effect,
that his acts were in bad faith. Id. at

257.
258.

382, 137 So. 2d at 69.

See text accompanying supra note 220.

Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 602 So. 2d 704 (La.

1 992).
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she failed to apply for staff privileges at a local hospital;259 or an
employee's act of leaving employment in part because of a personal
desire to avoid travel.260
Nonetheless, while the requirement of "good faith" is not the
same as the requirement of "good cause," applying the general duty of
good faith to termination of at-will employees would have important
consequences for the l aw of Louisiana. In particular, the duty of good
faith, if enforced as it should be in the context of employment at will,
would serve to eliminate many of the most egregious abuses spawned
by the current absolutist view of the at-will rule. For example, it was
held in Gil v. Metal Service Corp. , that the Louisiana doctrin e of
employment at will barred any cause of action on behalf of an at-will
employee who was fired solely because he refused to actively
participate in the employer's attempts to perpetrate fraud.261 If the case
had instead been analyzed in accord with the duty of good faith that
underlies all contracts, the employer's act could readily be seen as
motivated by a lack of "honesty" and "loyalty" toward the employee,
as placing an unjustifiable hardship on that employee, and as
motivated by an illicit self-interest or ill will on the part of the
employer. Such a violation of the duty of good faith then would-as it
should have in Gil-give rise to a cause of action for damages in favor
of the discharged employee. Similarly, recognition of a duty of good
faith would have led to very different results in Walther v. National Tea
262
in which the Fifth Circuit relied on Louisiana's absolutist view
Co. ,
of employment at will to absolve an employer who tenninated an at
will employee solely to prevent the vesting of the employee's pension
261
benefits. In Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat Service, Inc.
and

259.

Prevosc v. Eye Care & Surgery Ctr 635 So. 2 d 765 (La. Ct. App. I st Cir. ). 11.,./1
.•

dn1ied, 639 So. 2d 1 1 61! (La. 1 994).
260.

Sell v. Department of Employment S ec . 499 So. 2d 1 28 5. 1 286-87 (I .a. Ct. App.
,

4th Cir. 1 986).
26 1 .
1 982).
262.

4 1 2 So. 2d 706. 708 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. ) , writ dl'llii'll, 4 1 4 So. 2d 3 7') ( La .
848 F.2d 5 1 8 ( 5t h Cir. 1 9 88) ;

see

al.10 Hill

v.

M i ssouri Pac. Ry. . 8 F. Supp. 80.

8 1 (W.D. La. 1 9.� 3) (holding that a claim that an employer d i scharged an employee lo avoid

payi ng pension hcnefits stated no cause of action, de s p i t e employer's promise to emp l o y
worker "until such time as he retired on a full pension''); Williams
So. 2d 1 006, 1009 (La. Ct. App. 41h Cir. 1 99 1 ) (same).
263.

634 So. 2d

I 324. I 321! (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 994 ).

v.

li.1uro Infi rmary. 578
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Woodson

v.

Alarm Protection Services, Inc. ,264 the courts found no

viable claim could be asserted against an employer who punished an
employee who filed claims for compensation for work-related injuries
by firing that employee's relative and spouse. In Martinez v. Behring s
Bearings Service, Inc. ,265 the court found no cause of action under state
law for an at-will employee who was fired in retaliation for exercising
the legal right to file

a

complaint to the Wage and Hour Division of the

United States Department of Labor.

In all of these cases, the employer's decision to terminate
employment clearly failed to meet the minimal requirements of
honesty and loyalty toward the employee that are the bedrock of "good
faith."

In each case, the employer did act out of illicit motives,

attempting to secure an improper advantage in "bad faith."

In each

case, the law should have permitted, consistent with the requirement of
good faith, appropriate relief for the wronged employee.

V.

CONCLUSION
Louisiana courts ' virtually absolute interpretation of the rule of

employment at will h as let serious abuses by employers to go
unrectified.

The most egregious of these results are not, however,

mandated by anything i n the Louisiana Civil Code. On the contrary,
the Code, properly interpreted, contemplates a cause of action in
favor of a discharged at-wmcemployee whenever the termination was
not carried out in "good faith ."
Over the last thirty years, litigants and courts have justified the
absolutist view of employment at will, and its attendant hardships, as
mandated by the terms of Louisiana

Civil Code article

2747.

However, the derivation and history of article 2747 makes clear that
the article was never intended to apply to the generality of employees.
Rather, that article was written and intended as a very narrow
exception to the ordinary rules applicable to employment, an exception
which should properly be applied only to

an

extremely limited class of

household and personal servants.
Since article 2747 does not apply, the rights and duties of most at
will employees should be determined according to the codal principles

264.

53 1

So. 2d 542, 543-44 (La. Ct. App. Sth Cir.), writ denied,

501

F.2d 104, 1 05 (5th Cir. 1974).

1 988).
265.

533

So. 2d 358 (La.
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applicable to all other contracts terminable at will. First among these
general principles is the duty of "good faith," which the Code makes
applicable to all contracts, including contracts tenninable at will, and
to all exercises of contractual rights, including exercising an option to
terminate a contract at will. If applied, as it should be, to at-will
employment contracts, this duty of good faith would pennit Louisiana
to retain the substance of the rule of employment at will, while ridding
the system of its worst abuses.

